CONFERENCE REPORT.

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LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

CONARC 1973

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Leadership Conference, CONARC 1973:

TRAINING
TO LEAD

Leadership Conference, CONARC 1973: Training to Lead, 14-18 May 1973.

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UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL

FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

14-18 MAY 1973

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WELCOME

MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS M. TARPLEY

COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL

On behalf of the staff, faculty and students of the Infantry School and members of the Infantry Center, it is a pleasure to welcome you to Fort Benning as participants in the Infantry School's Leadership Seminar/Workshop.

Your current role as leadership and management instructors in the CONARC service schools is, in my opinion, one of the most sensitive and important assignments any officer/noncommissioned officer can have in the United States Army. What you teach will have not only a lasting impact on the students who attend these courses at our service schools, but ultimately will affect their competence in decisions, management practices, and application of the leadership principles. Your collective efforts in improving our programs of instruction will set the tone of leadership for many young leaders who will be assuming such positions of responsibility as platoon sergeant, first sergeant, platoon leader, and company commander.

As we seek to revitalize the leadership in our Army, let's remain mindful of the fact that unlike most institutions in the United States, leadership is our primary tool. And lest we forget, there are many great Army officers who have guided our men into the finest fighting force in the world. We can learn from their contributions, their mistakes, their successes.

SEMINAR PURPOSE

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM R. RICHARDSON

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL

Gentlemen, we are very delighted to have you here. We feel this seminar is very beneficial from several standpoints. As the doctrinal proponents for leadership in the Army, we are very anxious to see where we are today and where we need to go. So, we encourage your active participation in the five-day workshop and we think it will be fruitful for all of us.

In past conferences that we have attended, most of us have usually found ourselves listening, thinking, may be taking a few notes, and then departing with some enrichment from a personal and professional standpoint. Sometimes though, it's difficult to measure the type of achievement, or what we get out of a conference of this sort, or one of shorter duration. The investment of time, however, has usually been productive. We think there should be no difference in this particular conference for the five-day period. In a sense, this is quite different because it is a partially structured conference. By this structure, we are trying to give you an opportunity to do some stimulating thinking and provide you an opportunity to interact with each other. The entire conference represents a group of people who have been in the leadership business for a while and have a variety of ideas. This is great, and is as it should be. Attendees include representatives from Department of the Army all the way throughout the CONUS structure, to include representatives from overseas, as well as from institutions in the other service. We feel that we have a broad spectrum of experience from which we can build for better leadership in the future.

So, during this period we want to examine our current programs of instruction, determine our doctrine for leadership, and then decide how we should change our programs of instruction to insure that they are current, and compatible with the real world needs of junior officers and noncommissioned officers.

We take, as a tack, "Training to Lead," and there is a direct interrelationship between training and leading. You can always look at the great trainers in the Army and you can find that these professionals have been tremendous leaders. There is a direct correlation and I hope we can find that. The specific four purposes that we hope to accomplish at this conference are indicated in your workshop schedule, but let me briefly touch on them.

The first purpose is to try to consider the future requirements of Army leadership. We know that small unit leaders will have at their disposal, now and in the future, greatly improved means for accomplishing their missions whether they are in combat arms or noncombat arms. Obviously, all units will have forces of powerful destructive means which would affect the leadership on the battlefield. Leadership, in this day and time, is also important in a garrison environment as we have discussed both in the states and overseas. This is a point on which we need to focus, in terms of where we are for the future of Army leadership, especially at the small unit level. In this situation, the role of the individual soldier--a new soldier that we know is different from the one 20, 15, even 10 years ago-- needs to be part of this equation: how we should lead him right now in a training/garrison situation, as well as in the future, in a combat, stressful situation. We need to know something about the small unit leaders, his composition, his education, his background, his values, his attitudes, and how we can best apply him in our equation for leadership. Then how we can go about training him properly. We need to know how the soldier will act alone, and how he will act in a group response to the increasing challenges that face him, and the stresses that occur on a battlefield.

We have experience here in this group of instructors who saw good leadership in combat. Hopefully, the measure of that experience will be part of this forum from which we can derive some ideas as to how we should lead better in combat. But much of this question of the future lies in how we train our young men, both those that are the led and those that are the leaders, for the situations which occur in peace or war. Therefore, we are concerned about the competency of our leadership, its effectiveness, and how we can apply our combat power in the best possible way. So in short, we are trying to assess the climate of leadership today and in the future. If we have shortfalls today, which I think we do, we must point those out, determine what those shortfalls are in some specificity, and then apply a program that meets them head on--not in a peripheral sense, not in too much of a theoretical sense, but in a very active and practical sense.

The second purpose is to exchange ideas and information relevant to Army leadership and management programs of instruction throughout the service school system. As I have previously stated, we are responsible for the programs of instruction throughout the training base, both those that occur at service schools and those that are applicable in the training centers. We hope, during this portion of the seminar/workshop, that the ideas germinating from many of you who have been out teaching, can be brought to bear in a form from which we can derive some understanding of the shortfalls which currently exist and where we need to go. This interfacing will not only be an examination of information relevant to the United States Army, but it will give us an opportunity to discuss with the other services their leadership programs of instruction so that we can gain some very fruitful ideas from them. And again, to stress an important point, what we teach must be relevant. It must be meaningful and useful. It must have direct application to the need. I would caution, that we must watch exactly the proper balance between theory and the performance objectives that are now stated for training purposes. In the latter instance, this is generally the way we describe a program of instruction. And, I think it's pertinent here in leadership--a very intangible subject, but one that nevertheless has application--if we can define the performance objectives in leadership instruction, I think we'll be well ahead in being able to then prescribe exactly what we ought to teach and how we ought to teach the subject material.

The third purpose of this conference is to examine current leadership doctrine and the direction of Army leadership. In this respect, you will be receiving some significant information from our guest speakers, particularly Brigadier General Robert Gard, Lieutenant General Melvin Zais, and Colonel Bob Rollier. From these men you will obtain some new ideas on leadership and doctrine. Brigadier General Gard has a top position on the Army Staff as Director of the Human Resources Development. General Zais has been one of our finest leaders in the Army over the years. Colonel Rollier, as a field commander, has been exemplary in his leadership. From these men and other guest speakers we hope to get insight, motivation, and methods of how to better train the junior officers and noncommissioned officers.

What exactly do we need to do? Again, it seems to me from the discussion which will emerge from forthcoming presentations that we have to decide or try to define for ourselves, the proper balance between the behavioral aspects and the applicatory phases of leadership. This is a very gut problem. I hope we can wrestle with this and be satisfied with our conclusions.

The fourth and final purpose is interrelated with the background of the first three steps--to be able to revise and come up with programs of instruction for leadership that would be applicable for training future leaders.

During the first phase of the seminar/workshop, you will be primarily listening, maybe taking notes, and exchanging some ideas. We welcome you to express yourself at any time, when given the opportunity to by the moderator. Stand up and express your point of view. Maybe it's institutional, maybe it's personal, but in any sense, it is an idea which we can discuss, banter about, consider, either reject or adopt. We need the ideas from each one of you and I encourage you to stand up and discuss them. The second phase will be one of worker involvement. It's during this short period of time that you will be working together, examining and revising the programs of instruction at the four levels. This latter is a period of time in which you will get down to what we refer to as the "nitty gritty" in order to define precisely how and what we should instruct.

So, in summary, this week can be a very fruitful one, and I hope you will feel very free to contribute your ideas and to question us who write the manuals, prepare the subject schedules, and propose the training programs to CONARC and Department of the Army. Among all the members of the seminar/workshop, we should come up with a far better program for leadership instruction for junior officers and noncommissioned officers.

Again, on behalf of General Tarpley, I welcome all of you to the school, and we stand ready to assist you in any way we can while you are here. Thank you.

INTRODUCTION

Lieutenant Colonel Nathan C. Vail
Chairman, Command Leadership Committee
Leadership Department, USAIS

We at the Infantry School, have looked forward to this conference, not just out of a sense of responsibility as CONARC's proponent for leadership, but an obvious need for us--The Army--to settle on an instructional approach to leadership. Then and only then can we establish meaningful programs of instruction, and train our officers and noncommissioned officers to become effective leaders. Then, we can go about the business of training to lead with clarity and a high sense of purpose.

Feedback from commanders in the field and coordination with DA, CONARC, and other service schools clearly reveal widely diverging views on:

-The proper direction of leadership in the Army.

-How much time should be devoted to formal instruction in service schools on leadership.

-And the biggest issue of all--how much attention should be given to theory--the human behavior aspects of leadership versus practical methods and techniques--or the content.

During this conference we hope to come to grips with these issues, and we will revise our model leadership programs of instruction for both the officer and NCO basic and advanced levels accordingly.

Before describing the specific objectives of this Seminar/Workshop, I think a brief description of our proponent responsibilities coupled with a summary of events leading to this conference will provide a fuller understanding of our approach. As CONARC's proponent for leadership, we consider these our major responsibilities:

1. Plan, develop, monitor, and evaluate leadership and leader indoctrination training in basic combat and advanced individual training, CONARC Service Schools, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps.

2. Plan, prepare, revise and review FM 22-100, training circulars, special instructional texts, information pamphlets, training films, unit training educational courses, and MOS proficiency tests.

3. Maintain liaison with other service schools, military and civilian research agencies and educational institutions, and the Department of the Army in the development of leadership material.

I can assure you that the time devoted to our responsibilities in developing lesson outlines, publications, TV tapes, and training films for CONARC distribution far exceeds the time devoted to our resident instruction.

STUDIES

Our proponent responsibilities in leadership have been greatly increased since major research efforts were completed during FY 71 and FY 72.

The first of these research projects was conducted by the U.S. Army War College to study the climate of professionalism in the Army. The results of this study revealed that the existing professional climate was quite different from the idealized climate that we desire.

This study of professionalism was followed by another Army War College study dealing directly with the application of leadership. The study was based on the proposition that all levels of leadership would recognize and honor the terms of the "Informal Contract" to increase the effectiveness of the Army. The Informal Contract is an unwritten agreement between the Army and the individual who enters the Service. Each share expectations that must be met.

The Army expects proficiency and discipline from the individual, and the individual likewise, expects fairness, worthwhile work and adequate salary.

The leader contributes to the success or failure of the "Informal Contract" and plays the decisive role. If he is successful, the yields are loyalty, dedication, and support from the soldier. We use the Informal Contract, coupled with the concept of leadership, as the broad framework for all leadership instruction.

While these studies were in progress, the Infantry School was concurrently studying and developing instruction to present to our local leaders as well as Infantry School students on the need to adjust our styles of leadership to lead our young soldiers. This study resulted in the development of a 7-hour program of instruction entitled "Leadership for Professionals." We began presenting this class to all Post personnel in the grade of E5 through 06 on 3 February 1971. This class is presently conducted on a quarterly basis for all newly assigned personnel.

Then it was determined by the former Chief of Staff, General Westmoreland, that a more comprehensive leadership study could be conducted if an Army level leadership board was established. The CONARC Commanding General was directed to organize a board to collate and expand the studies being conducted by the U.S. Army War College and the Infantry School.

The CONARC Leadership Board developed recommendations and ways to improve upon our current leadership climate within the Army. From these I have selected significant findings to inform you of what has been done or is being done to raise the level of leadership in the Army.

One rather all-encompassing CONARC Board finding was that leadership instruction in service schools is inadequate to meet current and future needs of the Army.

An initial step by the Infantry School to shore-up this shortcoming was a workshop conducted during April 1972 here at Fort Benning, to develop model leadership programs of instruction for the officer and NCO basic and advanced levels. The workshop was attended by representatives of selected service schools. Following that workshop, our Leadership Department prepared packets containing the model programs of instruction, lesson outlines, and related instructional aids. These have been made available to Army service schools for use as school commandants deem appropriate.

With regard to another major finding that leadership instruction in ROTC detachments needs additional support, we will conduct a 4-day workshop for some 150 ROTC instructors here at Fort Benning at the end of this month. The purpose of that workshop will be to demonstrate how and what we teach in the subject areas of interpersonal communications, ethics and discipline, counseling, and human behavior and provide them with related instructional materials. The ROTC instructor workshop will be expanded to three weeks beginning the summer of 1974.

Another major conclusion of both the Army War College and CONARC Leadership Board studies was the need for increased emphasis on the human behavior aspects of leadership, which requires that service schools have more instructors trained in human behavior. As a direct result of that finding, the Infantry School was tasked to arrange for a two-week Leadership Instructor Development Seminar at the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) at Greensboro, N.C. The primary purpose of that Seminar was formal instruction in behavorial science theories for CONARC service school leadership instructors. Some 42 instructors representing most CONARC service schools attended.

Because of the success of the Instructor Development Seminar at CCL, CONARC then directed the Infantry School to conduct two follow-on seminars in FY 73, the first of these was another Instructor Development Seminar--held at Wichita State University in the Center for Human appraisal and Communications Research, under the direction of Doctor Arthur Sweney. Most CONARC service schools were represented among the 45 instructors who attended the three two-week Seminars that began during January 1973 and ended 3 March.

Needless to say, these Instructor Development Seminars proved highly successful in educating our instructors in prominent behavioral science theories. They stimulated much thought and additional research as service school instructors sought to become better informed about the human dimensions of leadership. Those who were fortunate enough to attend those seminars certainly have a better grasp of the interpersonal functions of leadership.

But obviously much of the human behavior theory being produced by the academic community does not have direct application to a system of regimentation such as ours. And that concerns just one serious task before us--translating applicable portions of those theories to add to our already established practical methods and techniques of leadership.

The board also recognized the need for better counseling instruction in service schools and a practical counseling manual. As to the first part of the finding, all CONARC service schools have been directed to incorporate counseling in leadership programs of instruction. In response to the need for a counseling manual, the Infantry School will complete the first draft of FM 22-101, Leadership Counseling, this month. Because of a recent change to the regulation governing Army publications, the manual will be published as a test version concurrent with field review. Under that system, hopefully we will get a FM in the field by the end of this summer.

The need for a revised Leadership Field Manual has been satisfied. It is now being readied for publication at DA and should be in the field by July of this year. An advance copy will be provided each of you for use during the workshop phase.

As you can see, much has been done and is being done to improve leadership in the Army. But we think it is both timely and important to address a rather disturbing trend or attitude toward the subject of leadership in the Army today.

First, we seem inclined on a self-fulfilling prophecy that is based on an apparent notion that the Army is possessed of incompetent leaders. While there is evidence of a climate of leadership that can be and should be improved, nothing is farther from the truth. The history of the Army, through and including recent history, is replete with many successes, not the least of which is the fact that we haven't lost any wars. Close inspection of those successes clearly reveals well-known and not so well-known professional soldiers, officers and NCO's alike, whose successes can be directly attributed to a trained, expert ability to deal with men, and an obvious high regard for their men.

Secondly, we seem to have found it necessary in recent years to turn to the academic community to solve our leadership problems. We should not lose sight of the fact that the Army has initiated considerable in-house research on the subject of leadership with many useful studies conducted. Just after World War I, in 1918, Major L. M Terman, acting on behalf of the War Department, psychologically examined all members of the Army excepting field and general grade officers. Tests were used as an absolute guide to meet the requirements of the Service, to include identifying leaders. Later, in 1920, when individual intelligence was analyzed by branch, Majors Yoakum and Yerkes reported a very high correlation between intelligence and leadership. As a matter of interest, present day IQ tests trace their way back to the Army's Alpha Test for literates, administred in the WWI time frame.

During World War II, Crawford and McClellan edited the results of psychology in the Army Air Corps at Lackland Field and published a multi-volume synopsis. Most of that psychological testing was directed toward assessment, personnel selection for MOS and skills, and identification of potential leaders. Subsequently, the personnel research board in the office of the Adjutant General of the Army (a forerunner of BESRL), HUMRRO, Office of Strategic Services (Assessment Staff) did much work in the leadership area, and of course, the U.S. Military Academy has done considerable research on leadership.

That research effort has been continued and intensified in recent years as I described earlier, and it has produced a storehouse of knowledge by us, about ourselves, not yet fully exploited--a storehouse of knowledge based on the views and experiences of military practitioners which adds significantly to its usefulness.

It is notable, for example, that the long used principles of leadership which evolved from the Army's study and practice of leadership over the years, were recently upheld by the AWC leadership study to be valid. But an equally significant part of that conclusion was our failure to apply those principles. This suggests that we're still not very successful at instructing the student in leadership skills, or in applicable methods and techniques. Whether they be interpersonal skills or assessing the leadership climate using the variables and indicators of leadership, perhaps we need to spend more time and effort teaching the principles rather than their theoretical bases.

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Thus, with this Seminar, we are redirecting our attention to instructional development, hopefully more effective instruction that will better train our junior leaders to lead, will be the end result of this conference.

As you know, we have a seminar phase and a workshop phase.

During the seminar phase we are fortunate to have guest speakers who will help us to focus on the direction of leadership in the Army, the significant results of Army leadership studies conducted in recent years, a synthesis of behavioral science theories and their application to Army leadership, educational techniques to move the message of leadership, and finally a review of leadership problems at the small unit level and specific techniques to minimize those problems. We have made heavy and deliberate use of experienced and accomplished officers to assist us in keying on leadership problems in the Army. And as you've observed, we've asked that representatives of the other services inform us of their approach to training small unit leaders. I'm sure we all look forward to their presentations.

The seminar phase will culminate in a discussion of the need to and the means for pulling leadership and management together. There persists a conflict between the schools of leadership and management thought, principally because leadership, the way we have taught it traditionally, has involved more than just man-management, as the British would put it. It has involved the effective use of all resources, particularly at the unit level. Similarly, management programs of instruction have addressed the use of all available resources: men, money, materiel, and time.

There is an obvious need to pull together the subjects of leadership and management. While we recognize that to do so constitutes a sizeable task, that simply cannot be done in the time we've allotted at this conference. We do hope to stimulate thinking in a direction that will make the instructional approaches to these two important subjects more compatible. Specifically, during the short time allotted on the third day we intend to get your views, by way of small group discussions, on what should be the doctrine of Army management considering Army leadership doctrine; and secondly, to develop a scope of management instruction for the basic and advanced levels of officer and NCO programs of instruction. We look forward to a meaningful exchange that will leave us with a better understanding of a balanced approach to leadership and management instructional programs.

At the beginning of the fourth day, we will have each of the groups present for the consideration of all, the results of their discussions.

During the workshop phase, our primary purpose is to reevaluate the goals and training objectives for each of the four levels of leadership programs of instruction with the objective of restructuring them to address current and future leadership needs, and to incorporate the experienced views expressed during the seminar phase. The advance copy of FM 22-100 will aid in alignment of training objectives with the organization and content of the new FM.

During the leadership workshop phase, a special work group, comprised of selected conferees will help us develop a philosophy of leadership, redefine current leadership doctrine, and evaluate a USAIS proposed change to our concept of leadership.

On the fifth day, similar to our approach to the leadership/management small group reports, each group will have a representative present its revised program of instruction for consideration by all conferees, and I'm sure we'll all look forward to the special work group report on the Army's philosophy, doctrine and concept of leadership.

Now this leads to the obvious question, what will be done with the workshop results? The revised goals and training objectives that you develop for each program of instruction will be incorporated into our final conference report which will include transcripts of the guest lectures. These will be mailed to you as soon as we can get them compiled.

Because the content, length, and methods of instructing leadership remains the prerogative of the service school commandant, it is intended that model POI goals and training objectives be used as guides, with each service school developing their own lesson outlines and instructional aids accordingly.

We sincerely hope you have a pleasant stay and leave here with a sense of accomplishment.

THE CONFERENCE REPORT

Colonel John J. Walsh
Director, Leadership Department, USAIS

The purposes of this Leadership Conference, "Training to Lead," were successfully fulfilled. Service school representatives from the CONARC service schools, Department of the Army, and civilian agencies were afforded the opportunity to exchange ideas, evaluate current leadership doctrine, and analyze the trends of leadership instruction.

Model programs of instruction developed by the various workshop committees will serve as useful guides for service schools to use in developing their own programs of instruction. The material represents a general consensus of seminar participants, and should be used by service schools as guides to develop their own programs of instruction considering time and faculty constraints, lesson outlines, and supporting strategies.

Studies should be continued by agencies involved in leadership training, to determine the impact of future warfare on leader requirements, and on methods of leaders selection and leadership training. Cognizance should be taken of leadership research and training advances in the other services and in the civilian sector. Effective, enlightened leadership training will require the Army to remain abreast of changes in our society at large. Finally, leadership training must reflect the implications of new organizational and tactical concepts to ensure that the leader is made aware of the problems which will face him on the future battlefield.

GENERAL: The 1973 leadership seminar/workshop was an outstanding opportunity for CONARC service schools uniting to synthesize theories, studies, and a variety of programs of instruction for student officer/noncommissioned officer leaders who attend the various school courses. There were many widely varying views on the approach to the teaching and application of leadership, which ranged from approaches emphasizing human behavior to those emphasizing only long established principles, methods and techniques. Guest speaker presentations and group discussions were integrated into a balanced whole. The fundamental question of how much platform time should be devoted to leadership instruction was not satisfactorily answered. There may be no precise answer. Some faculty and staff members regard an entire course of instruction in the combat arms schools as leadership training while others tend to concentrate more on the development of interpersonal skills. However, all the model POI's developed by the work groups reflect a significant increase in hours devoted to leadership instruction. This time increase results in more platform hours than currently are allocated in most service schools. Perhaps the question of "how many hours of leadership instruction" can best be answered by measuring officer and NCO performance in the field. As for the essential content of leadership programs of instruction, there was little disagreement. Generally, the conference was of greatest value as a forum for exchanging ideas, concepts, and models for leadership instruction.

PURPOSES:

To fulfill the CONARC requirement of conducting leadership development seminars during FY 73, a two-phased program was planned. The first phase emphasized instructor development. Three two-week seminars were conducted at Wichita State University from 15 January--2 March 1973. A total of 45 quotas were available.

The second phase, a leadership seminar/workshop, was conducted at Fort Benning. This seminar/workshop focused on content, methods and techniques of teaching leadership, and modified the programs of instruction. The theme of the seminar/workshop was "Training to Lead." Four purposes were established:

Consider the future requirements of Army leadership.

Exchange ideas and information relevant to Army leadership/management programs of instruction.

Examine current leadership doctrine and the direction of Army leadership.

Revise model leadership programs of instruction.

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<u>REPRESENTATION:</u>

Conferees represented CONARC service schools; the United States Military Academy; Human Resources Research Unit from Fort Benning, Georgia; CONARC; Human Resources Development Branch, DCSPER, DA; and the Army Research Institute.

Conferee selection of personnel (E-7 through 0-5) to attend was closely monitored. As a minimum, they were required to be directly involved in both the development and presentation of leadership instructional programs. The seminar maximized the interaction of attendees and facilitated a two-way exchange of ideas, while taking advantage of the extensive research and development efforts of the Infantry School.

Participants were required to examine and evaluate recent concepts, current leadership programs of instruction, and innovative teaching techniques. In small groups, attendees communicated their programs of leadership and management instruction which support their basic and advanced commissioned and noncommissioned officer courses.

<u>CONDUCT OF THE CONFERENCE:</u>

The seminar/workshop was divided into two phases.

During Phase I the first two purposes of the seminar were accomplished by use of distinguished military and civilian guest speakers. Representatives from other services also provided an invaluable insight into their approach to leadership instruction and training.

During Phase II the future requirements for leadership and the model leadership programs of instruction, which were distributed by USAIS to other service schools during October 1972, were considered. Work groups were organized to review each of the four major POI's (Officer Advanced, Officer Basic, Advanced NCO, and Basic NCO). A special work group considered future requirements for leadership.

One day was devoted to a discussion of pulling together leadership and management. Presentations by panelists from selected service schools revealed a pattern of emphasis on leadership in the combat arms and emphasis on management in the combat service support service schools. The Command and General Staff College makes a balanced approach to leadership and management in the Army, while the Army War College focuses on management.

Conferees acknowledged the tendency in the Army to regard each as separate functions, often conflicting in a doctrinal sense. Although this is not as apparent in application, it is essentially true of the Army service school approach to leadership and management instruction.

An acceptable approach to the majority of conferees was to view leadership and management as essential functions of command along with decision making (DA Pam 600-15). The subjects are then made complimentary. Time devoted to leadership and management instruction for a given course of instruction (basic and advanced) can be logically regulated by the proposition that a company commander is more a leader and less a manager, whereas at brigade level, the commander becomes more a manager of resources and less a leader in the organizational sense. But important to the thesis, is that leadership remains an important role of the commander at all levels in the Army. Consistent with that thrust, branch schools would emphasize leadership (the behavioral school of management thought), C&GSC would make a balanced approach to the commander roles of leadership and management, and the War College would emphasize resources management. Using this approach, the concept of command becomes a convenient format for instructing in leadership and management as well as the basis for progressive instruction throughout the Army School System.

Conferees also identified conflicts in Army doctrine of leadership and management (i.e., principles of leadership and tasks/functions of a manager). The obvious need exists to coordinate and make more compatible the doctrine on the two subjects.

The fact that there is no proponent for "general management" (as opposed to select management such as personnel management, logistics management, etc.), denies the service schools a needed source of expertise and an agency to carry out research and development doctrine. Because there is no proponent for "general management" and an obvious need for one, the Assistant Commandant, USAIS, went on record at the conference as desiring USAIS to assume proponency.

A special work group met to determine the need for and develop a philosophy of leadership, objective of leadership instruction, a common model for teaching leadership, and specific actions to improve leadership training. Development of a philosophy of leadership was considered especially important because of the persisting tendency of some to confuse leadership, the art of influencing so as to achieve willing obedience, with the wielding of command authority to achieve results. The special work group produced some highly useful results, worthy of consideration by all service schools to improve leadership programs of instruction. These are included in Section 7, Work Group Reports and Recommendations.

Because of the limited time, groups revising the officer and NCO advanced and basic model programs of instruction were only able to determine appropriate subjects, develop scopes, and estimate the time to instruct the POI in a performance mode. The programs of instruction and associated rationale are also in Section 7. These are intended as guides to development of programs of instruction at the various service schools. All include the CONARC directed subjects: interpersonal communication, counseling, human behavior, and ethics and discipline.

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CONCLUSIONS

GENERAL:

The USAIS Leadership Seminar/Workshop was a success. It is certain to contribute signifi-
cantly toward improving the programs of leadership instruction currently taught in the CONARC
service schools.

Work groups tended to center around a merger of leadership and management instruction.
Since the three broad functions of command are leadership, management and decision-making, all
courses of instruction should be developed on the foundation of these three functions.

HOURS OF LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION: Service schools vary widely in the number of plat-
form hours of formal leadership instruction.

THEORY AND CONCEPT: There is too little emphasis on the theoretical and conceptual
foundation in leadership; such information is important in providing students with background material
and the need for such courses of instruction.

TRANSLATING THEORIES AND CONCEPTS: Instructors need to explain the theories and
concepts used in their classrooms more explicitly, in understandable language which realistically
relates to performance situations. Students need to be able to use such theories and concepts for
application in unit experiences.

SMALL GROUP INSTRUCTION: Currently, instruction in many service schools is given to
large classes of students (50-200 per classroom). Students receive little personal attention or
interaction with instructors or student peers. By dividing classes into smaller 12-15 man groups,
the needed interaction and conditions for motivation and learning would be improved.

ATTENTION TO GARRISON PROBLEMS: Now that a combative stance has been modified into
a peacetime one, there is a need to place greater emphasis on leadership problems and management
of resources in garrison. Case studies, practical exercises, and classroom situations need some
modification to accommodate to these needs.

A DOCTRINE OF MANAGEMENT AND A PROPONENT: At the present time there is no
doctrine of general management. There are recognized reasons for having definitive guidance in this
area. Such direction will place all CONARC service schools in the same arena rather than going in
many directions. No CONARC service school has been given the proponent responsibility for general
management. The Assistant Commandant at USAIS has gone on record indicating that the US Army
Infantry School would accept this responsibility.

PROPONENCY FOR LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT: There was general consensus of the
conferees that the CONARC service school which is the proponent for general management should be the
proponent for leadership. These need to be placed together because of their common purpose, concept,
and material. Regardless of where it is assigned, there is an absolute need for a proponent for
"general management."

PROGRESSIVE PROGRAMS OF INSTRUCTION: From an overview perspective, the conferees
indicated a need to have established levels of leadership/management instruction for service schools, to
ensure progressive and developmental programs of instruction. This would provide a building block
approach through service school instruction, i.e., Basic Officer, Advanced Officer, USACGSC,
USAWC.

CONARC ESTABLISH LEVELS OF INSTRUCTION: CONARC needs to develop levels of
instruction for service schools to ensure progressive programs of instruction. This program should
represent a building block approach to educating the officer and noncommissioned officer. An example
of this approach is that IOBC would be the foundation for IOAC, and the courses of instruction should
be systems engineered accordingly.

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CONTINUATION OF LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE: The conferees expressed a desire to hold an annual leadership conference. For planning purposes next year, conferees made the following recommendations.

Devote more time in workshop sessions with clearly defined goals.

Invite quality guest speakers.

Include leaders from other countries to speak on leadership in the military at small unit level from their country's perspective, i.e., French officer, British officer, Canadian officer (or NCOs).

Consider the possibility of emphasizing one area next year such as the advanced noncommissioned officer program of instruction. An invitation to the Sergeant Major of the Army as guest speaker should be considered.

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"THE DIRECTION OF ARMY LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1970's"

Introduction of Brigadier General Robert G. Gard, Jr.
Director, Human Resources Development
DCSPER, Washington, D. C.

Our distinguished speaker is Brigadier General Robert G. Gard, Jr. He is no stranger to Fort Benning, especially with regard to opening conferences for us. He was here last summer to open our Drug Instructor Conference as well.

General Gard has had a distinguished career in the Army both as a soldier and as a scholar. As a matter of fact, he served at least two basic tours at West Point, one having been born there, and secondly having attended the United States Military Academy, graduating in 1950. He served in combat in Korea where he commanded a firing battery in 1953. He later attended Harvard University and from there joined the faculty at the United States Military Academy Department of Social Sciences, following which he returned to Harvard for his Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the National War College in Washington, D. C. His assignments include USAREUR as a war plans staff officer in the Operations Division, battalion commander of the 5th Battalion (Airborne), 81st Artillery, and Division G1. He has served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and has commanded the 9th Division Artillery in Vietnam. He was an Army fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. Of course, he also has served on the DA Staff where he is now the Director of Human Resources Development in DCSPER.

General Gard, I can assure you that we are most pleased that you have taken time out from what we all know to be a very busy schedule to open this conference for us. General Gard

Ladies and Gentlemen, as you could tell from Nate's introduction, I certainly am not academically qualified to speak to you on the subject of your conference. I fear you are going to see a sharp drop in the quality of an otherwise superb performance so far today. I decided that I could serve you better by making some outline notes and telling you what's on my mind than I could by preparing a script and the slides that one is usually expected to have.

You might ask since I'm not an expert either in the subject matter or how to teach it, what I'm doing here. Well, I'm here because in my area of responsibility, which as Nate said is Human Resources Development, this is the most important thing going on in the United States Army today. It may be the most important thing going on in any area of the United States Army, because of the complex problems that we have in a volunteer military institution and profession in a rapidly changing democratic society. You people will play a crucial role in the success or failure of whether we even are going to have an armed force, leaving aside the vital question of whether it will be skilled in applying military resources in support of the National Security of the United States. I don't mean to dramatize it, but it's that fundamental. General Richardson mentioned that how we train the leaders of the future is going to be very important, and I want to underscore that. But if I have any comparative advantage in assisting here, it is to try to place what you are going to do in context, rather than trying to give you prescriptions.

Where has the Army been recently? We have had a buildup for Vietnam that was different from any we've ever had in our history. We increased the size of the Army by two-thirds, from about 900,000 to something over a million and a half, without calling up more than token numbers of the reserves and the guard following TET. You can compare this with Korea which lasted less than half as long with a maximum commitment of ground force 90,000 less than at the peak of Vietnam. We called in 383,000 reservists and national guardsmen, including eight combat divisions. Failing to do this in Vietnam has serious impact, as all of your know. It attenuated the career force, particularly our noncommissioned officer corps, required us to cadre from the active force all the units that we needed to mobilize, and forced us to rely on an inequitable draft, not only for the manpower increase but also for key junior leadership positions.

We also reduced our enlistment standards. You probably are familiar with project 100,000, a program under which we tried to bring people in who couldn't meet the standards in order to upgrade their cpabilities. We granted large numbers of moral waivers, 10,000 in one fiscal year alone, for people who had committed felonies before they came into the service. In each of these two groups, we had far greater than proportional disciplinary problems.

But the most serious consequence of the Vietnam buildup was something to which General Tarpley already has referred this morning: The turbulence throughout our organization. The remainder of the Army, in effect, became a replacement depot for Southeast Asia; the turnover in some of our units reached 200% and there were three or four company commanders in some units in a single year. All of this of course, breeds a loss of cohesion. It's not only difficult, but almost impossible, to follow the traditional leadership precept of taking care of one's men when you hardly know who they are, and the men don't know who their leaders are. Nor did this problem end with the buildup for Vietnam; indeed, in some places the recent reduction has been even more turbulent. We have cut the size of the Army by about half over the last couple of years, and the attendent instability has continued to create serious problems for us.

There is, however, an unfortunate tendency on the part of many to think that turbulence is the sole cause of the leadership problems we have today. Clearly there have been and are other sources of difficulty: our experience in Vietnam, the frustration of applying military force in a conflict with very heavy political, social and psychological overtones; the My Lai affair, with all of its implications; violations of ethical conduct. Not only on the part of the short term soldier but on the part of careerists in the Army to include the Provost Marshal General and our top noncommissioned officer; and the loss of mutual trust and confidence, perceptions of careerism, and development of credibility and communications gaps.

As we look to the post-Vietnam period, we can see a customary post-war syndrome in our society rooted in a generally healthy and anti-military tradition. There are recriminations and charges of military ineptness, some justified, and a focus on deteriorating standards. There is the usual retrenchment. The defense budget in absolute terms is about the sam as it was in 1968, at the peak of the Vietnam War, but it represents on 6.7% of the gross national product, the lowest porportion by far since before the Korean War. Instead of 42% of the federal budget, the defense budget is now 28%. We already have reordered priorities in this society. The manpower strength is the lowest since before the Korean War, even including the height of the period of so-called massive retaliation. Many, therefore are saying that there is nothing new, in that we've faced similar post war situations before; and we need only "to get back to the basics."

Let me suggest to you that there are new factors unique in this period that offer a special challenge to all of us in the Army today, factors that seriously complicate an already difficult situation. There are fundamental doubts on the part of many citizens in this country as to the effectiveness of the military instrument in solving political problems and achieving political objectives. There is a widespread questioning of the morality of the use of force. The military is seen by many as a blunt, insensitive and even immoral instrument. To some this not only invalidates the use of force but it impugns the very legitimacy of military service itself.

It has become commonplace, so commonplace that I think we fail to realize the impact, to say that social change during this same period has been so pronounced and so rapid that its effect is termed a social revolution. You've heard the terms "chaotic society," "technotronic age," and "the age of discontinuity;" but whether you agree with Charles Reich's Greening of America, and the counter-culture, or Herman Kahn's "Squaring of America," and the counter counterculture, it's difficult to avoid certain conclusions regarding the unsettling effects of increasingly rapid change in what Toffler has called the "Post-Industrial Society." A social system in rapid transition creates chaos in personal and group fundamentals. There is a feeling of being cut off from the past and a lack of vision of the future; and consequently a difficulty in providing the basis for a feeling of purpose and fulfillment. This has led to increased emphasis on the present by the so called "Now Generation." And in the increasingly affluent society which we enjoy in this country, jobs and money are seen more and more as means not as ends. There is a vastly increased resistance against the concept of people considered as economic factors valued only for their productivity; correspondingly, soldiers today resent being viewed impersonally and valued only for their output.

And again, whether you subscribe to Reich or Kahn, there is a widespread questioning throughout our society, especially on the part of youth, of our larger established institutions; I feel sure that the recent events concerning Watergate are reinforcing this feeling. There is a hostility against bureaucracy, seen to be insensitive to legitimate influence and incapable of responding to human and social needs; a disenchantment with insensitive officials and outmoded practices; a rejection of obedience to what is regarded as unjust and arbitrary authority; feelings of frustration and alienation; and a desire for greater personal freedom, privacy and informality. I do not mean to overstate these anti-establishment attitudes, that exist to varying degrees, nor to suggest that they are focused solely on the military; but combined with both traditional and new anti-military attitudes in the society, they present a very serious challenge to the leadership of the Army today. You undoubtedly will continue to see a reflection in our institution of the problems in our society, currently expressed symptomatically by indiscipline in its various forms, crime, absenteeism, racial conflict, dissent in all its manifestations, and drug abuse.

But the most significant change that makes this period unique is that for the first time in our history, we are required to maintain a sizable active armed force without the benefit of selective service. The implications for the Army are profound; and I believe that institutionally, we are taking far too little cognizance of what this may mean. For over 32 years, with the single exception of a year between World War II and Korea, we have had open access to the manpower pool of this nation, allowing us to pay too little attention to how we treated our soldiers. I submit to you that we have developed some bad habits. Now we are faced with the problem of attracting a relatively large proportion of the eligible young men and women from the pool of high school graduates, and retaining a number of these beyond their initial enlistments. The key to success in this endeavor is not the recruiting sergeant, although his is an important role; the leadership throughout the Army must provide a rewarding experience to those who elect to serve even one enlistment, as well as inducing some to select the military as a career. The leader will be our most effective recruiter in the long term, because it's the soldier who returns to his peers and says that service in the Army is a rewarding experience that will cause others to come into it.

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If you look at this composite situation, it seems evident that the necessary first step is to restore credibility within the institution. The Army War College Professionalism Study, a remarkable document, pointed out the need for that. But we also must regain the confidence of the public; among other things, this requires us to comprehend the implications of social change, and to take appropriate action. Perhaps requiring the greatest creative effort is to learn to respond to the legitimate aspirations of the young men and women who join our ranks.

From one viewpoint you can regard these tasks as no more than traditional leadership problems; such an outlook is probably true at very high levels of abstraction. But that view risks interpreting current reality to fit prescriptions appropriate to a different situation, and it blocks a willingness to explore new techniques to meet the challenge of social change. Focusing on the symptoms and relying on punitive measures to achieve discipline, without addressing underlying problems, can lead to inappropriate action which may aggravate, not improve, the situation. What we must do--and now I am at a high level of abstraction--is to relate essential values to changed circumstances. Charles Moskos, whom I'm sure many of you know, put it this way to me the other day: we must avoid the two extremes; one is the storm center mentality, getting down in the basement to wait for it to blow over; and the other is the radical approach of throwing out all our supports and traditions. Neither of these is satisfactory; what is required is the very difficult art of striking an appropriate balance.

To accomplish this, special efforts are necessary to understand the social and psychological factors at work and to respond in a meaningful and effective way to the desires for personal identity and development on the part of the young men and women who come into our institution. We must improve communication and interaction skills, and infuse positive motivation. It's the leadership that sets the climate and mediates the balance between institutional requirements of mission, organizational stability, and role behavior on the one hand, and the needs of the individual, the self role, on the other. These objectives are by no means incompatible, but they're not identical. Our stress throughout these 32 years has been on mission and commitment, as well it should be; but institutional goals, even short run and unimportant ones, have been considered predominant at almost any price to the individual. I suggest that the "can do" attitude must be balanced with a reasonable concern for the individual. Taking care of your men, and looking out for their welfare, has long been a leadership principle or precept. But let me suggest that "dry socks and a hot meal," while still important, simply are not enough today. As General Richardson stated, we can't rely on what may have been applicable fifteen or perhaps even ten years ago. The legitimate expectations of our soldiers are far greater than ever before, and people more and more see themselves as unique and valued human beings possessing not only immediate but also ultimate potential. Overemphasis on low priority institutional goals will prevent the accomplishment of the fundamental long term goal: a viable Army, capable of supporting the foreign policy of the United States. Both in attracting volunteers and in developing professional units, this concern is essential.

I recently read a talk given by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe. In speaking about the leader in relation to the soldier, General Davison put it this way: "To the extent that he, the leader solves his soldiers' problems and causes them to see themselves as important and contributing members of the unit, to that extent and only to that extent, is the leader going to have a unit capable of carrying out its mission in a professional manner." The point is, that a reasonable response to the desires of our soldiers for their own development is not inconsistent with mission accomplishment, but is essential to it.

The challenge to our service schools is great. How are we doing? Nate told you that we've had a lot of successes, and undoubtedly we have. But there is substantive evidence that we also have some serious problems that are worthy of your considering during the next five days. The Haines Board in 1966 pointed out that greater understanding human behavior is necessary to a successful combat arms leader as well as in some of the professions such as psychology and sociology. The Franklin Institute study of junior officers, which outlined the lack of mutual understanding between juniors and seniors, was accomplished in 1968. The Army War College Professionalism Study, conducted in 1970 is indeed remarkable for its frank self-evaluation. We can learn a great deal from it, for it presents clear evidence of a lack of sensitivity on the part of Army leadership for the soldiers they lead. The Army War College Leadership Study pointed our both performance and perception shortfalls; not only are we failing to apply leadership principles effectively, but we don't even realize the extent of our shortcomings. Major General Frank Norris recently made an extensive study of the Army school system. The statement in his report that struck me, and I hope will strike you, is that there was

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general agreement, he said, on the part of both faculty and students that leadership instruction was the single most deficient area in our service schools. Also, by looking at some of the volunteer Army evaluations that have been done in '72 and '73, you will find that leadership has a very low positive response.

Just two or three days ago, I saw the results of a survey on retention of junior officers. They were asked about the various factors that influenced their decision. The leading dissatisfier was "leadership of superiors," and this by a substantial margin. The second dissatisfier, family separation, was fourteen precentage points below. Now you might conclude that the forty percent who cited leadership as the number one cause represent the malcontents, those we wanted to get rid of anyway, but don't be misled; those who were considering a career decision also looked at the most satisfying factors. Leadership of superiors came out last; and only 1% cited that factor as the most satisfying that would cause them to stay in the service. Leadership was far and away the most influencial factor in the negative career decisions: 72% of the second lieutenants, 64% of first lieutenants, and 70% of captains. The real reasons for leaving are very hard to write up on a resignation statement, and you rarely see reference to leadership because it's difficult to be very specific about it.

The center for creative leadership in North Carolina was mentioned earlier this morning. We sent 11 battalion commanders there not long ago for evaluation. Some of the results of the assessment were very encouraging; in eight of ten roles they were better than the corporate executive with whom they were compared. They were lower, however, in two key areas: relating to people and building morale. Incidentally, in evaluating how the commanders reacted to various situations in handling problems, report compared their performance to "defensive driving." In addressing what many regard as the essence of leadership, the report stated that "the battalion commander has no greater understanding of people, has no greater skills at influencing people, and has less interest in people than the average man." A ringing indictment of their leadership training! Also, in addressing their ability to appraise others and to sense what they feel and think, the battalion commanders were about the same as men in general, while the civilian corporate executives were substantially better. Another extract from that report concerning the battalion commander observed: "It is hard for him to see any sense in needs that differ widely from his own. He is likely to dismiss them offhand as nonessentials." There are a number of other selections one could cite, but the point should be obvious.

Let me add that the problems are not limited to the relations between middle grade leaders and their subordinates. Some of you may have seen Mike Malone's article in Army recently, which pointed out gross insensitivities of the same kind on the part of more senior officers to perceived needs of field grade subordinates. You will be pleased to hear that there was substantial interest on the part of the top uniformed leadership of the Army in the Pentagon in what Mike had to say; perhaps you can draw him out during this conference. The article was extremely useful in calling attention to the subject of leadership. The subversive in our organization is not the self-critic, it's the fellow who sits back complacently and ignores the obvious faults in the institution.

What's been the reaction in the field to shortcomings in leadership education and training? There are attempts underway to fill the void. Efforts are being made in leadership courses and seminars to develop a sense of awareness and an ability to communicate horizontally as well as between senior and subordinate. The chief of my leadership and behavior division is here, having just returned from a command tour in Germany. He found that the individual best trained to teach counseling to junior leaders was his chaplain, who had some training how to communicate with people. We are fortunate that our Chaplain Corps had the foresight to provide this kind of experience to relatively large numbers of their officers.

The individual who participates in a one week course in the field adressing leadership fundamentals receives about 40 hours, more than is taught in most service school advanced courses. As incredible as it seems, that's the kind of emphasis we've been giving to instruction related to leadership in our service schools. On the other hand, the Sergeant Majors Academy at Bliss recently designed its course out of the whole cloth, without the competition of entrenched academic departments. The result of trying to provide instruction relevant to Army problems produced a curriculum with something like 60% of the instruction devoted to human and social behavior and to leadership. This compares to something on the order of 5% or less in our officer courses, with the exception of the Chaplains School.

The point I'm trying to get across is that much remains to be done in our leadership instruction in service schools. The problems we're facing are deep seated and complex. The professionalism study indicates more than a need to restore personnel stability; the leadership study indicates more than a temporary aberration. For example, take a look at our race relations problem in the Army today. Some of you are old enough to have shared with me elation that the Army was leading society in desegregation then seen as the solution to civil rights. We did integrate, and it worked very well. But once having done that, we assumed the race relations problem was solved, and we failed to perceive its evolution. I submit to you we are, in many respects, institutionally blind to social change. Another example is the drug abuse problem. About three months before the commander in chief directed the armed forces to participate in the "national counteroffensive," witnesses from the Department of Defense went before the Congress and stated there virtually was no hard drug problem in the military. It seems incredible now that this could have happened. Yet if you stop to think about it, it's really not that surprising. Consider the principal general staff functions that we have in the Army. The G2 function, intelligence, is complicated and requires a specialized knowledge; we have a separate branch for it, and an intelligence school. Logistics also is very complicated, and we have a career field and a separate school. Our entire school system is geared around operations, the G3 function. But what about the personnel function, dealing with and taking care of people, our most expensive and most complicated commodity? It appears that we assume anybody can do that job! Lacking the staff expertise we have been able to give commanders in other areas, what you teach in your service schools concerning influencing and caring for subordinates is especially important.

In suggesting that we have much to do in our leadership instruction, I do not want to ignore the great progress that has been made here in the Infantry School and in some other locations as well. The new field manual on leadership is going to be of tremendous assistance to us all. The counseling manual, which I understand will be published shortly thereafter, is needed desperately. We all recognize that we must counsel people, but how many of us really know what that means? How many of are good at it? Some of the teaching techniques that have been developed here are very useful, but it's difficult to permeate them into the service schools. I know many of you who are trying to do this must feel a very heavy sense of responsibility.

What must we do? Let me suggest that first we must overcome some stereotypes. Teaching leadership through biographies of the great warriors presents an interesting perspective, but it surely will not provide a formula for success in today's environment. At the time I was first studying leadership, we learned to recite the so-called leadership traits. If you possessed these various traits, you then would be a good leader. One can't take exception to the desirability of developing such characteristics, but they could not provide a prescription to situational leadership behavior. We then went to leadership principles, which are unexceptionable. Most assuredly, they are valid, but they are comparable to the principles of war. If you just examine them by themselves, they're in part internally inconsistent. The art, of course, is in their application.

I do not believe you can assume that your students will have developed adequate leadership skills, or even that they will possess a basic understanding of human behavior, which must underpin the development of skills and of individual style in applying the various leadership traits and principles. It seems to me that if we don't understand a problem it's awfully hard to deal with it rationally. I think we may have to question some of our more rigid concepts of training. We hear increasingly, and encouragingly, that in our service schools we're interested in something called "education." This has to do, I think, with knowledge and understanding, rather than merely training in procedures. Permit me to take a different approach than Nate in suggesting that we must place greater rather than less emphasis on a basic understanding of what makes human beings tick, if we are going to instruct leadership in a meaningful way. As General Richardson pointed out, it's difficult to know where to strike the balance between theory and application; but from my standpoint as a layman, it seems to me that an understanding of the factors that motivate individual and group behavior is an absolutely essential basis on which to build meaningful applicatory instruction. I'm very encouraged by General Richardson's opening remarks. I think he set the tone for this conference in personally indicating that the Infantry School is not defensive about what's been done before; he challenged you to take a fresh view and to make your own suggestions. I think you have an important task over the next five days.

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There is nothing more essential to the future success of the United States Army than how you carry out your responsibilities in your respective service schools. From a personal standpoint, and from the perspective of my own responsibilities, I would like to enjoin you to take this responsibility very seriously. What you teach is, in my view, the most important subject in any service school. We do reasonably well, I believe, in the more technical areas; but we are only in the infancy of developing instruction to teach our leaders how to motivate their subordinates and how to inculcate self-discipline.

More than this, we must insure that the youth of our society perceive service in the Army both as an interesting challenge and as an opportunity for a continuation in their development, not an interruption of it. The experience must be one that they can recommend to their civilian associates. This by no means will solve all our problems, but I suggest to you that if we are not successful in this effort, then we have no chance at all of solving them.

The title of my Directorate, Human Resources Development, was chosen very deliberately. When I was assigned intially to this job, it was called "Discipline And Drug Policies," which seemed to me to emphasize the symptoms of anti-social behavior rather than a more positive approach. In the Secretary of the Army's terminology, we are trying to "grope and cope" toward means of creating an environment in which the soldier will see his experience in terms of human resource development, not inconsistent with, but complimentary to, and indeed reinforcing, our institutional goals. What we are talking about basically is increasing organizational effectiveness. If I've created the impression, which I sometimes leave with others when talking about this, that I am advocating "permissiveness," let me assure you that I am not. To me permissiveness is tolerating failure to meet the standards you set. I don't think the young soldiers or the young officers coming into the Army want that. I think they want to be challenged; but I do think they want to be used well as well as treated well, and this is a fundamental challenge for us in meeting the requirements of leadership in a volunteer Army.

QUESTION: (LTC Vail, USAIS) General Gard, I have a question I think is perhaps the toughest one of all. We talk about leadership, and we talk about race problems and drugs. We seem to be talking or addressing symptoms. I'm not so sure we've gotten yet to the root cause. When I say that I mean that we've got a system of careerism versus professionalism that to me provides the impetus or the driving force for a climate that kind of suppresses imaginative and innovative actions on the part of potential professionals who otherwise are getting out. And to be specific I'm talking about something I would dub "zero defects in human behavior." In other words, a system of careerism within the framework of an efficiency report that drive commanders and subordinates alike to seek to make no errors whatever in anything they do in order to insure a good report card. In a nutshell we've got too many careerists, too few professionals and those careerists are working for report cards. This permeates the entire Army. This isn't confined just to aspiring ambitious young officers or NCO's as we well know. That's part and parcel to our whole makeup, to our character. To me that's certainly something we've got to address and start changing before we can see these symptoms disappear.

ANSWER: I'd like to try to hit that from two directions. First, you're quite right that we have a lot of programs that are addressing symptoms. As I tried to suggest, I hope that we'll look at the various symptoms of indiscipline as part of a conglomerate social problem with different manifestations. My hope is that we can get at the root causes, recognizing that taking care of one's men means far more than it did 15 years ago. But that's the thrust of what I was trying to say in my remarks.

You mentioned a much more difficult aspect of the problem, one that probably to some extent is ingrained in any large organization in which the top leadership can't know individually all its members. We are forced to rely on some system of evaluation that will enable us to select for positions of greater responsibility those that appear to be most deserving, hopefully from the standpoint of doing the best for the institution. So the question is what can we do to base that evaluation more on professional rather than careerist behavior. There is no easy answer.

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I suspect that everyone in positions of responsibility is going to have to take a more realistic view of what comprises success. There's clearly an institutional bias against surfacing problems precisely for the reason you described, a desire for the record to look good. This creates emphasis on those things that can be measured and reported. These often are relatively unimportant matters. Personnel turbulence during the Vietnam period exacerbated this tendency and created the additional problem of commanders feeling the need to make a mark in a very brief period. The result frequently was emphasis in the wrong areas to achieve a favorable record at almost any cost to their subordinates. Greater personnel stability and longer command tenure should assist materially.

In addition, the new officer personnel management system or OPMS, should help a great deal. It recognizes that a professional doesn't have to punch all the tickets to be a successful soldier. It acknowledges that life has become so much more complicated that every man can't become an expert in everything. Hopefully, it will insure that in command as well as in other specialties, supervisors will be sufficiently knowledgeable to be able to assess subordinates, and be assessed in turn, on more rather than less important criteria. Leadership at all echelons must stress professionalism and insure that their subordinates are informed accordingly. We should be able to create an environment in which commanders are encouraged to surface problems and are penalized for concealing them.

Those of you who instruct in our service schools and at C&GSC and the War College have a special responsibility to teach the leaders to have the courage to allow their subordinates to make mistakes, to create enough trust within the organization so people feel free to discuss problems instead of sweeping them under the rug. We must insure that our leadership materials reflect this approach. All of us must be forthright in discussing these perceptions and calling them to the attention of the leadership throughout the Army. There is no easy answer to your question; but it is clear that throughout the Army, we must take a comprehensive approach to enhancing professionalism so that the "careerist" will be forced to become a "professional" in order to succeed.

QUESTION: (Mr. DeLaune, CONARC) Under the TRADOC reorganization, the administration center comes into being at Fort Benjamin Harrison. One element of that is Personnel and Administrative Combat Development Activity (PACDA) which has a behavioral orientation. I was wondering, sir, if you could comment on the role that you envision for this organization.

ANSWER: For those of you who may be unfamiliar with the CONUS reorganization, we've split it into a force command for tactical units and a training and doctrine command for our schools and combat development activities. There are three centers as part of TRADOC: the Combat Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth; the Logistics Center at Lee; and the so-called Administration Center at Ft. Benjamin Harrison. The purpose of these centers, as I understand it, is to assess developments in their respective areas, determine what may be useful and produce doctrine and literature for the school system and the field.

PACDA is far more than just a behavioral science division. It will perform its functions across the spectrum of personnel management. In fact only a very small portion of it is designed to address areas of leadership, motivation, and other human resources problems. It is intended also that the human resources element will be able to operate as a kind of field agency to supervise the various pilot projects in motivational development, going on throughout the Army under the aegis of the DA Special Assistant For Training.

The organization is not yet even formed, but I think it will evolve as a small field agency to do the sorts of things for the Army that we are not equipped to do either in the service schools or on the DA staff. As some of you know we are reducing the DA staff and in the process are trying to delegate to the field all of the "operational" responsibilities, trying to get the Department of the Army staff back to the general "policy" matters.

QUESTION: (Dr. Sweney, Wichita State University) I'll be speaking tomorrow from the podium and reinforce many of the things that you brought up today, and I just wanted you to know that. But I do have a question involving your view of whether developing individual effectiveness really differs in anyway from developing leadership effectiveness. In other words aren't we talking about developing human potential in whatever phase of human interaction he encounters?

ANSWER: A layman in this area, I don't want to do violence to terminology which is unfamiliar to me. But it does seem to me that we really are talking about the development of human potential, whether it is providing equal opportunity to a disadvantaged soldier by remedial assistance or improving the leadership capabilities of a young officer or NCO in a service school.

The attitude we must promote is that our top priority, organizational effectiveness, now more than ever before is dependent upon the young soldiers and officers perceiving both a challenging experience and an opportunity for individual development. Because if our young people continue to view the Army as in interruption in their development, as two or more years down the drain, we're not going to have an Army. Despite what some of you may have heard, we already have recruitment problems before the full impact of cessation of the draft is really felt. We better take a fresh look. It's not enough to say "get back to the basics." We're going to have to provide the kind of organization to which people want to come and in which they want to stay and serve.

QUESTION: (Seminar Participant) (First part of question couldn't be understood)........officer leadership, how're we going to deal with this problem of improving the leadership capabilities of the senior officer?

ANSWER: I know those of you that are teaching at the basic and advanced course levels can't influence that directly, but only indirectly. If, however, you can teach your students to be knowledge-able, committed, and persuasive, I think you'll find that most of the more senior leaders in the Army will be willing to listen. They want effective organizations. Of course the instructors at Command and General Staff College and the Army War College can influence the senior leadership more directly. Hopefully, we at the Department of the Army can assist in creating these kinds of attitudes by taking every opportunity to promote them in our staff actions at that level.

QUESTION: (MAJ Weigand, USAIS). . . . .As you mentioned, life has become so complicated that men cannot do everything. It would appear to me that there is kind of a danger of overspecializa-tion, with no one really seeking responsibility for any one task. Rather it's always the other guy's specialty that contributed to an overall malaise or problem within a given project. However, it would appear that the man who has completed many jobs in an acceptable manner could better control many different subordinates in coping with diversified tasks. And therefore in my opinion the challenge of leadership is one of growing men and training them to be generalists. Would you care to comment?

ANSWER: It's hard to have this one both ways; that is, to stabilize commanders and provide staff specialists and at the same time to allow many personnel to dip into a wide variety of functions. On the other hand, there is wide enough inherent diversity to preclude the narrow mindedness that concerns you. I do not believe we ever will reach the degree of specialization implied by your remarks.

Under OPMS it is not envisioned that the individual will start right out in his specialty as a second lieutenant, except in rare cases. He will work in units, where he will be exposed to the broad spectrum of problems. The commander still will have the responsibility for integrating all these various skills and talents into a cohesive organization. There in affect will be a command specialty, as well as others. Hopefully, those selected for it will be those that seem to have a special talent and skill in being able to perform the integrative function, not necessarily those with the most brilliant academic records or even the most perfect efficiency record.

If we're going to provide any stability in leadership positions, and prevent the continuation of what Nate was describing as short-term commanders worried about a single mistake, we already are faced with a fact that there are not enough commands to go around. At the same time, the accelerating increase in knowledge and technology requires staff officers to spend more term learning these skills. The combination of these developments drives you to something like OPMS. It's going to have growing pains and problems with acceptability. But I think really that we have no alternative.

QUESTION: (CPT Loftin, USAIS) You've probably answered to a degree this question but I'd like to ask it a little more pointedly. Given that we have certain lifestyles from our people coming into the military now and recognizing this is a fact, this is a resource we have to work with; we have a situa-tion where I feel that there is a conflict between life-styles and discipline within the military. And the question I have is do we change those people coming in or do we adapt to that life-style? To para-phrase something I heard the other day, if we run in to a situation where what becomes a hardship to us is a luxury to our enemies, then we're probably going to have difficulties.

ANSWER: I don't think there's any simple answer to that one. I believe that there are certain values, certain requirements of this profession, that we cannot compromise if we are going to retain a military institution and the ability to apply military resources in the support of national objectives. The real question on the day to day level out in the field is what's essential and what isn't.

I think to ignore social changes is to court failure. The Marines may be able to recruit "A few good men" with minimum change to traditional practices. But given the numbers we have to attract, I suggest we cannot allow the perception to persist that we are returning to the kind of Army described in the book, From Here to Eternity. There's no question that we must have disciplined response, but the real question is what practices and traditions that we have in the Army are essential to ingraining the kind of self-discipline in our soldiers that will cause them to do what they're supposed to do even if we're not supervising them. While I believe that we must respond to changes in our society, I do not mean that this requires the Army to adopt the life-style of the counterculture. Indeed, I believe those volunteering for service expect and want reasonable standards of discipline and apperance.

What I believe we must do is to respond to the increased desire on the part of young people for for human dignity and self-development. I think we can respond to that and at the same time retain the necessary standards of discipline and avoid "permissiveness." A young man or woman who places a high premium on extreme dress and anarchic behavior is not likely to sign up for this organization. I think we can attract the kind of individual who will be able to adapt his life-style to ours so long as we recognize and treat him as an individual and provide him a rewarding and challenging experience, which does not mean luxury or softness.

QUESTION: (Seminar Participant). . .is to make an impact on the new soldier that's coming into the Army. It seems to me in talking with battalion commanders and battalion staff members that have come into Fort Benning, in talking to the students that we're getting here in our Infantry Officer Advanced Course, and just yesterday I read a letter from a recent graduate from Germany that there are two things that impact on the soldier's life; the missions that the unit gets and the quality of leadership that he is faced with. I'm talking about company commanders primarily. What is the thinking in Department of the Army about either reducing mission commitments or else providing enough lead time so that the commanders in the field can do them properly? And also is there any sort of guidance about getting the Advance Course graduate down to the level where he can have an impact on that soldier? Graduates today are going to Graduate School. They're going to staffs and they're not getting to that they can have an impact on the soldier.

ANSWER: I can be fairly explicit about the last part of your question. There is a recognition of a sort of gap in the company leadership area as suggested by your question. CONARC is seized with the trying to do something about preparing an individual for company level command in a more realistic way, and DA is looking to getting the right officers down to the company.

The more difficult question is what we are doing about missions unlimited with resources quite limited. It does seem to me that establishing integrity throughout our organization, that's the place we probably should start. Given his resources and the time available to him, what can we reasonably expect a commander to accomplish? Although commanders probably always have had the problem of balancing priorities, and probably always will have to one degree or another, I believe we could make good use of more techniques grouped under the term "management by objectives."

There is at least the recognition around the Pentagon that we must ease the burden of the company commander. It's easy to say that, but it's one of those problems that must be attacked at every echelon in the Army if we're going to accomplish anything. I can report to you that the new Secretary of the Army is personally interested in doing all that we can to ease unnecessary administrative burdens at that level and allow the company commander to function as a leader.

QUESTION: (General Richardson, USAIS) With respect to the all volunteer Army, the ability to recruit what we want; at the present time as I understand it there are established percentages on high school graduates for recruiting purposes. In view of the possibility that we may not get the quantity that we're looking for, do you envisage the possibility of the Army's cutting back on those percentages? And if so, what sort of detrimental effect do you think this will have? And the second question incident to the recruiting, what is the feeling of the new leadership in the Pentagon concerning the statement on recruiting posters "The Army Wants To Join You?"

ANSWER: I really don't know the answer to the latter, but the Chief of Staff has expressed strong support for taking care of soldiers in terms of such programs as transition training. I suspect many of us react negatively to that expression because it seems to imply, as an earlier questioner suggested, that we are willing to lower essential standards and permit norms of behavior inconsistent with institutional requirements. We would have to ask the young; but if it conveys our willingness to meet their legitimate expectations, then I hope we would favor it.

On the other hand, public relations experts tell me that the slogan has had a very positive impact in reaching the target audience. Hopefully, it is not conveying the wrong message, but rather is communicating our willingness to recognize the necessity to respond to the legitimate aspirations of the nation's youth for human dignity and self-development, consistent with the needs of the organization. I doubt that many potential recruits really interpret the advertising as suggesting that the Army will accommodate to indiscipline or extreme life-styles.

There is considerable attention to a whole range of questions concerning recruiting standards. Over the last few months, DA and the recruiting command have been engaged in an intensive effort to prevent the acquisition of individuals with a low probability of becoming successful soldiers. For example, we are attempting to prevent those who have been seriously involved with the police from coming in, since experience has shown they tend to repeat their antisocial behavior in the Army. The young high school dropout who is in mental category IV also has proved to be a poor risk--and the recruiters get no credit for bringing in seventeen year olds falling into this group. The present ceiling on non-high school graduates is 30%, although it was higher a few months ago.

The current policy is to maintain these standards even though we already have rather serious shortfalls in our recruiting objectives. There are those in the office of the Secretary of Defense and elsewhere that believe we can afford to lower these standards, especially regarding the 70% minimum of high school graduates. I believe we can expect further pressure in this regard, especially if we do not meet our objectives. It does appear that we can attract sufficient numbers if we lower the standards. As you know, maintaining a sizeable Army without selective service is an uncharted course. We will have to watch the situation closely and evaluate our experience. Hopefully, we will be able this summer to attract a relatively high proportion of the high school class that will graduate in May and June.

If we do accept substantially more non-high school graduates, we probably can expect increased indiscipline of various sorts, if past is prologue. But even though high school dropouts do cause a higher than proportional share of problems, the majority of such individuals perform satisfactorily, and some extremely well. Many of our top career noncommissioned officers earned their high school diplomas in the Army. So perhaps if we are required to accept more non-high school grads, but can maintain other standards, to include a floor on mental category IV's, the impact won't be as great as it might appear. Unfortunately, we do not appear to be very far along in being able to predict individual cases who will make a good soldier. Our research people are working on that.

Let me mention one possible partial solution to the quality problem: bringing more women into the Army. I believe there's great potential here. Thus far we have met our quotas on women without having to take a single non-high school graduate. We have opened the majority of military occupational specialties to them, and they are surprising a number of people by out-shooting men at the MP School, driving trucks, and winning honor graduate at Drill Sergeant School. Perhaps instead of validating spaces in which women are acceptable, we should require the field to take positive action to designate those non-combat spaces in which they are not acceptable. This should open more positions for them.

CLOSING COMMENT

Let me share with you some comments the Chief of Staff made in early March following a discussion of some of the applications in the field of various techniques to improve leadership performance. He stated that while we have the litany of taking care of our people, when it comes to the crunch, when it comes to doing our business, the human element too often gets last place. He acknowledged the need to improve our leadership instruction, and stated that if there were concepts and techniques that could help, we should not allow unfamiliar terminology to scare us off. But he directed that these concepts must be translated into terms meaningful to members of the Army and that we must build upon the solid base already established rather than rejecting valid principles by attempting a revolutionary approach.

So as Nate mentioned earlier, the job to be done here at Fort Benning, to which all of you must contribute, is to make the body of knowledge available to the Army in meaningful terms, and to provide curricula for our service schools and literature for the field. Improving leadership in the Army requires efforts from us all, but yours is a key role.

I know that everyone tells his audience that they are important; but in this case, no exaggeration is required. Your job is to teach the leaders of this Army how to perform their most critical task. It's an awesome responsibility, so let me close by reading you something that has been of assistance to me. It is an extract from <u>The Marauders</u> written in 1959 by Charlton Ogburn: "Being unready and ill equipped is what you have to expect in life. It's the universal predicament. It is your lot as a human being to lack what it takes. Circumstances are seldom right. You never have the capacities, the strength, the wisdom, the virtue you ought to have. You must have always make do with less than you need in a situation vastly different from what you would have chosen as appropriate for your special endowments. "

Best wishes for a profitable conference.

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GRASS ROOTS LEADERSHIP

Lieutenant General Melvin Zais
Commander, Third United States Army

INTRODUCTION BY MG TARPLEY

No military conference on leadership would be complete without the man about to be introduced because he's truly one of the most accomplished and acclaimed in the military. He established his capacity for leadership as a pioneer in making airborne a vital part in our army training and tactics. In fact, he volunteered for assignment to the original parachute battalion here at Fort Benning in 1941. His entire army career has been centered around leadership, including command assignments at every level in our army. He has commanded a battalion, a division, and a corps in combat, as well as commanding two regiments, a battle group, and Third Army in peacetime. His leadership as the Division Commander, 101st Airborne in Vietnam, under his call sign "Lucky Eagle," has made him a legend in that distinguished organization. I am especially pleased and privileged to present to you the commander of the Third U.S. Army, Lieutenant General Melvin Zais.

LTG ZAIS
Address

I know that there has been a tremendous amount of thought, effort, energy, concern, introspection, and study on this business of leadership. It is an intangible thing and very difficult to come to grips with. It is hard to define. It is mercurial. You just can't quite get your hands on it. So, those who are involved in behavioral science have endeavored to make a science of it. You should be prepared for me to say some things that you don't agree with and you should be prepared to argue with me if you don't agree with me. Because I know that I'm not all right and I know that you're not all right, and sometimes when you chew it around, and argue about it, you sort of crystalize some thoughts and feelings and some good comes of it. If nothing else, you have to think to argue. You have to organize your thoughts. You have to come to grips with the way you feel about things.

I have, in my own nonstudious ways, tried to be a student of leadership all of my military career and it disturbs me a little bit, having struggled with this problem as I have in recent years. I find what I believe to be an over-swinging of the pendulum toward the scientific approach to leadership. The aesthetic approach, the approach which uses models, that which uses boxes and squares and lines, that approach which somehow says "if you do this, then, that will happen, and it will then cause this to happen and that will happen." When you are all over somebody, as quantified in terms of a human relationship, it does not turn me on. Some of it is almost so infantile as far as I'm concerned that it insults my intelligence. It is like a fellow diagramming: man in bed plus woman in bed equals baby later.

I have read Hank Emerson's report on leadership which I feel was pretty good. He worked with some behavioral science outfit in North Carolina and I found some good stuff in it. I read the War College study on leadership and I did not care for it. I thought they were just struggling to make a very clever output from the Army War College at that level. You have got to be willing to be ordinary and common, willing to admit that a lot of this is meat and potatoes, and it is not all souffles and all that jazz. So, I'm going to approach it on that level and on that basis.

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As you can see, I am just sort of conversing here. I do not have a written talk. I went to my own files and found that I had spoken here at Benning on three different occasions on leadership, each with a different approach. One of my talks, as you may recall, was "Command is Concern." Another was "Officer/Noncommissioned Relationships" and I really addressed it to young lieutenants just coming out and the problems that they immediately face in their relationships with their noncommissioned officers. Another one was related to what I call "low level" command as opposed to high level command and the kind of problems that you face in those areas. I reviewed my three talks and I thought, well, I would just sort of try to stand on the platform here and open it up for questions and probably do better that way than I would going on at great length.

One thing that has been apparent to me all through my career is that everybody says that to be a good leader, you must have integrity. That is true. You must have concern for men and that is true. You must be honest, loyal, trustworthy, kind, and all you have to do is read the Boy Scout Manual, and you have got it made. It is much more complex than that, but at the same time it's quite simple.

When I reflect on the leaders whom I have known, I find tall ones and short ones, noisy ones and quiet ones, extroverts and introverts, intellectuals and fellows who really don't go for that kind of stuff. This reminds me of an efficiency report I just read and the fellow said, "This officer is equally at ease with intellectuals and those in authority." At any rate, there are all kinds.

A book I recently read, Nineteen Stars, by Edgar Puryear, had as its subject of concern, MacArthur, Marshall, Eisenhower, and Patton. The book traces the life and activities of each of these four great leaders. I thought about what was the same in these four men, what was different, and what made them great, and how could I profit from reading this book. This was a tremendous task of correlation in terms of drawing some lessons from it. Because, here was George C. Marshall, stern, kept his own counsel, tremendously disciplined, created an environment around him of great confidence in him and his ability, never intimate, calling his subordinates who he had known for years by their last names, never dreamed of putting his hand on a man, remote and distant, yet, terribly able. He exuded so much confidence that Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin turned to him and listened to him. He was a fantastic leader.

Then you look at MacArthur--brilliant, magnetic, oratorical, colorful, a consummate actor, beautiful writer, highest grades anybody ever attained at West Point, held himself in an aristocratic manner, almost a deity. Is that how you become a good leader? What a good leader he was!

And, of course, the bombastic Patton--colorful, courageous, swearing, emotional, knew what he wanted to do, had his reasons for what he did, he did not do things without purpose or reason, although it seemed as though he did. He did things for effect and he did them with a purpose. He intended to shock people. Patton was shrewd about how he handled troops and he had a reason for what he did.

Eisenhower--homespun sort of Kansas guy, able to write well, rambled a little bit, lots of friends, everybody liked "Ike." He did fairly well at West Point, worked for MacArthur as his aide and did not really like MacArthur, was good at getting people to work with each other, good at resolving differences, good at having people do well for him, great father image, great morality, and paternalistic, and related with everybody. He was a different kind of fellow.

If these four men are such great leaders, and they have really reached the pinnacle in terms of leadership, and they are all in the Army, then, couldn't each one of them do what the other fellow could do? Couldn't they be interchangeable? We are talking about leadership as a generality. Could Marshall have done what Patton did? I do not think so. Could MacArthur? Maybe, but in a different way. MacArthur was a brilliant combat leader at division level in World War I and had won the Medal of Honor and had been very colorful as a younger officer and had done certain things. Maybe he could have done Patton's job. Could Eisenhower? Not as well. Could Patton have done Eisenhower's, Marshall's or MacArthur's jobs? My answer is a resounding "NO!" He could not possibly have done any of those jobs. He would have been busy at them and would have gone down in history as a poor leader. So, there is a time and a place for certain talents suited for certain environments, and all sorts of things make up a leader. That is why I say it's so difficult to quantify and establish a pattern. Still, there emerge certain things, and I believe that an observant noncommissioned officer or officer learns just as much from mistakes as he learns from good things.

Let me get down to a sort of "grass roots" level, now, on leadership. I have had occasions to talk to young officers a great deal. They struggle with things, particularly now in this changing society of ours. They try to find a happy balance between rigid discipline and the acceptance of a changed life style as it relates to the modern army, while at the same time, retaining good order and discipline. This is tough for these kids. They find it difficult to accommodate the requirements for privacy, time off, certain independence of action, and the elimination of certain accountable procedures that made it very easy for them to have control. They have to exert control without having the rigid format within which to exert it. It is really difficult. Who commands a company? It is the guy who rewards and the guy who punishes. That is the fellow who commands the company. It does not make any difference what his rank is. It soon becomes apparent that the guy who rewards and punishes has got it all. He isn't always necessarily the company commander. Noncommissioned officers run and officers decide. If you are going to retain command, you have got to be the guy who rewards and punishes. For young officers, their relationship with the noncoms is a real problem. We are all aware of this. There is such a great difference between concern and familiarity, deep and abiding friendship and patronizing popularity seeking. Good judgment is based on experience and experience is based on bad judgment. The noncommissioned officer really has a place, even if he will not admit it to himself. He has a place in his own mind. He has an image of an officer and this image is what they like to call a "straight one." And, if you are not straight, you destroy that image. Quizzled old noncoms do not salute fuzzy-cheeked second lieutenants because they are second lieutenants alone or because the law says so. They do it because they see this young fellow becoming a captain, a major, and on up. They see in him a product. They are proud of him and they want to bring him along. They like him to be straight, but when he is not straight, it really hurts the noncoms. All of this is a part of understanding leadership.

To lead, you have to first decide what it is you want, if you are going to be a real leader. Good or bad, that is relevant. You must decide. You cannot wait for events to catch you up. In every phase of leadership, you MUST decide! Secondly, you must explain clearly how you want things done so that there is no misunderstanding as to what you decide. Thirdly, enforce your decisions.

Eisenhower, Marshall, MacArthur, and Patton all had concern for their subordinates. Yet, they manifested this in different ways. You have got to really care. If you don't worry, you don't care; and if you don't care you can't lead. Some guys are making it who don't really care. I know who they are --they are the ones who have been promoted because they are aggressive, brilliant, and hard driving and hard charging. You wonder why. These guys are not leaders. They may have been promoted, but they are not leaders, because they do not care about their people.

You know, I like to draw on analogy, and this is going to really impress you guys who work with charts and diagrams because you can use it. I compare the leader to a generator who is generating *electricity and sending out current.* Below him, *depending on the level of his assignment,* is a series of potential pulse surges, cut off points, or circuit breakers. Every subordinate commander is either a pulse generator or a circuit breaker. That's why some fellows are great company commanders and great battalion commanders, but as they go up the line they lose their effectiveness. You have seen them. Some fellows seem sort of ordinary, but as they go up the line, they get better and better because they are able somehow to transmit their thoughts to their subordinate commanders who in turn surge them along. Every potential circuit breaker becomes a surge point. The current you put out at the very top surges until at the very end of the line the lights are all shining very brightly. If you are not getting through to these subordinates, or there are some not getting through, then there are problems. You may be getting bright lights, dim lights, no lights. Things are screwing up in your outfit here and there. You are putting out fires and you can't understand why things are not going right. The reason is that you have some circuit breakers in there that haven't gotten your message. Or, if they have gotten it, they haven't transmitted it. They are not surge points. It's dying! The word hasn't gotten out to where it happens. Now, there's an easy way to get around that. You don't screw around with all these surge points and you don't screw around with all these circuit breakers. You go around them by going directly to the man. By the time the current gets from you all the way down to him it is very weak, flickering all along the end. There is not a bright light there. All those circuit breakers have turned off the juice because they resent it. They resent it very much. You have not used the chain of command. You have left them out of the picture. They feel like you are kind of gaining popularity at their expense. You are in deep trouble.

I know of one very high ranking officer in the Armed Forces of the United States who made that mistake and who paid the penalty. He lost his chain of command and loyalty by going around. He got it started fast. It all seemed great and brilliant, but all of a sudden it began to crumble because the framework was not there. Those surge points did not exist for him. Those guys were not with him and didn't quite understand what he wanted. They didn't understand why he wanted it. They didn't like him going by them to do things that they didn't agree with, hadn't been sufficiently explained, nor had they been sufficiently motivated. That's what happens when you by-pass the chain of command.

When I came down here and talked to you recently, I said that I have an open-door policy. It opens out. I go out and find out what is going on. I don't want you all coming to my office! I don't want you to fall in love with me! I don't want all the loafers, floaters, ghosters, and coasters telephoning me with their many problems! I have to spend 95% of my time with the 95% of the Army which is good. I can't spend 95% of my time with the 5% of the Army which is lousy. If you have a problem, see your squad leader. If he doesn't help you, see your platoon sergeant, your platoon leader, your company commander, your battalion commander. Don't pick up the damn phone and call the Commanding General at Third Army; because I'm not ready for you yet, and I don't care whether you love me or not. I want you to love your sergeant, and your company commander, and your battalion commander. When I told the noncommissioned officers this in my address, those noncoms jumped up spontaneously and screamed - RIGHT ON! They don't want me taking over. They don't want me running down to all the privates and speedy-4's and telling them, love me, call me, I'll take care of any problem you have. If you have any difficulty be sure and let me know.

Well, I'm going to close my portion of this and mention this column I had in a paper. You see, you still need to talk to everybody. You still need to communicate. You need to use your chain of command. You need to convince them of what you want and get everybody on your side. You have to explain clearly what it is you want and be sure they understand that if they don't do it, you are going to do something about it. While doing all that, you have to create sort of an image of yourself. The men have to know who you are so they can relate to you. You know, I had a big "101" patch on the nose of my plane. I had wings spread on the fuselage and Lucky Eagle printed over the top of my plane. It wasn't because I was looking for any plaudits. I wanted the soldiers to know when that chopper was there, who was in it. And I would hook on to as many assaults as I possibly could in the course of the day--just go in, hover, take off, go someplace else. They knew they had seen Lucky Eagle that day. They knew they had seen it because there it was. There was some relationship. Even when I couldn't stop as I flew over a battalion, I would get on the radio and say, "Ramrod, this is Luckly Eagle, on my way to Da Nang, how's it going?" And I could feel the cheer in his voice, "Great, Sir, great sir, thanks for calling!" You know, what the hell. I was just going by, but there's the concern and do you think that when I asked Ramrod to do something he wouldn't do it? Of course he would! I take this next quotation from a Lucky Eagle column which I wrote. I said to my leaders, "You cannot expect a soldier to be a proud soldier if you humilitate him. You cannot expect him to be brave if you abuse and cower him. He will not be strong if you break him. The line between firmness and harshness, between firm leadership and bully, discipline and chicken, is a fine line. Those who have accepted the leadership of men as a career must find that line. Command is concern."

Judgments regarding people and human relationships are involved in leadership. Only men can lead men, not computers. Be ever alert to the pitfalls of too much authority. Beware that you do not fall into the category of the little man with the little job, with the big head. In essence, be considerate, treat your subordinates right and they will literally die for you.

QUESTION: (LTC Malone, USAWC) I'd like to start off by saying that I do have some disagreement. I had not anticipated a direct attack on what we put a lot of work into. The behavorial scientist is trying to give the practitioner something with which to work. If our mission, our goal, the purpose of being, and the reason we get paid are leadership, I think we are amiss if we do not look at any tool that can help us in the execution of leadership whether it is scientific, practical, or historical, past present, or whatever. That is our business and that is our job. The behavioral scientists have to work with models. I would draw an analogy in a type of model that he uses like the long range patrol leader who is given a map. That map is a model. It is a model of terrain. It is a way of representing something we cannot bring into your CP and show you, but, we can bring a model. It has blocks and diagrams and arrows that say this equals that and these little round circles mean that ground is higher. So, that is the way the guy is trying to use that model. It is a field of knowledge which is imperfect. We know that, but, it is a field of knowledge that we are trying to explore and develop along with the growth of knowledge that is occuring throughout the world. We know that change is upon us. We know that the Army today is different from the Army that was. Change is going on at a rate that is difficult to keep up with. We have to cope with change. Basically, coping with change is like getting up an oak

tree. There are two ways: one, climb the tree or, two, you can sit on an acorn somewhere. It is true that as you climb, the higher your climb, the more your tail hangs out. But, at least, when you get to the top you can see the forest. That is what the behavioral scientists are trying to help the commander do. So, it is a concept of balance.

ANSWER: I hear what you are saying and I agree. By the same token, I will give you the other side of it. I have never disagreed with the need for behavioral scientists' research. In fact, I have encouraged it in my second son who first wanted to go back and teach at West Point in the Social Science Department. He said to me, "Dad, I think I'd like to return to school and take behavioral science and get my masters degree in it, and go back into the military leadership department." I told him that I thought that was great. I encouraged him to do that. Now, my other boy is studying history at Duke and he is going back and teach military history at West Point. But, the younger boy wants to get into behavioral sciences and I encourage him. So, if I gave the impression that I was against behavioral scientists and the study of leadership by behavioral scientists, I gave you the wrong impression. But, what I will stick with is that I do not agree with you that you need to display your results in the kinds of models that you are using and displaying. This turns off the recipients. When this happens you had better start climbing another trunk of that tree, or another branch or look at some other way to get up that tree. Because, I read that type of an article in Army Magazine, written by a previous Director of the Leadership Department here, and it turned me off. I went around to my lieutenant colonels, majors, and captains and asked them and it turned them off. And, you know it turns off the sergeants. So, some way, the behavioral scientists have got to come up with their findings and get a better way to transmit their findings. They need a better way to transmit their findings to the recipients so they can put it into practical application, rather than half-heartedly sticking to their model and diagram concept. I think that there are other ways to get across leadership. That is what I am saying. Ways other than refining leadership into blocks, x's and squares, and that is where I thought the Army War College study went astray. Not that there was not a group of brilliant young men working on it. Not that they did not come up with some good things. I do not wipe out that whole study, but, the format of it turned me off and turns off most people who are trying to understand leadership. That is my point. You have got to study it, of course you do. What the hell have I been doing in my own simple way--reading Soldier, Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe, Nineteen Stars, Dark December. I read, and have got a library full of them. I am trying to find out about how you lead, what you do, and what is right, and what is wrong, what are the things that work, and what things do not work. You do not get this stuff because you are a guy they happen to like. You work at it. I have worked at it in my own clumsy way. I just read and watch and listen and try to learn. If the applied study by behavioral scientists can enlighten us faster, can open a greater avenue, can do it better for us--then, I encourage it. I am all for it. But, I think they have to look at the way they present it. I do not think they can engage in what I call intellectual arrogance and say if you want to learn, you have to learn the way that we show it. I think the behavioral scientists have got to say, "If we're going to teach it, we've got to figure out the best way acceptable to the recipient and put it in the that format."

QUESTION: (CPT Harris) I'd like to start off by saying I'm just a captain and I probably shouldn't say anything. I've been in this business of teaching leadership for two years now and I've worked a little with LTC Malone and I went to the Center for Creative Leadership--the outfit you were talking about in North Carolina that helped General Emerson. I've seen both sides of the behavioral scientists and the way they train leadership. I was a platoon leader in Vietnam and a commander. My observation is about what the behavioral scientists teach, like Dr. Farr in the Center for Creative Leadership and Dr. Jacobs (HumRRO). I think there is a lot of misunderstanding about what they are trying to say with their models. In the Center for Creative Leadership, I liked everything that Dr. Farr and Dr. Penner communicated--things they taught made really good sense to me in terms of my practical experience. They were very practical men. Yet, they don't have the experience we have in terms of leading troops and all that. In fact, Dr. Jacobs spent a couple of hours yesterday, telling us that it doesn't do us a lot of good teaching theory in models. He said that doesn't make sense to soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers. We need to take their findings and put it in terms of practical cases and our practical experiences. In other words, they can help us a great deal but it's our job, as leadership instructors, to take those models that don't really make sense to anyone else but behavioral scientists--things like LTC Malone's War College study weren't really meant to show the things we need to do. We need to take that and put it in terms of practical leadership instruction, exercises, case studies--things that really involve the students. My big criticism of Army leadership instruction is that we don't have the time to really teach the students to do what you just said. We all know what you just said is exactly right. But, how do we teach students to do that? I don't think we

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can do it in lectures. We only have 26 hours to teach leadership. We have great content there; but, we can't tell them what to do. We have to put them in situations where they learn by experience As Dr. Jacobs said yesterday, when a guy gets out on the job, he really doesn't get a lot of feedback. People won't really tell him what to do. We need, in our schools, to put him in situations where they make mistakes, bad judgments, and then, we, as instructors, show them where they goofed up. I don't think we have the time that we need to do this in our leadership training.

ANSWER: That is a good valid remark and I must say at the outset that I agree with you. The final product of a school system has always concerned me. I have been subjected to a lot of courses. It always disturbed me when I analyzed, as a troop commander, what I did all day, I even broke it out into time utilization--time spent on personnel and leadership, tactics, logistics, intelligence, etc. I came up, as I analyzed my activities as a regimental or division commander, with a gross feeling that I spent about 85% of my waking hours on personnel and leadership, morale matters, etc. I Spent about 15% of my time on tactics, strategy, logistics, technical aspects of my leadership. Most of the day I was dealing with people, greeting new officers, saying good-bye to old officers, pinning awards on, talking to soldiers, asking questions, going down to greet a new battalion arriving, saying good-bye to a battalion that was departing, reviewing court martial cases, talking to men. Mostly, it was not too much about tactics, but just human relationships. I tried to figure it out--all my military career I have been studying 85% of the time that which I do 15% of the time. I have been doing 85% of the time that which I study 15% of the time! The whole thing seems screwed up to me. I do not believe that our service schools spend enough time on leadership training. Do not call it leadership training. It is not all leadership training--it is morale, personnel, administration, the interface you have with your people, the kinds of problems you have, the administration of justice, the kinds of things that you as a commander can do; the gimmickery - all the little tricks of the trade - all of the stuff that's inherent in command. You learn this by on-the-job training. Then you go off to school and study like hell that which you do so seldom. Of course, it has to be right when you do it.

I agree that you have to take findings and place them in presentable forms. By the same token, I want to challenge the behavioral scientists to put it in a more presentable form. Help make it easier for us to translate it into some way we can teach it.

QUESTION: (Seminar Participant) One point to possibly reinforce your comment on behavioral scientists. At Leavenworth, the behavioral scientists recognized that the Army of 1970's wasn't the same as that of 1941. Specifically, the man coming into the Army wasn't the same... cultural impacts and everything else. The purpose of their study was to try and capitalize on this somewhat, re-invent the wheel and project into the future so that we could anticipate what sort of man we would have in 1985 or 1990. All of this sounded very good except for the ultimate purpose of the behavioral scientists; and, it seemed as though they were working in a vacuum. They were losing sight of why we or anybody else have an Army. They were looking at this time frame and trying to figure out the type of individual we have had in the army for purpose of making the army compatible to this man. It is my contention that we should make a study to try and determine what we're getting, in order to determine what we would have to do with the raw material in 1985 to make him an efficient soldier, recognizing that he may come from a society that didn't lend itself to producing soldiers the traditional or practical sense. I just felt that there was a slight twist there, based upon the fact that people who were making the study were not really looking in terms of the final product they had to produce--a soldier, if you will; but, were looking more in an isolated or vacuum type atmosphere and were really losing the main thrust of the whole exercise.

ANSWER: I think that when you get into an academic environment, whether it be behavioral scientists, or whether you are writing a field manual on airborne operations which I went through, you have a tendency to become scholarly and grasp and grope and strain sometimes at gnats. But, you are trying to reach some conclusions and sort things out for yourself. I did not want to see the whole thing wind up in a dialogue; what the hell is right or wrong with behavioral scientists! I want you to stop talking about leadership and get on with the program.

QUESTION: (Seminar Participant) Regarding leadership instruction, I have a point to make sir. And that point is--encourage people to read. My observations, one man's admittedly, is that very, very few people within the contemporary officers corps spend much time reading. There are very few people who know of Grant's campaign, but, everybody knows the Wall Street Journal and how stocks are doing. I think your point is well emphasized by the fact that at this stage in history, militarily

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speaking, it would take a complete genius to come up with an original "screw-up." They've just about all been done and if you read about them, you can pretty much learn how to avoid them.

ANSWER: That is right. Of course, you do learn that. You learn big things. I listened to Sir William Slim years ago speak at Leavenworth on the "Art of High Command." He wove an hour talk around the "Art of High Command." He said there were just three points: one, no papers, two, no details, and three, no regrets. I use this as a point to say, "Well, now I'll talk about the art of low-- command--decide, explain, and enforce." There are all kinds of ways to do things. Some people are delegates and some are perfectionists who find themselves incapable of delegating. You have to really worry about a man like that. I worry about him. That is, when I find a splendid young captain and a tremendous major; you just think he is great, and all of a sudden he gets to be a colonel and he cannot command that regiment or he cannot command that brigade. You are disappointed! You are shocked! You thought he was better than that. You wonder about your own judgment. You wonder how did I mis- judge this guy? Well, you did not misjudge him. He was awfully good at those things he did himself. He was fantastic at the things he did himself; but, he had not learned to use other people to help him. He was such a perfectionist that sometimes when he used other people and they did not do it quite the way he would have done it, or not quite as well as he would have done it, he could not resist the urge to take over. He would not recognize forty guys all working and each one not doing quite as well as he would have done one of those things. These guys are doing so much more than you could possibly do alone that it is not even funny. So, you have to learn to trust people. You have turn loose. How does Coca-Cola run with all those little plants all over? Who runs all of those 7 - 11's? Who runs all of those Sears Roebucks? You know that the guys at the top have got to be able to delegate. They have to have some confidence and accept the fact that there will be some stealing, some lousy handling of materials, something falling through the cracks. You have got to delegate. You cannot reach positions of high responsibility without being willing to lay your money on other people. You have to lay your money on other people! A brilliant fellow worked with me on the faculty at Leavenworth. He worked hard; but, what a pity! He even came back at night to cut his own stencils because he did not like the work of the secretary who was assigned to our department. How ridiculous! This man bordered on genius in terms of intellectual capacity. And there he was, wasting his time sitting there cutting stencils because he was such a perfectionist! You have a man here in whom I do not want to infer anything wrong because I loved him. He was my first battalion commander. You all know him. I talked to his son about this just the other day. His son is a Brigadier General. He was a great instructor at Leavenworth and was director of instruction. As I say, he was my first battalion commander. That man did not make general. He was brilliant, conscientious, worked hard all the time--over 70 years--and is still very busy today. Everbody asks, " why didn't he make general?" I think I can tell you why. Because I go back to 1937 when I was a second lieutenant in G Company. I was going out with details as a young lieutenant to set up the range and the rest of the company was coming out in a couple of hours later. And, who should show up down there but the colonel--the battalion com- mander! Not only does he show up but he is helping me load the truck. And, he is telling me what he thinks, where the targets should go. And I couldn't help but think, as a young lieutenant, what in the hell is a battalion commander doing down here now, and why won't he let me load this truck? So, this is a point I would like to get across to you. You have to be willing to let other people work for you. Everybody needs a pat on the back--some high and some low!

CONCLUSION: (MG Tarpley, Commandant USAIS) Lieutenant General Zais, you said you have to think to argue and I think you have everybody thinking!!! On behalf of all of us, thank you for a very stimulating hour. It has been just great and I am sure there is going to be a lot of discussion about this in the seminars and workshops that follow. Thank you again for being your keynote speaker.

DISCIPLINE, COMMITMENT AND LEADERSHIP
Colonel Robert L. Rollier
Commander, Third Brigade
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

INTRODUCTION.

General Tarpley, General Richardson, distinguished guests: I consider it an exceptional honor to be selected from among the infantry brigade commanders in CONUS to provide this address for the Annual Leadership Seminar. You know, the fact that this address is designed for presentation to a group of "leadership experts" is a bit disconcerting--and even an awesome experience.

A few weeks ago General Richardson wrote to CONUS brigade commanders asking for a progress and performance report on NCO and basic and advanced officer graduates once they arrived in the field.

We also had decided to take a real close look at racial issues in the brigade to see if we knew what was going on. I was pretty sure there were no racial problems of any degree of significance, but wanted to be sure we weren't just kidding ourselves.

Then came the opportunity to address this leadership seminar--and it occurred to me that it provided a rare opportunity to combine all of the brigade effort in these fields into a single presentation to a group which was in a unique position to, first, appreciate the problems cited--and, second, had the power to provide assistance if convinced by our presentation.

To avoid exposing a lot of ignorance, I studied the program of instruction and the lesson plans for the Fort Benning Basic Branch Officer Course/Warrant Officer Intermediate Course/Officer Candidate School/Reserve Officer Candidate Course.

I wrote for, received and perused the Command and General Staff College leadership program of instruction plus the texts.

On a local basis, I looked closely at the Fort Leonard Wood Noncommissioned Officer Academy/ Drill Sergeant School leadership program of instruction and its texts.

Now I felt that I knew to some degree what is being taught in the various schools and posts. My next question was: How do individuals perform after having received this instruction? Therefore, I took the following steps:

I conducted a seminar with the graduates of OCS who are training officers in my brigade.

I did the same thing with several graduates of the Reserve Officer Training Course and the Infantry Officer Basic Course who are assigned as training officers in this brigade.

Next, I had a conference with all my battalion commanders reference the adequacy of ROTC and OCS graduates.

I conducted a brigade officers' call to discuss the program.

I talked to senior officers in positions of command at Fort Leonard Wood.

And last, I analyzed the comments received from seminars and discussions and compared them with my own reactions after 29 years of experience as an infantryman.

At this point there was still one ingredient missing from the picture. This ingredient was the reaction of enlisted men to leaders we receive from Fort Benning and other service schools (regardless of the leader's commission source). Therefore, four additional seminars were conducted to obtain the perceptions of enlisted personnel reference these officers as follows:

Black enlisted personnel, grades E2 - E4.

White enlisted personnel, grades E2 - E4.

Black enlisted personnel, grades E5 - E7.

White enlisted personnel, grades E5 - E7.

As a result of these preparations I found that I, too, had come to several conclusions: Not only about the officer who graduates from Fort Benning--but also about noncommissioned officers--and the entire subject of leadership. These reactions and conclusions have resulted in the text that you are about to have inflicted upon you. Both to stress the things I learned and to provide additional emphasis throughout this address, I will intersperse taped comments taken from these seminars to illustrate specific points.

DISCUSSION. The texts and the programs of instruction from all of the service schools do a good job of exposing the budding leader to the essential principles required for success as a leader of men. In fact, it was a constant source of amazement to me that so many areas were covered so well. I do, however, suggest a few areas in which things might be done a little bit better!

Preparation of the Leader. What are you doing to prepare the new lieutenant for his first challenge; i.e., his first duty assignment? Well, in reading the USAIS IOBC program of instruction, it was obvious that sometime in the past a decision was made to concentrate on the TOE organization. At no point in any leadership text did I find reference to the fact that the new lieutenant does not necessarily go to a TOE organization. I checked with DA to get an idea as to the initial assignments of new officers and I discovered that approximately 60% of them go to other-than-combat units. Now it seems to me that we, therefore, have an obligation to let this young leader know he may go to other units-- and to provide him situations which include problems he'll face in "other-than-TOE organizations." To give you an analysis from the viewpoint of the training center, as I mentioned in the start of this discussion, I went to the officers of my own brigade to evaluate the newly arrived leader. Let me now comment on a few of your products and to some significant degree, how your products evaluate themselves.

It is no secret that the Officer Candidate School graduate is better prepared for his initial assignment than any other commission source. It is also true that later on the graduate of the ROTC program and/or military academy achieves ascendancy as he masters the fundamentals, becomes confident and then begins to capitalize on his education. However, this is a slow process and I do feel that we should study to find ways to do the job better and faster.

The classes on leadership--if they are presented as they are written in the lesson plans--are too technically oriented. In some cases, and particularly in the five-hour block entitled "The Effective Leader," the lesson plan sounds like a treatise in an advanced psychology class (abnormal psychology?). A great deal of technical terminology is used, and it is difficult to translate into meaningful example. As I read through a few of the lesson plans I was bemused by terms like "Goal Congruence, Cognitive Leader Functions, Counter-Motivators, Self-Actualization, Interface Processes in the Individual, Effective Incentive Value (EIV), Need System Optimization, and System Induction."

It seems to me that what we need to do is to turn the gun around and examine it from the other end for a while--and in basic English that even I can understand. I think we should study the budding leader. What is the young lieutenant like when he first arrives at the unit? What are his impressions, reactions, hang-ups, fears, drives and goals? The new lieutenant suffers from a tremendous feeling of insecurity--caused in large part by a lack of familiar surroundings. We must realize this young officer is green.

TAPE: ROTC & OCS (FIRST IMPRESSIONS):

TAPE: SYNOPSIS OF ROTC & OCS GRADUATES (FIRST IMPRESSIONS)

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1st--An OCS graduate assigned to a TDA (training) unit indicated that he was not trained for this kind of assignment. He recommended broader training in Officer Candidate School.

2d--An OCS graduate believed that leadership is achieved by "force." After assignment to a training unit he felt the "follow me" concept was not practical. He stated the Officer Candidate School had failed to provide well-rounded training.

3d--A recent ROTC graduate indicated that at IOBC he was taught "walk softly and carefully" when around noncommissioned officers; both to gain their cooperation and for his own self-preservation.

4th--One ROTC graduate felt timid in giving orders to NCO's because of the age difference.

5th--A recent IOBC graduate felt that all of his orientation was toward TOE units. His assignment in a training unit caused uncertainty, confusion and insecurity.

We must realize this officer is young and terribly green.

He has made no career decision--that will come only after months of exposure to the Army.

He is not sure of his job or how to accomplish it.

He is scared to be enthusiastic.

He is afraid he'll make mistakes.

He doesn't want too much commitment.

In most cases, he still lacks true dedication.

He hopes for glamor that he intuitively attaches to leadership as a lieutenant.

His self-discipline is nonexistent or nebulous at best.

He views long hours and hard work as distasteful. These things don't quite square with his views on the glamor of leadership.

What we need to do is to "set the stage" for him so that he knows what to expect in that first duty assignment. Let's listen to a few of his comments made after he has been in the unit for a few months.

TAPE: ROTC AND OCS GRADUATES.

SYNOPSIS OF TAPE: ROTC AND OCS GRADUATES: (ALTERED IMPRESSIONS)

1st--"I began with an authoritarian approach. Because of this style, the NCO's did not back me. After altering my approach, I gained cooperation from the NCO's."

2d--"I had to first prove myself with the NCO's to become an effective leader."

Yes, we need to make the young lieutenant appreciate the cold, hard realities of the job he is about to undertake. First, it's not an eight-to-five job anywhere. Second, as pointed out before, not all jobs are with TOE units. Remember, approximately 60% of all new lieutenants are going to training centers and similar assignments.

Both my battalion commanders and I feel that while we are the ones who have to infuse the individual with self-discipline, dedication, motivation and commitment, you can do a lot just by letting him know this is the exposure he will receive. I recommend that you inform him, and, by situational problems be sure he grasps, the fact that long hours are both the fate and the primary fare of a new lieutenant. Furthermore, this will be true as long as he is in the Army. As Edison said, "Genius is 99% perspiration and only about one percent inspiration."

I recommend that you stress competition as a leadership technique which produces great results. That there is danger in competition being overdone, I concur. But at this point in a leader's development, competition can be a very important tool in the motivation of subordinate personnel and the achievement of success. By competition, both a leader and his men can strive to be number one. Beating that other unit is a good way to develop professionalism as long as it's not overdone.

In discussing character traits and how they lead to our ultimate goal of professionalism, I am reminded of a verse from Kipling's poem, "That Day":

> "We was rotten 'fore we started
> We was never disciplined
> We made it out a favor if an order was obeyed.
> Yes, every little drummer - 'ad his rights and wrongs to mind.
> So we had to pay for teaching -
> And we paid!"

Integrity. Events of the past few years have created a credibility gap, not only for the government, but for the armed forces as well. Stories of body count in Vietnam, PX scandals, the Wooldridge affair and similar incidents have served to tarnish the name and sully the professionalism normally associated with the armed services. I think that what hurts most, however, is that this credibility gap exists within our own ranks in the military as much as it does in the civilian community. There is a very significant degree of distrust on the part of junior officers; they enter the Army with a great deal of scepticism as to the honor and integrity of our senior officers. They practice it themselves to a very significant degree but are conditioned by the press, TV and other media to believe it does not exist to any degree within the armed forces. In a way, it's a question of perception versus reality.

After 29 years of service, I confess that many within our own military community add credence to this belief in the way they alibi, "cover-up" on inspections and make excuses for substandard performance. This is an area in which all of the service schools, and indeed all of the services, can join in a common cause. In the advanced courses of the various branches, at the Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, at the Senior Marine School and the Senior Service Schools (War, Industrial, Navy, Air Force, National)--we must make a point of properly explaining to student officers the need for proper reporting and accounting without alibis, excuses or distortion of fact.

As leaders we must stress the fact, and live it as well, that impeccable honesty is the officer's way of life. At the risk of sounding overenthusiastic, I think we ought to come close to starting a new "Holy War," dedicated to honesty and total commitment. Only in this way and by building on this broad base can we convince the new lieutenant of our credibility.

I think it is extremely important to give the new lieutenant a thorough understanding of the men he will lead.

Today we stress the fact that the individual soldier must have instilled in him the desire to obey-- the desire to do the right thing--the desire to follow.

There is far more emphasis placed on the individual soldier and his obligations, rights and privileges than ever before. This represents a significant change in our approach to the individual soldier.

Although good leaders throughout history have known and counseled their men, today we formalize counseling as a leadership tool. The intent or the goal of this counseling is to make the soldier want to obey by:

Discovering his problems and resolving them;

As a result of problem resolution, permit him to concentrate on his job;

As a result of counseling, make him feel understood, needed and a vital part of the team.

The counseling techniques that you teach are right on target. As a BCT brigade commander I emphasize counseling as a tool in promoting harmony. Out of it we get a bonus effect of reducing both AWOL's and delinquency reports.

I find, however, that the new leader fails rather significantly in one area. This is the important leadership trait which I call <u>perception</u>. It embraces not only how the leader views the enlisted man and his problem, but also how the enlisted man views the leader. Let me give you an illustration of <u>perception versus reality</u>. When I asked the officers whether they knew their enlisted men and gave them opportunity to effect a two-way information exchange--without exception--the officers felt that they had established good communication and that this communication had, in fact, resulted in a satisfied group of enlisted personnel. What was the reality from the enlisted man's viewpoint?

<u>TAPE: BLACK AND WHITE, E2 - E4 (THEIR PERCEPTION OF LEADERSHIP)</u>

SYNOPSIS OF TAPE: BLACK AND WHITE, E2 - E4 (THEIR IMPRESSION OF LEADERSHIP)

1st--(Black) "Some brigade officers act like God and have the power to squash people. If they acted more human, things would be better."

2d--(White) "The 'little man' has no say in matters. Officers won't listen. They will invade the privacy of soldiers and punish them without knowing facts."

3d--(White) "The educational background of men is not properly utilized. Many college graduates drive trucks, cook, and work in jobs which do not use their skills and training."

4th--(Black) "I found officers snobbish, unfriendly, and noncommunicative with low ranks."

This same contrast between <u>perception</u> and <u>reality</u> can be, and was, carried over into an appreciation of racial issues. I learned a great deal which I am now applying within my own brigade as a result of these seminars which were intended to provide data for this address. Believe me, I have now taken some very important steps in awakening my own leaders to the racial prejudice of both <u>Black</u> and <u>White</u>.

Whether justified or not, if an individual perceives himself as a victim of discrimination, it is important to recognize this--and to counteract it.

I noticed in our seminars that there was a reluctance to use the words "Black, White, Hunky, Nigger, Negro, Whitey" and similar terms. It was even more difficult to stimulate a dialogue on the subject of race and individual racial perceptions. As I mentioned at the beginning, I am a man who prides himself on being one who <u>knows</u>, <u>intuitively feels</u> and works hard at being a leader. I was convinced by my personal rapport with my troops that I knew the answers. But after our seminars-- I know all units have real problems and, like icebergs, two-thirds don't show. But that two-thirds of the iceberg is there just the same--waiting for a Titanic to hit.

<u>TAPE: BLACK AND WHITE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS (PREJUDICE)</u>

(BLACK PERCEPTION OF WHITE/WHITE PERCEPTION OF BLACK)

SYNOPSIS OF TAPE: BLACK AND WHITE NCO'S (PREJUDICE):
Black Perception of White:

1st Black--"A black soldier will get a bad rating more quickly than a white soldier when he steps out of line. It's because of color."

2d Black--"I have seen a white drill sergeant single out blacks. A black noncommissioned officer would not do this to white soldiers."

3d Black--The black man will get a court-martial a lot faster than a white man."

4th Black--"The black soldier has nowhere to turn. The commanding officer and sergeant major of my unit tries to look good before his boss when it comes to race relations."

5th Black--"Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Indians will pull for the minority group since they have been placed together."

SYNOPSIS OF TAPE:
White Perception of Black:

1st White--"A white soldier now has to take second place because black soldiers cry discrimination!"

2d White--"I think the old black NCO's are okay. The young ones, however, are not okay because they are prejudiced and militant."

3d White--"Black soldiers become a real problem when they congregate."

4th White--"The blacks have superior attitudes regarding their rights and privileges."

5th White--"Black is black; yellow is yellow; none of 'em are white; I don't trust any of them."

It was a shock for me to find that the bias among white noncommissioned officers was far more violent than I had expected. You know as a class or a group--and through education--nearly all officers have now learned to accept integration, both on duty and in a social environment. I believe the NCO's have not yet learned!! In most units the NCO is a high school graduate--by way of GED-- and there are some deep wells of antipathy, prejudice and rancor which exist to a very significant degree. As a result of this fact I would recommend that the new leader be made aware of this NCO resentment and prejudice and that he be prepared to counteract it by example and conviction--through training.

TAPE: OFFICERS: LITTLE PREPARATION FOR REAL RACE PROBLEMS IN UNIT

SYNOPSIS OF TAPE: OFFICERS (PREPARATION FOR RACE PROBLEMS)

1st--"We need less emphasis on race relations instruction for officers. The NCO's need more race relations training."

2d--"Previous training (IOBC) did not prepare me to cope with racial problems."

3d--"I think the Army's overall race relations program is ineffective."

Classes which teach race relations must include specific leadership situations on race just as on combat techniques and other TOE unit leadership situations. I would suggest that you include the technique of developing "empathy" in your instruction on leadership.

The new lieutenant should be taught to look at the situation from the viewpoint of the enlisted man of all ranks just as he looks at the tactical situation from the standpoint of the enemy commander in order to evaluate the impact of his own actions and orders.

The new officer, and the old one as well, must be made aware. He must be taught to distinguish between his perception of reality and the perception of reality through the eyes of the follower-- to me this is empathy.

Once we have received a new lieutenant from OCS or a Basic Officer Course, it then becomes the job of the brigade, battalion and company commander to assess the potential of each individual. We first find his strong points and his weaknesses and then seek ways to exploit his potential to the fullest.

Initially, we seek to allay the new lieutenant's fears through extending a hearty welcome, giving him an opportunity to get quarters and finances, or other personal problems straightened out. Then briefing, conversation, orientation and guided tours--gradually break him in.

Above all, we must try to convince him that he is not expected to be an "instant expert." If possible, we place him with another training officer of greater experience to help make the transition. If this is not possible (and in most cases it is not) then the company commander takes even greater pains than usual to "walk him through" his initial exposure to the unit.

Battalion and company commanders also talk with the senior drill sergeant to insure that the lieutenant is brought along at a rate commensurate with his abilities and personality. When he arrives at brigade, and before he is assigned to a battalion, the new officer is required to read the brigade SOP--a very voluminous document--and he is given a personal copy of correspondence relating to the duties of a training officer. This provides all the regulations and legal authorities for actions he is apt to take once he arrives in the company.

After prolonged discussion, my battalion commanders and I have agreed that our first mission is to instill confidence in the individual through successful performance of tasks of gradually increasing complexity--then we begin to develop his sense of responsibility in the social and religious fields as well as those relating directly to his duty performance.

Collectively, we teach and preach cooperative competition and the importance of communicating a competitive spirit to personnel under his command. We are particularly careful to permit him to make mistakes without getting too excited, but being careful to point out why it was mistake--and how it could have been done better. General Mel Zais used to say, "Every man has to be patted on the back once a day--sometimes high, sometimes very low--but every day."

I think that the young lieutenant who comes to a training center environment has a greater cultural shock than the individual who goes to a tactical unit. In basic training units, he is not a platoon leader, but the training officer, range officer, executive officer and frequently, the only officer in the area with responsibility for over 200 trainees and ten to twelve drill sergeants. It is this kind of exposure that produces the shock because he has been preconditioned to envisage himself as a commander of 30 to 42 men.

The one subject we preach continuously, but never seem successful with, is making on-the-spot corrections. There appears to be a natural reluctance to make corrections unless the individual is in an official formation. I know this deficiency is characteristic of the entire Army, but maybe there is a way you can help us solve it at the service schools. I challenge you to do it and I assure you that anything you do is bound to constitute an improvement.

Out of all of this mode of attack, plus using carrot and stick motivation, the brigade achieves a surprisingly high degree of discipline and commitment; and with discipline and commitment you have the true basis for leadership.

SUMMARY. I know that in the last 45 minutes I have presented no panaceas or shortcuts to leadership. Nothing I have discussed is earth-shaking or radical in context or approach. However, it is necessary to forewarn the new lieutenant and provide him with a realistic appraisal of what his first duty assignment will be like. I do believe it is important that you recognize the odds are roughly two to one that the new lieutenant will not go to a TOE organization and that, therefore, the curriculum must be adjusted to acknowledge this fact. Long hours are both the fate and the primary fare of a new lieutenant. Don't let him leave the school feeling otherwise. Develop in the new leader a desire for confidence and cockiness achieved through competition--through a desire to be number one in everything.

Stress the need for integrity and his ability to rely on his superiors and their word.

Above all, give the new leader an understanding of the men that he is going to lead. Provide him with the ability to increase his understanding awareness. Use the situational approach to problem-solving in the everyday aspects of leadership and race relations. Teach him to distinguish between his perception and that which he will attain if he uses empathy--seeing things through the eyes of the

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led.   Alert him to the substantial prejudice that he must meet and overcome in his own role as a leader, as well as in his attempt to implement policy relating to equality and race relations.

I guess what I am really saying is, to quote my son, "tell it like it is."

CONCLUSIONS.   The junior leaders that we are receiving today are far and away the best educated in the history of the Army.   The quality is there too.   They are altruistic, sincere, dedicated and highly motivated.   It is your duty and mine to translate these qualities into the commitment that is vital to the improvement of the Officers' Corps.

Commitment, I believe, is an infectious quality which we impart to the new leader through our own sincerity, professionalism and competence.   A picture is still worth a thousand words--what better picture could we draw than that of all the brothers--honorable?   Let's live up to the Infantry School motto--which in essence says, "Do as I do"--or, Follow Me.

TRAINING TO LEAD AT SMALL UNIT LEVEL

Colonel Earl G. Peck, USAF
Commandant, USAF Squadron Officers' School

It's a pleasure for me to be here. I felt some trepidation as did Colonel Rollier, when asked to come here and speak about training for leadership at small unit level, as I'm employed principally in education rather than training. I'm also delighted to see that the Navy is represented here. As you know, the Navy has a long tradition of distinguished leadership and leadership training, which flows back probably to their British predecessors, and the indomitable Admiral Lord Nelson, who was quite famous you may recall, for the "red jacket" which he wore up on the bridge in battle. Each time the enemy ships would approach, the valet would run below to get Admiral Nelson and say there are three enemy ships on the horizon, and Nelson would ask for his "red jacket" and promptly go up to the bridge and lead the fight. After this had happened several times, the valet asked him why he donned the "red jacket." Lord Nelson replied, "It's simply so that if I'm wounded, my crew won't see the blood and get discouraged and they'll continue to fight." One day the valet ran downstairs and said, "Admiral Nelson, there are 75 enemy ships on the horizon." Lord Nelson hesitated for a moment. He didn't ask for his "red jacket." The valet looked at him for a few moments. Finally, the Admiral said, "You better bring me my brown pants!"

In discussing the subject of training to lead at small unit levels, there are a great many areas I could address. But, I'm going to focus principally on the Squadron Officer's School (SOS) which provides leadership education for junior officers in the Air Force. We assume, and it's not always a valid assumption, that officers have acquired from the precommissioning sources those basic qualities of officership, which will permit us to educate them for leadership whether the guy comes from the Air Force Academy, or ROTC, or what was OTS, or Officer School of Military Science now at Lackland. We assume the basic qualities of officership and, of course, after an officer enters active duty, he receives all the specialized training. So when we talk about training a squadron commander, for example, we assume that he has all the technical expertise required on the part of a squadron commander. An Air Force F-4 squadron commander, for example, is a combat-ready F-4 pilot. So, when we talk about leadership training or leadership education at the Squadron Officer's School, we're totally divorced from specialized training, or technical training, and it is the real focus of leadership education in the Air Force. I won't belabor the Air University wiring diagram but Squadron Officer's School is the bottom layer of a three-tiered system of special military education. The schools above it, the Air Command Staff College, which is comparable to your school at Leavenworth, and the Air War College, of course, which is comparable to the Army War College or the National War College or Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

The Squadron Officer's School is a school essentially for captains and an essential leadership school. The officers come to us after about five or six years of active duty in which they have specialized very narrowly. They come from all the diverse specialities in the Air Force--pilots, navigators, supply officers, maintenance officers, whatever they may be. We take all these people with diverse backgrounds and hopefully place their jobs in perspective in the total Air Force mission.

In the three-tiered system of professional military education, the number of SOS graduates is now about 2400 officers each year. Beginning next year, by compressing the course from 14 to 11 weeks and going to four classes instead of three classes a year, that figure will be increased to about 3000 officers each year, which will represent 85% of the career eligible officers in the Air Force. Contrast that with the succeeding tiers of the professional military system, Air Command Staff College with 609 annual graduates of which about 500 are U.S. Air Force officers, and the Air War College with 288 of which about 220 are Air Force officers. You can see that for many of our students this is not only their first professional military education experience, but in many cases, their last. Simply on a statistical basis, the opportunity for attendance at the Air War College or the Air Training Staff College, will run about 25% as contrasted with our 85%, and about 20% at the Air War College, if you consider equivalent schools.

Our mission has three elements and they can be broken down quite simply: to increase competence of the individual as an Air Force officer; to strengthen his dedication to the Air Force and to a full career (incidentally, if we go back over the last 15 years of graduates, 85% of all the squadron officers school graduates have remained with the Air Force for a full career); the third element of the mission is to strengthen his inclination toward continuing professional self-development to give him the impetus to continue his own development. That stems from the preceding slightly because for many of those officers, this is their last professional military education experience.

These are the objectives and I will break them down quite simply for you--communicative skills, leadership attributes and principals, management concepts and techniques, the elements of national power and the fundamentals of national relations, and finally, the employment of forces. The SOS philosophy is embodied in the "whole man" concept--mind, body, and spirit. Academically, we hope his communicative skills, and so forth, are increased, and that a sound mind will reside in a sound body as a result of his participation in an athletic program which I will describe in a few minutes.

The ethical side of the triangle, we say less about for a couple of reasons. Whereas it is probably possible to teach a course in ethics, it is almost impossible to teach ethical behavior from the platform. Therefore, much of what we try to accomplish in this area, we hope is transmitted by example and from lessons the student draws from the situations into which he is thrust in the games, in the seminars, and even in the social arena. But, to echo something Colonel Rollier said earlier, there is nothing more important to officership toaday that integrity; we hope most of all to impress upon those 800 officers in each class, that this is true. Secondly, as he suggested, with the Armed Forces under attack, with our image at stake--when we are blamed for everything from My Lai to Wounded Knee, from Sergeant Wooldridge to Jack Lavelle, for procurement difficulties with the C-5 and the F-11 to support for the SST and space exploration: it requires the highest order of professional courage and integrity to combat the misunderstanding which ensues.

A statistical crosscut of our current class shows 792 students presently in session over at Maxwell. The average age is 28, although they vary from 23 to 41. Slightly more than 40% are rated officers, the rest from support specialties. Although we call it Squadron Officer's School, about one-half have worked, at one time, above squadron level. Virtually all are college graduates by virtue of our procurement process, the only exceptions are a few nurses and a few guardsmen reservists; a significant number have graduate degrees. Eighty-six percent married is representative of this kind of officer, and more than one-half bring their wives. This is significant because we encourage them to bring their wives even though this a TDY school and they bring their wives at their own expense. We deeply involve the wives in all the squadron officers' activities and many of them, for the first time, feel they are part of the Air Force. We have found that the career decision of a young officer is dramatically affected by the attitude of his wife. Invariably, an officer who elects to make the Air Force a career has a wife who has either a positive or neutral attitude. Invariably, when he elects NOT to make the Air Force a career, when married, his wife has a negative attitude.

We have allied officers in two of our classes each year. They have come from 62 different countries. We have graduated more than 1400. They go through virtually the same program as the Air Force officers. In the current class we have 35 to 18 countries--Tunisia, Lebanon, Malaysia, South Vietnam, Brazil. In the last class there was one student from Panama, one from Sweden, and students representing countries which you might not characterize as allies. But we learn a great deal from them and they learn a great deal from us. Many of these officers have gone back to assume positions of great responsibility in their own Air Forces, including, in some cases, Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff, and they are relatively recent graduates of this school.

Our director of curriculum is responsible for platform instruction and all the manuals. Our director of evaluation is responsible for the three friendly examinations, subjective in nature, which take place during the 14-week course. Admin takes care of everything else in terms of services required by the school. The students belong to the directorate of student operations, which is divided into eight wings, each commanded by a Major or Lieutenant Colonel on our faculty. Each wing is divded into eight sections, 64 sections in all, each commanded by a Major or Captain on our faculty, 12 or 13 students in each seminar. Those sections are very carefully balanced as to athletic ability, academic prowess, aeronautical rating, command of origin, marital status, experience, and a number of other factors, to insure that any one section or seminar is virtually the equivalent of any other section or seminar. This becomes very important because in the competition, which is the lifeblood of the school, this reduces the temptation to rationalize either the success or failure because those guys had all the jocks or those guys had all the brains. We find that the section which is best able to organize, provides the best emergency leadership, develops the best system for overcoming the problems which they encounter, is the section which does the best in this school.

Our curriculum content corresponds to four objectives. They are: communicative skills, to include logical thinking, problem solving, speaking and writing; leadership, which I will mention in some greater detail in a few minutes; management and national power; and the course culminates during the last week in a forces and employment exercise involving air, ground, and naval forces. Unlike a typical academic institution, instruction is phased so that we will provide all of the platform instruction and reading assignments in a practical subject, as in communicative skills during the first week, then to follow-on assignments and exercises which ensue from that instruction, continuing through the 14 weeks. Leadership instruction is a week and half of simple instruction. But then the exercises in which you employ the principles and techniques which you have learned in that instruction continues through the remainder of the 14 weeks. The same with management and national power. Finally, the student puts it all together in the forces and employment exercise at the end of the course. We vary our methodology for effect. We recognize that the lecture is most efficient but probably the least effective way to transmit information. We vary from the platform to the teaching interview, sort of a Bill Buckley technique; seminar discussions which are the guts of the school; seminar exercises, such as the forces and employment exercises which I mentioned earlier, exercises in some cases in competition with other sections and in some cases only in competition with a standard or with themselves.

Self-instruction, to include programed texts, are widely used through the use of education TV, and a field leadership program. The field leadership program starts with conditioning, as you might expect Although we expect all Air Force officers to be in condition, we find that they are not, so we start with conditioning and combine that with combative measures techniques, sort of a combination karate, judo, and jujitsu, and it is hardly more than an introduction. Then competitive sports, which consist of three games, none of which you have ever played in the form of which we play them. We take the edge off the professional athlete who has been a football player or professional volleyball player. We play volleyball, but we play it with SOS rules, which involve nine men instead of six on the side. If you think that simplifies it, it does not. We play soccer by SOS rules which eliminated contact and hitting the ball which complicates the problem for the guy who had played soccer. We play a game called "flicker ball" with which some of you are familiar. The game is played with a football and a field one-third the size of a football field. This combines throwing the football with basketball strategy and hockey tactics, soccer fluidity, and finally, passing the football through a vertical goal. The lessons to be learned from this are those of organization and leadership. The section which organizes and learns the rules and learns how to play the game most rapidly is the section which is most successful.

We have a number of special activities which are used to dramatize for the young officer the value of unit comradeship, spirit, etc. A Wing award night at the end of the course recognizes achievement within the Wing for individuals and sections, and finally, a School awards night at the end of the course recognizes those who have won everything in the whole School, individuals or sections.

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I mentioned we involved the wives very deeply in the activities of the School. We have the usual activities with which you are familiar. We also have the wives enrichment program, constructed just for wives, in the evening, at no expense to the Air Force, and conducted by our own faculty voluntarily. We begin with explaining SOS in a nutshell to the wives so that they will know why their husbands are there. Then a night on Russia, one on women's health given by one of the doctors in the hospital, then a night on China, and one on home decorating. We teach the wives how their husbands are assigned and how they are promoted, when even their husbands don't know in some cases. A night demonstration on combative measures training for the women, and four daytime courses are provided, for which we award a certificate of completion if they go through it all.

There are student evaluations, principally for feedbacks, so that we can tell the guy whether he is learning anything from the course and we can find out whether we are getting any "thinkback" to him. Forty-five percent of the course is based on objective examinations given three times in the course; 30% on communicative skills, both speaking and writing; then 25% on problem solving from which the section commander evaluates the individual's ability to solve problems, both in a group sense and an individual sense. Then, we evaluate ourselves rather critically. Every lecture, every presentation, is evaluated formally by at least one-sixth of the student body. I meet with the students several times for feedback. We survey our alumni, every class, to determine what they learned or what they should have learned, what they didn't learn, or what suggestions they have after they have been back and put it in practice. We survey the commanders of every graduate to determine how much improvement there is in the individual. And they report, invariably, a significant improvement in confidence and competence. We run scientific test data analysis, based on discrimination, ease, etc., to insure that our examinations are valid. Our faculty runs field trips all the time, updating the curriculum material. That is SOS in a nutshell.

TRAINING TO LEAD AT SMALL UNIT LEVEL
Commander E. Fenn Schrader
Director, Supervisory Skills and Training
Program for Chief Petty Officers
United States Navy

About two years ago, I was a little dismayed by the fact that the staff of the Training Command didn't seem to have the zing and zest and desire to want to excel in the job. They felt a lack of esteem; they were instructors; they were professionals. But, it reached the point that unless someone pushed them, they wouldn't get off bottom dead center and carry on with doing what they really could do.

Our mission, primarily, at the Fleet Ballistic Missile Training Center, is to train Polaris missile crews. This means technical training for the men who have joined the Navy. They had signed on the dotted line, saying, "Hey, I want to be in the Navy," but they didn't have that glitter in their eyes, that kind of lilt to their voice and the desire to get on with doing the job to the best of their ability. We felt there had to be some way in which things could be a little better. The things that came to mind were that in the last 20 years, our society has been moving very rapidly.

We had the invention of the computer, and for a long time, we thought the computer was going to solve everything for us. Forget about MAN, the computer has got it, and we will give all our attention, all our money, and all our love and care to the computer. We have to air-condition the classroom because of the computer, not because the people will learn better, but because the computer will run better. With all the exotic equipment that we have in the Navy, Army, and Air Force today, we have become very technically oriented and directed. This is important in a rapidly moving society. But, somehow the man who accomplishes all the work is forgotten. What are his feelings? How does he perceive his job? Is he really getting recognition that is important to him as a person? I think that has basically been the problem with us in the submarine force. We have become so technically oriented with nuclear power and ballistic missiles carried on nuclear submarines that we have placed emphasis on the machines rather than the men. We can buy equipment and we can keep the men in. However, money doesn't buy people with the desire, the burning desire, to do exactly what is required to do with a certain amount of self-satisfaction in accomplishment and to really be able to do the job to the best of their ability.

Last August, our Force Commander wrote a letter to our local Admiral, saying, "I sure wish you would devise a course to teach chief petty officers how to be better chief petty officers and to teach them in that course how to conduct field days, such as clean-up--a cookbook on how the course should be taught." That was well intended, I do not mean any disrespect to the Force Commander as he is a tremendous man. I really just pointed up where he had forgotten. We had gotten to the point of reacting and creating cookbooks for everything. Everything is documented and has to be done by numbers. We have procedures that are checked and rechecked. When we dive submarines, we have a rig for the dive--it is checked and rechecked and then it is checked again. I thought maybe we should try a different approach. We have too many "by the numbers courses" - the "how to course," strictly headstuff, as I call it. We became "threat leaders," fear leaders, reactive managers. Supposing that we get a chance to convince them to try a learning program that will be different. We are talking about skilled people in whom we have invested a lot of money and time. And they have invested a lot of money and time by being in the Navy for 10 to 26 years. Why not provide them with the tools to do a better job? The basic premise is that people want to do a good job. I don't think there are people who don't want to do a good job if they have the right know-how and the right ability and they are left to do that job within the mission. They want to please people and they want subordinates to follow them because they are liked as a persons.

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I'm not talking about generally respecting a man for his knowledge and position of authority--you all get together and work as a team. The point is that the men I noticed in the Navy and in society were a pretty lonely lot. We have let outselves become captured by the "boob tube." We have lost the art of being able to communicate frequently and freely with one another. The TV has given us, especially as younger people, a lot of bad programming--a lot of "bum" information. This includes anything that comes along--fear, killing, threat,--all kinds of things that tear a guy's guts up inside as a young person. Consequently, we have come to the point where we are afraid to take a risk, afraid to talk to people, to solicit feedback because they may disagree with us. They may be right, but, damn it, "I'm the person that's an authority and I don't want anyone to challenge that authority." Though each of us may be leaders, we are a little insecure.

We started our program back in September, by taking resources from our command and working with them. I won't go into all the dynamics of the organization; essentially, however, we used two chief petty officers to work with a group of 12 to 18 men with whom we could try out segments of the course. They all came out with a glitter. They were "doubting Thomases" when they first came in - angry, frustrated, and didn't know why they were down there. We just told them, "Hey, go on down, you're going to like it." We finally put together a full pilot program on 9 December.

The Admiral felt that if we could put any glint of humanistic compassion into the noncommissioned officers, then maybe we really had something. We still didn't have a name for the course. Leadership has not progressed too much in the written word for a long period of time. Management has another bad denotation or connotation for me. We didn't have a title, we just referred to "that Course for Chief Petty Officers." So we ran the pilot program. Our Force Commander came down to observe the program. He was pleased with the results, and said, "GREAT! I'm going to send a message and have all my commanding officers make sure they get their people in that program!" We said, "Please, Admiral, would you do us a favor and not say anything about the program except to just give it silent support? If the program is good, it will sell itself and it doesn't need advertising. If it's not good, then we should stop anyway. Let the program grow on its own merit and if it is really worthwhile, the word will get out by the grapevine." He agreed to this. We have to provide something worthwhile. The things we are talking about are self-esteem, a sense of responsibility, a sense of well-being, a sense of identity to the organization and jobs that will be meaningful. This means getting away from all this "nitty gritty" stuff that is perceived as "happy rinky dink."

At that time, the Navy had a few sufferings--the "Hick's Report," the "Constitution," the "Kitty Hawk," and racial problems came up; so middle management training suffered. This program, "Supervisory Training for Chief Petty Officers," is technically oriented and basically managerial. Its foundation is that leadership was not a title but a way of thinking, feeling, acting, and that is what the course is all about. If you want to be a better leader, you first have to be a better person, you first have to work on yourself. We do that by experimental learning.

The first day is a destabilization period. Essentially, we show people that they don't listen very well. This sets the tone for the rest of the program. The "here and now" of what is important. The course objective is to get them to be more aware of how they come across with other people and how they can then listen to other people, and solicit the support of other people to accomplish the things they are charged to do.

Transactional analysis by Eric Berne is a way in which people communicate through their various ego states of personalities. You have to know what kind of personality you, yourself, have. What makes you tick, why you get whizzed-off at this? We have people live certain ego states because it is important as a leader to have a feeling of well-being, a sense of responsibility, and a positive attitude to solve the problem because the problem is nothing but a solution waiting to be made. Consequently, it is started as a group, and by the end of the fourth day, they know one another probably better than they know their wives. I don't prescribe to the fact that leaders are born. No, leaders are made and you have to lift weights in order to build muscles--in order to become a good leader. That is what the course is deisgined to do--to lift weights as much as a person wants to take on at the time. We don't say that it is 100% successful, but there has not been a person who has not changed noticeably in the nine days, for the better. He smiles more, he is happier, not as frustrated or disturbed with his job. It has proven successful in motivating people to a positive attitude. We can not change attitudes, but we can provide stimulation for motivation. However, motivation must come from within each one of us.

Each of us must motivate ourselves; we have to commit ourselves to want to do whatever is right, good and just. In a climate survey taken, we found that 14% of our chief petty officers feel they have very little responsibility. We, hopefully, inculcate the desire for a person to want to be a better leader, etc. We try to create the desire for people to want to work with one another and for one another, rather than against one another. The program has been successful and strongly endorsed by those who have attended it.

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TRAINING TO LEAD AT SMALL UNIT LEVEL
Captain Paul K. Van Riper
Unit Level and Individual Training Specialist
Training and Education Branch, G3 Division
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

I'm here as a representative of the Training Educational Branch, Headquarters, Marine Corps.
I would like to emphasize that the Marine Corps is a tough club to join, not a rose garden, which high-
lights our philosophy of leadership and leadership training. Leadership is more than giving orders.
For Marines, it's a way of life. Marines believe that the best way to provide training and leadership
is to live leadership. We stress the power of example. We demand that marine leaders set examples
to bring forth from their subordinates--respect, pride, and desire to meet the highest of standards.
To do this, our leaders must at all times be physically fit, mentally alert both physically and morally,
courageous, and willing to share danger and hardships.

This concept of "living leadership" is best spelled out in the following exerts from the Marine
Corps Manual, the basic regulatory publication of the Marine Corps.

Individual responsibilities of leadership are not dependent upon authority. Each
Marine is expected to exert proper influence upon his comrades by setting the example. .
. . . .
Each officer and noncommissioned officer must endeavor by all means in his
power to develop within himself those qualities of leadership. . . which will fit him to
be a real leader of men. . .

The Manual continues:

The relation between officers and noncommissioned officers and enlisted men
should in no sense be that of superior and inferior nor that of master and servant,
but rather that of teacher and scholar. In fact it should partake of the nature of the
relation between father and son, to the extent that officers and noncommissioned
officers are responsible for the physical, mental, and moral welfare, as well as the
discipline and military training of the men under them. . .

Crucial to this philosophy of "living leadership" is the knowledge that military leadership must be
considered as the means to an end--a means of carrying out the mission. In peacetime this means
achieving a high state of operational readiness. In combat, it is to take the objective in the shortest
possible time with the minimum loss of men and equipment and expenditure of ammunition. However,
there is more, for in the final analysis the essence of Marine leadership is the genuine human concern
of each leader for his men as individuals. Their welfare is his preoccupation. If he lets one of them
down he lets down the entire Corps.

None of the foregoing is to imply that Marines do not conduct leadership training per se, because
we do. The point is: though we identify certain periods of instruction with the title "leadership," in
reality leadership training permeates all of our activities.

With this short explanation of our philosophy of leadership training as a background, I would now
like to discuss how the Marine Corps is organized to provide formal training for its small unit leaders.

Combat readiness is our basic reason for existence and this readiness rests with the individual
Marine. For the young man enlisting into the Corps readiness becomes an obligation from the
moment he enters boot camp where we still train every Marine to be a rifleman.

Eleven weeks of recruit training provides the new Marine with the skills, knowledge and attitudes
which he will be required to have regardless of future military occupational specialty or billet assign-
ment. This is the Marine who sets the example of leadership for each recruit. The Drill Instructor
is a vital assignment for leaders of small unit level.

The criteria for selection to this vital assignment are strict.

The specific goal of recruit training is to develop within each recruit a state of discipline which assures respect for authority and instant, willing obedience to orders; individual proficiency in basic military skills essential for success in combat; a skill with the rile; physical fitness and endurance; and self-confidence, pride, a sense of duty and responsibility, and a love of Corps and Country.

For those few recruits who experience difficulty in training, a Special Training Branch provides remedial instruction, special assistance or discipline.

Following boot camp the Marine undergoes from 3 to 67 weeks of skill qualification training which qualifies him for an MOS and is related directly to entry-level job performance requirements.

Recruit training and skill qualification training collectively are known as basic sequential training.

Although there are few classes in basic sequential training that could be identified as formal leadership training, the foundation and tone for all subsequent leadership training is established here. The Marine Corps takes the position that a man must learn what it means to follow before he can lead. Select recruits do, however, participate in a leadership program which is designed to challenge their above average abilities and to alert them to the responsibilities advancement in the Marine Corps will bring.

Following basic sequential training, Marines are assigned to operating or supporting units. Here the commander is responsible for their leadership training.

To ensure that their Marines maintain proficiency in the essential skills and knowledge acquired during recruit training, commanders are required to test all of their Marines annually and provide remedial training to those who evidence deficiencies.

The second element of the commander's unit level individual training program is career training. Career training provides a Marine with the capacity to assume increased grade and responsibility. It consists of two parts--that training designed to improve a Marine's proficiency in his MOS, and the leadership training which will provide noncommissioned officers with the ability to effectively direct and influence the activities of their men at all times.

The commander meets his responsibility to provide leadership training through the establishment of local training programs and by assigning members of his unit to attend NCO schools and staff NCO academies.

Let's examine the Marine Corps Staff NCO Academy at Quantico, Virginia, to see one example of an institution where Marine noncommissioned officers are trained to lead at the small unit level. This academy is the hub for command-sponsored regional Staff NCO academies which extend the opportunity of acquiring professional education to more Staff NCO's. The length of the Staff NCO course is six weeks.

The mission of the Academy is to educate the staff noncommissioned officer in the high standards of professional knowledge, esprit de corps, and leadership traditional in the Marine Corps in order to increase his ability to fulfill and discharge his duties and responsibilities.

Sergeants (E5) selected for staff sergeant (E6), staff sergeants, and gunnery sergeants (E7) are eligible to attend the Academy.

Twenty-six of the 200 plus hours of instruction is devoted to leadership. In addition, instruction includes physical fitness, effective writing, close order drill, techniques of military instruction, general administration, personal financial management, and history and organization.

Physical training and close order drill are both subjects invaluable in developing the poise, command presence and confidence required by small unit leaders.

The noncommissioned officer is required to develop the skill necessary to express himself both orally and in writing.

Not all leadership training is conducted in an academic environment however, formal meals, though social in nature, promote comradeship and esprit de corps.

Mission-oriented training is the third element of a commander's unit level individual training program. This training is to enable each Marine to discharge his duties in support of the accomplishment of the unit's mission.

Two examples are mission-oriented training in a Marine barracks or ship's detachment with a security mission which might well concentrate on appropriate guard responsibilities and security measures, while in an infantry unit it might focus on tactical and weapons training.

For Marine officers, initial individual training consists of one of several programs leading to commissioning, the Basic School, and if appropriate for assigned MOS, technical training prior to assignment to a unit.

Let's examine one of the programs, that is conducted by the Officer Candidate School, Quantico, Virginia, to see the training Marines undergo prior to commissioning.

The Officer Candidate Course, as with all commissioning programs, is designed to motivate, train and evaluate candidates for appointment to commissioned rank in the Marine Corps.

Numerous techniques are used to motivate candidates. As examples, they attend parades conducted by our ceremonial units and are provided with instruction on Marine Corps history and traditions.

Training covers such basic military subjects as drill, weapons and small unit tactics.

Evaluation of candidates is a continuing process, and includes measuring their ability to tackle and solve problems on a reaction course; drill troops; negotiate obstacle and confidence courses; and complete rigorous forced marches.

Also important in the evaluation of candidates are the frequent individual counseling sessions conducted by the staff officers.

Officers commissioned via OCS, and all other commissioning programs, attend a 26 week course at the Basic School.

The mission of Basic School is to educate newly commissioned officers in the high standards of professional knowledge, esprit de corps, and leadership tranditional in the Marine Corps in order to prepare them for the duties of a company grade officer in the Fleet Marine Force, with particular emphasis on the problem-solving and decision-making duties and responsibilities of a rifle platoon commander in helicopter high mobility and mobile sea-based environments.

Every effort is expended to make instructional situations as relevant as possible to actual conditions. Practical leadership and tactical skills are developed by assigning students to responsible command billets within the student company both in the field and in garrison, and to duty officer billets with other Marine Corps units. In this manner, the newly commissioned officer gains invaluable experience in problem solving under a wide spectrum of realistic tactical and garrison situations.

The Basic Course includes instruction in a wide variety of subjects. Formal leadership training consists of nearly 60 hours of instruction. Emphasis is on the skills and knowledge required to command a rifle platoon in combat. This skill and knowledge encompasses proficiency in individual tactical measures, small unit tactics, combined arms, and special operations. Particular attention is given during the Basic Course to operating in an amphibious environment.

Leadership training for officers beyond the Basic Course is accomplished primarily by formal schools and the guided development of practical experience through controlled duty assignments. Each officer is also required to take appropriate independent action to further his professional and leadership qualifications and prepare himself for duty assignments of increased responsibility.

Marines are convinced that the Corps' corporals, sergeants, lieutenants and captains trained in the programs we have described provide the most direct and personal leadership found anywhere. They do it in peacetime as well as in war. No better example could be given than Gunnery Sergeant Jimmie Howard, who led his reconnaissance platoon in Vietnam in a fierce all night fire fight though outnumbered 20 to one. The citation for his Medal of Honor states "His valiant leadership and courageous fighting spirit to inspire the men of his platoon to herioic endeavor in the face of overwhelming odds." He led by example. Though Gunnery Sergeant Howard's actions "above and beyond the call of duty" were exceptional, his relationship with his men was traditional. This is perhaps best evidenced in a UPI report of his award ceremony in August 1967.

> As he stood in the East Room of the White House, far from the steaming battlefields of Vietnam, Sergeant Howard's thoughts were for his men. "I don't know how to speak, gentlemen," said the nation's newest Medal of honor winner, "but I want to say in all sincerity . . ."Here his voice seemed to break for a second, but with a wave of his hand toward his Marine buddies, Sergeant Howard said quickly, "That's the guys who did it right there." They were all younger, more like his sons that his subordinates. He was their "gunnie"--strong, broad shouldered, ready to take them thru anything.

Gunnery Sergeant Jimmie Howard lived leadership. He set the example. He carried out the mission, yet, his concern was for his men as individuals.

Gentlemen, for the Marine Corps, leadership is a way of life.

THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE STUDY *

"Leadership for the 1970's"

by

LTC Dandridge Malone
and
Donald Penner, Ph. D.
Educational Research Analysts, Army War College

(NOTE: In lieu of their address, the Abbreviated
Report is used which permits a detailed
analysis of findings, summaries and
recommendations).

ABBREVIATED REPORT--LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1970's

INTRODUCTION

In January of this year, General Westmoreland asked the Army War College to undertake a study of the validity of the Army's concept of leadership for the years ahead--particularly in light of the move toward a zero-draft environment. The Chief of Staff approved the study design in March. The major findings of the study were presented to the Chief of Staff on 3 June, and to the Secretary of the Army and the Army Policy Council on 16 June. This Abbreviated Report provides the highlights of the AWC Leadership Study--the methodology employed, the principal results obtained, and the action concepts whereby the results can be used to the benefit of Army leadership.

The study was conducted by a selected team of AWC students and faculty members. Over 60 students volunteered to assist in the project, and the 18 selected represented a wealth of enthusiastic talent in terms of recent practical leadership experience as well as education in the variety of academic disciplines specifically required for conduct of the study.

From the outset of the study effort, the team kept in close touch with elements of the Army which have a major continuing interest in the practical and theoretical study of leadership. The United States Military Academy, the Infantry School, and the Leadership Research Unit of the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) were among these agencies. Additionally, the study team sought the advice of civilian scientists recognized in the academic community as authorities in the investigation of leadership and related areas: D. R. Penner, R. M. Likert, R. M. Stogdill, D. G. Bowers, C. R. Moskos, T. O. Jacobs, and others.

As the study progressed and its potential utility became clear, close liaison was established and maintained with the CONARC Leadership Board, organized at Fort Bragg in May at the direction of General Westmoreland. The CONARC Leadership Board, headed by Brigadier General Henry C. Emerson, has incorporated the method and findings of the AWC study into its seminar program. This program will send carefully selected and trained leadership seminar teams to posts Army-wide during the summer and early fall of 1971, the idea being to ask Army leaders to reflect upon the specific problems and opportunities of leadership as the Army moves toward a zero-draft condition.

This Abbreviated Report, then, is designed to provide insight into a carefully controlled, scientific study of the concepts, problems, and opportunties of contemporary Army leadership--problems and opportunities whose precise delineation can be a major asset in the Army's continuing effort to provide the soldier with the best possible leadership.

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RESEARCH OBJECTIVE.

The research objective in the AWC study was to determine the type of leadership that would be most appropriate as the Army's personnel sustainment procedures changed from reliance on periodic draft calls to reliance on volunteer accessions. Inasmuch as Army leadership policy and practice have developed for almost 20 years in an environment where personnel sustainment was insured by conscription, there was good reason to believe that a "zero-draft" condition would present leadership challenges sufficiently different to warrant some modifications of existing leadership practices. Accordingly, a derivative objective of the AWC study was to assess the validity of the Army's institutional concept of leadership, reflected in the commonly accepted 11 Principles of Leadership, and, should this concept and these principles appear inappropriate or to some degree deficient to the leadership requirements of a zero-draft condition, to determine the concept and principles that would be appropriate. The ultimate purpose of the Army--success in combat--remained the single overriding consideration in both study design and execution.

CRITICAL QUESTIONS

★ WHAT KIND OF LEADERSHIP IS APPROPRIATE FOR MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY?

    ★ TO WHAT EXTENT WILL EXISTING PRINCIPLES MEET REQUIREMENTS?

    ★ WHAT GROUP OF LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES AND BEHAVIORS WILL MEET REQUIREMENTS?

METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES

● CONDUCT STUDY ACROSS A WIDE BASE OF ARMY LEADERSHIP...

● EMPLOY THE METHODOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONALISM STUDY...

● PRODUCE A UTILITARIAN REPORT.

FIGURE 1. CRITICAL QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES

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GUIDANCE.

The Chief of Staff provided certain guidance for the conduct of the study. First, the study was to be conducted across a wide base of Army leadership. Second, the study was to employ the methodology of the Professionalism Study--an introspective study of Army officer values and standards directed by General Westmoreland and completed by the US Army War College in the summer of 1970--which used both objective and subjective methods of data generation. Finally, the study was to produce utilitarian results which could be applied readily to Army leadership without the requirement for additional studies or extensive interpretation of theoretical findings.

RESEARCH STRATEGY.

The overall design or research strategy for the study was built upon two principal concepts or ideas: the "informal contract" and "leadership climate." Both concepts have been and are the focus of extensive research and theory by those scientists engaged in the study of large organizations.

The Informal Contract. The idea of the informal contract addresses the relationship between the organization and the individual who is a member of that organization. The organization has certain needs or expectations of the individual. It expects, for example, job proficiency and disciplined response. The individual has expectations as well. He expects, for example, sufficiency of pay, worthwhile work, and respect for his dignity as an individual. Both parties must pay off on the contract--each in terms of what the other expects. If both parties participate fairly in stating and meeting the terms of the contract, then a satisfactory relationship will exist between the two. Without this satisfactory relationship, and without such external options as conscription or detention, the individual--the lifeblood of the organization--can be neither attracted nor retained. Thus the informal contract appears to be an especially pertinent factor as the Army moves to a zero-draft environment. The concept is by no means a new one, and it has always been a feature of Army leadership; its significance for leadership in the 1970's, however, is increased vastly by a zero-draft condition.

Leadership Climate. Army leadership can be viewed as the organizational mechanism which mediates the informal contract. Army leadership must represent both parties to the contract--the organization and the individual, the superior and the subordinate, the accomplishment of the mission and the welfare of the men. Army leadership, functioning in this sense throughout the entire organization and at all levels, must therefore be viewed in its entirety--all of its levels and all of the

processes which interconnect those levels: authority, communication, discipline, loyalty, direction, and dedication, to name a few. This view of leadership as a totality can be represented by the term "leadership climate," and it is within the context of this leadership climate that the informal contract is supported or negated.

Central Theme. By utilizing the two organizational concepts of informal contract and leadership climate, it was possible to derive a central theme or hypothesis which would serve as the basis for the detailed design of the study. This theme or hypothesis answered tentatively the primary research objective of the study and can be stated as follows:

> THE LEADERSHIP MOST APPROPRIATE FOR THE 1970'S IS
> THAT WHICH PRODUCES A TOTAL LEADERSHIP CLIMATE
> CHARACTERIZED BY RECOGNITION AND FULFILLMENT OF
> THE INFORMAL CONTRACT IN ORDER TO INSURE MISSION
> ACCOMPLISHMENT OVER THE LONG TERM.

RESEARCH DESIGN.

To achieve the research objective, the study was designed to employ the organizational concepts just discussed as well as adhere to the guidance given by the Chief of Staff. An understanding of two of these design features is essential to understanding the findings of the study and the methodology employed.

Leadership Behavior. In treating the subject of leadership, the study utilized a more specific description of leadership than that represented by statements of the 11 principles. In the middle 1950's, some milestone academic research at Ohio State University succeeded in isolating and describing in detail those things that an individual does· which constitute actual leadership behavior. The original research listed approximately 150 items of human activity that represented leadership behavior. Subsequent research validated these early findings, reduced the list to fewer items, and showed conclusively that, using the proper methods, it was possible to separate observable human behavior into leadership and nonleadership activities. The study was repeated and the results held across many different organizational environments: academic, military, industrial, and governmental. To provide a working description of leadership, and a means of representing the application of leadership principles, the USAWC team employed a list of 43 items of leadership behavior, derived from the research just discussed, and adapted to the military environment. (These items will be discussed in detail in a subsequent section.) This design feature reduced considerably the generality and subjectivity normally associated with the study of leadership and provided a commonly understood operational definition of leadership for collection of data and analysis of results.

Perspectives of Leadership. Considerable research establishes the fact that the impact and effectiveness of leadership vary greatly as a function of the perspective from which leadership is viewed. The company commander's view of the leadership of the platoon leader may differ markedly from that of the men of the platoon. And the platoon leader's view of his own leadership may differ even further. Each perspective has its own inherent bias. The superior is predisposed to look for results, for mission accomplishment. The subordinate, on the other hand, is particularly sensitive to leadership practices which affect, or appear to affect, his own welfare. And the leader himself, viewing his own leadership, has the natural human tendency to overlook or rationalize his own weaknesses and errors. These common, normal facts of human perception dictated that the study design employ a "tri-focal" view of leadership in order to obtain a complete and useful picture of leadership at any selected level. This tri-focal view, then, could provide a combined description and assessment of leadership from the viewpoints of three individuals: the individual responsible for the results of the leadership (the superior); the individual who was the recipient of the leadership process (the subordinate); and the individual who was actually applying the leadership process (the leader himself). In application, the results of this three dimension view would enable the leader to see himself as others see him. A moment's reflection will show that this tri-focal view also can give a valid representation of the two principal features of the Army's institutional concept of leadership: the accomplishment of the mission, and consideration of the welfare of the men. Further, this tri-focal view is essential to an objective study of the terms and execution of the informal contract previously discussed.

DATA BASE.

Documentary Research. Development of the data base for this study began with the initiation of a comprehensive survey of existing literature. This documentary research effort covered military publications, periodicals, and the literature of the pertinent academic disciplines. This effort continued throughout the duration of the study. The annotated bibliography (Annex A) contains a carefully selected list of documents, each of which is concisely summarized, and each of which contributed in some measure to the total study effort. Two of the references are of central importance both to this study and to the study of leadership in general: DA Pamphlet, 600-15, Leadership at Senior Levels of Command; and Leadership and Exchange in Formal Organizations, written by Dr. T. O. Jacobs of Fort Benning's Leadership Research Unit (HumRRO) and based upon an exhaustive survey of much of the leadership research of the past 25 years.

Field Survey. The second major input to the data base was the information collected by an 18-man field survey team. Members of this team visited 17 posts throughout CONUS and obtained both quantitative and qualitative data from a group of approximately 1800 individuals of all grade levels from private to general officer.

DATA COLLECTION

PARTICIPANTS

E1	44
E2	151
E3	18
E4	104
E5	148
E6	142
E7	77
E8	27
E9	10
WO (1-4)	50
O1	107
O2	68
O3	220
O4	207
O5	137
O6	85
GEN O	46
DA CIV	43

N=1800

INSTALLATIONS

FT. JACKSON
FT. HOOD
FT. ORD
FT. SILL
FT. KNOX
ABERDEEN PVNG GROUND
ATLANTA ARMY DEPOT
FT. LEAVENWORTH
FT. BELVOIR
FT. BENNING
FT. McCLELLAN
FT. RILEY
FT. BLISS
FT. EUSTIS
CARLISLE BKS
PENTAGON
USMA

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ACTIVITIES

BASIC CMBT TNG
ADV INDIVIDUAL TNG
BCT & AIT (WAC)
NCOCS
NCO ACADEMY
DRILL SGT SCHOOL
SR NCO ORIENTATION
OFFICER BASIC COURSE
OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL
OFFICER ADV COURSE
OFFICER ADV COURSE (WAC)
AVN MAINT COURSE
COMMAND & GEN STAFF COLLEGE
CIVILIAN PERS MGT SCHOOL
ARMY WAR COLLEGE

FIGURE 2. FIELD SURVEY: DATA COLLECTION

Data were obtained by two means: questionnaire and group interview. The questionnaire was carefully designed and pretested and was administered not by uncontrolled random questionnairing, but by team members

who personally explained the questionnaire to each respondent group, then remained on hand to answer questions as the individual completed the items. The questionnaire collected quantitative data in five major areas: demographic characteristics of the individual; relative importance of the principles of leadership; attitude toward the Modern Volunteer Army concept; satisfaction with Army leadership; and detailed description of leadership in the individual's last duty assignment. For this last major area, three different versions of the questionnaire were employed. All versions asked the same questions about leadership in the last assignment, but each of the three versions asked the respondent to assume one of three perspectives in describing leadership. Of the 1800 respondents, one-third answered questions regarding the leadership behavior of their immediate superior in their last assignment, one-third their immediate subordinate (neither the best nor the worst, but one they knew well), and one-third their own leadership in their last assignment. The data thus obtained provided the tri-focal view of leadership mentioned earlier.

FIELD SURVEY

NCO'S, DRILL SGT SCHOOL
CAPTAINS, ADVANCE CRS

Q'AIRE (1800)

ALL:
● DEMOGRAPHIC
● PRINCIPLES
● MVA

QUANTITATIVE DATA

1/3 SELF BEHAVIOR

1/3 SUPERIOR BEHAVIOR

1/3 SUBORDINATE BEHAVIOR

FIGURE 3. FIELD SURVEY: QUESTIONNAIRE

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Members of the survey team who had been trained in interview techniques conducted group interviews with approximately 450 of the individuals who completed the questionnaires, with each of the three perspectives being equally represented. These group interviews were "focused interviews" in that a common agenda was employed:

1. What are the leadership problems at your grade level?

2. What do you expect of the leadership of your immediate superiors? Your immediate subordinates? Your contemporaries and yourself?

In essence, the questionnaire provided quantitative data that could be studied by computer--by descriptive and analytical statistics. The interview, based upon the same research design, provided qualitative, subjective information which added additional meaning to the quantitative, statistical data.

FIGURE 4. FIELD SURVEY: GROUP INTERVIEWS

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In addition to administering the leadership questionnaire and conducting group interviews, the field survey team conducted two secondary research projects: an investigation (interviews and observation) of the leadership climate within a TOE Army division; and an investigation (interviews) of the new soldier's perception of the informal contract.

Adequacy of the Data Base. The data obtained by the field survey team are broadly representative of the leadership of the Army, but with somewhat heavier representation than a purely random sample would provide of those who have demonstrated effective leadership. This "quality loading" comes about as a result of obtaining most of the data from individuals in the Army school system. The school environment is by no means representative of the Army's "real world," and in recognition of this, questionnaires and interviews were focused on leadership in the individual's assignment immediately prior to his entry into the school. Since previous assignments had been Army-wide, the geographic and organizational diversity of experience among the respondents can be considered sufficiently representative of the Army as a whole.

The sample size (approximately 1800) is relatively large compared to most previous academic and controlled research efforts in this area. The sample size is much more representative in the higher grade levels than in the lower enlisted grades. Subgroup or "cell" sizes are generally adequate for statistically significant sampling within the key demographic variables used in the analyses. A larger sample would, of course, allow finer discrimination as well as analysis based upon compound characteristics; however, the nature of the research objective did not require the extremes of sampling care needed in, say, such sensitive efforts as public opinion polling wherein the views of a minute but highly selected group may be extrapolated to depict the overall population.

The adequacy of the data base is supported by two prime factors: first, the high degree of internal consistency between the quantitative and qualitative results which were analyzed thoroughly but separately; and second, the favorable comments of respected professionals who have examined the data base in detail.

LEADERSHIP IN OVERALL CONTEXT.

There are of course other ingredients than leadership in the formula for long-term effectiveness of the Army. The missions assigned the Army; the resources allocated for national defense; the political, technological, and psychological factors at home and abroad--all influence operational capabilities of the Army. Optimum leadership is not sufficient to ensure mission attainment by troops who are ill-equipped in weaponry, or long divorced from popular support of their operational goals. On the other hand, immense resources of manpower, material, and national will can go for naught in the absence of the control, coordination, and consideration that are the hallmarks of effective leadership.

THE STUDY METHODOLOGY IS A

RELIABLE DEVICE FOR MEASURING

FINDING 1

LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS AND

DIAGNOSING PROBLEMS.

DISCUSSION. The internal consistency of the study in terms of data
complementarity, with quantitative and qualitative results affording
similar insights after independent analyses, provides assurance that
the study concepts and methods are sound. Competent academicians--
statisticians and behavioral scientists--who have examined the design
and findings have commented favorably on the theoretical background
and the techniques of data manipulation.

Equally important in regard to eventual utility and acceptability
of the study is the consistent mode of comparability between the study
findings produced by rigorous analytical techniques and the intuitive
judgments of experienced military professionals.

The study design permits duplication of the sampling and analysis
techniques on an Army-wide scale. It also provides a convenient method
for isolating problems unique to a particular location or major unit
(preferably of division or larger size). The individuals who partici-
pated in the study were enthusiastic about their role as contributors
to a program to improve leadership practices. Also, the participants
indicated that the necessary self-appraisal and evaluative processes
involved in completing the questionnaire and following the discussion
agenda prompted both healthy introspection and a convenient review of
leadership education.

The data base has great potential for further exploitation. Time
has so far permitted analysis of only that portion of the data necessary
to answer the major questions derived from the mission assigned to the
study group. Many important demographic variables (level of education,
age, branch of service, etc.) have not yet been used. Further, there are
a number of promising statistical manipulations which have not yet been
completed. (Several of these more detailed examinations will be in the
final report, which is scheduled for publication in early fall of 1971.)

FINDING 2

DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADER-
SHIP VARIES SIGNIFICANTLY BY GRADE LEVEL
(HIGHER GRADE, HIGHER SATISFACTION), VARIES
ONLY SLIGHTLY BETWEEN COMBAT AND NON-
COMBAT, AND DOES NOT VARY BY RACIAL
GROUP.

DISCUSSION. "Satisfaction with leadership" was used as a subjective overall assessment of individual leader effectiveness. (See page B-20 of Annex B, Sample Questionnaire--Evaluation of Subordinate Version.) It was employed as a criterion measure in order to examine patterns of leader behavior which resulted in perceptions of differing degrees of leader effectiveness. The level of satisfaction on a scale from "totally pleased in all respects" down to "totally disappointed in all respects" was determined by compilation of questionnaire results from *the perspectives of subordinate, self, and superior*.

Figure 5 represents overall satisfaction with leadership as expressed by the different grade levels in the study. Circled numbers are percentages. The top segments show percentages within the respective grade levels who indicated they were displeased to some degree; the bottom segment, those who were pleased to some degree; and the middle segment, those who were undecided. These percentages are the result of the summation of expressed satisfaction with the overall leadership of superior, self, and subordinate. (Effective leadership was defined in the study as that which was satisfactory to both the superior and the subordinate.)

The grade level subdivisions used in the diagram and throughout the study are: JR NCO: E-4 through E-6 with less than five years' service; SR NCO: E-6 with five or more years' service through E-9; JR CO GR: 0-1; SR CO GR: 0-2, 0-3; JR FLD GR: 0-4, 0-5; SR FLD GR: 0-6; GEN OFF: 0-7 and higher.

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SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP

JR NCO	SR NCO	JR CO GR	SR CO GR	JR FLD GR	SR FLD GR	GEN OFF

Note: The top segment of each bar is "Disappointed." The middle segment is "Undecided." The bottom segment is "Pleased."

FIGURE 5. SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP

The study design permits depiction of relative satisfaction by perspective (superior, self, subordinate) as well as by grade levels. As shown in the following figure (Figure 6) the Senior NCO is least satisfied with his subordinate's leadership, more satisfied with the leadership of his superiors, and most satisfied with his own leadership.

SR NCO'S SATISFACTION WITH LEADERSHIP

SUPERIOR'S LDRSHIP	OWN LDRSHIP	SUBORDINATE'S LDRSHIP

FIGURE 6. SENIOR NCO'S SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP

The next figure (Figure 7) shows that there was only slight, although statistically significant, variation between degree of satisfaction in combat compared to satisfaction in noncombat situations. In general, the leader must perform slightly better in combat in order to maintain the same degree of satisfaction he

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delivers in noncombat. These data were generated by asking those
respondents who were describing performance in a noncombat situation
to describe their level of satisfaction had the situation been combat.

SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP

FIGURE 7. VARIATIONS IN SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP

As further illustrated by the preceding figure (Figure 7), the 124 blacks in the sample showed little variation from the overall sample in terms of their satisfaction with leadership. Blacks in general were slightly more pleased with leadership than were the participants in the overall sample population.

3 FINDING

IN GENERAL, SOLDIERS ARE SATISFIED WITH LEADERSHIP

IN BASIC TRAINING AND DISSATISFIED WITH LEADERSHIP

IN ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING. (SOLDIERS ARE

DISAPPOINTED IF HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE

ARE NOT SET AND MAINTAINED.)

DISCUSSION. These data were obtained primarily through the group discussions held at three basic training centers (Fort Ord, Fort Jackson, Fort McClellan) and at other posts visited. Responses regarding this aspect of the Army's meeting the expectations of the informal contract (in BCT) and perceived failure to meet the terms of the informal contract (in AIT) were similar at all posts. Drill sergeants were generally thought to be competent and fair. However, the leaders in AIT were frequently seen as impersonal and lax, neither setting nor maintaining sufficiently high standards.

4 FINDING

OUR LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES (AND THE INSTI-

TUTIONAL CONCEPT THEY EXPRESS) ARE VALID,

AND APPROPRIATE FOR THE 1970'S.

DISCUSSION. This finding is a major finding of the study. Three factors establish the validity and acceptability of the Army's time-honored "Principles of Leadership." First, the study group found that

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the Principles of Leadership were fundamental to leadership instruction across all Army schools charged with a leadership development mission. Further, the other services, and at least four other nations, use either the Army's principles or a close approximation thereof in their own leadership instruction. Second, the participants in the study, when asked to select the most and least important of the principles, were reluctant to put any principles in the latter category--it was difficult for them to consider any principle as "least important."

Final support for the validity of the principles comes from a free response questionnaire item which asked for proposed changes to the list of principles. Content analyses of this questionnaire item revealed that, of the 1800 respondents, only two or three individuals recommended any substantial change. The vast majority commented that the principles in their present form were sound and appropriate, and that leadership deficiencies derived not from the principles, but from the manner in which these principles were applied.

The principles vary in terms of their perceived relative importance. Figure 8 below shows the frequency with which each principle was listed

PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP

ALL RESPONDENTS
(1800)

		0	250	500	750	1000
1	BE TECHNICALLY AND TACTICALLY PROFICIENT.					
2	KNOW YOURSELF AND SEEK SELF-IMPROVEMENT.					
3	KNOW YOUR MEN AND LOOK OUT FOR THEIR WELFARE.					
4	KEEP YOUR MEN INFORMED.					
5	SET THE EXAMPLE.					
6	INSURE THE TASK IS UNDERSTOOD, SUPERVISED, AND ACCOMPLISHED.					
7	TRAIN YOUR MEN AS A TEAM.					
8	MAKE SOUND AND TIMELY DECISIONS.					
9	DEVELOP A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AMONG SUBORDINATES.					
10	EMPLOY YOUR COMMAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS CAPABILITIES.					
11	SEEK RESPONSIBILITY AND TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR YOUR ACTIONS.					

▬▬▬ = MOST IMPORTANT   ▬▬► = LEAST IMPORTANT

FIGURE 8. PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP--MOST AND LEAST IMPORTANT

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as "most important" and "least important" by the total group of 1800 respondents. From this analysis, based on the views of a cross-section of Army leadership at all levels, the most important principle is "Be Technically and Tactically Proficient"; least important is "Employ Your Command in Accordance With Its Capabilities." When the data are analyzed by grade level, a different picture emerges and is the basis for another major finding.

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FINDING

THE PERCEPTION OF RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIFIC LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES VARIES AMONG GRADE LEVELS.

DISCUSSION. The significance of this finding is that, even at the level of leadership generality represented by the Principles of Leadership, each level has a different view of the requirements of leadership. To look at the data another way, this finding says that the pattern of importance assigned among the principles by a given grade level defines, in a sense, how that grade level views the leadership situation. In Figure 9, for example, when the relative importance of a given principle

DEVELOP A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AMONG SUBORDINATES

MOST IMPORTANT   **LEAST IMPORTANT**

FIGURE 9. IMPORTANCE OF A PRINCIPLE BY GRADE LEVEL

is analyzed by grade level, the principle "Develop a Sense of Responsibility Among Subordinates" receives the highest number of "least important" ratings from the Senior NCO's. At successively higher grade levels, the importance increases, until at general officer level, this principle is obviously among those considered most important by leaders at that level.

This variation in perceived relative importance of principles by different grade levels is related closely to attempts in the past to distinguish among processes of leadership, commandership, and generalship. The data of the present study draw this distinction clearly and more precisely in terms of the patterns of relative importance assigned by each grade level. Figure 10, for example, illustrates the relative importance of the Principles of Leadership as seen by the Senior NCO. This pattern will differ for each grade level.

PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP

SR NCO'S

		0	50	100	150
1	BE TECHNICALLY AND TACTICALLY PROFICIENT.				
2	KNOW YOURSELF AND SEEK SELF-IMPROVEMENT.				
3	KNOW YOUR MEN AND LOOK OUT FOR THEIR WELFARE.				
4	KEEP YOUR MEN INFORMED.				
5	SET THE EXAMPLE.				
6	INSURE THE TASK IS UNDERSTOOD, SUPERVISED, AND ACCOMPLISHED.				
7	TRAIN YOUR MEN AS A TEAM.				
8	MAKE SOUND AND TIMELY DECISIONS.				
9	DEVELOP A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AMONG SUBORDINATES.				
10	EMPLOY YOUR COMMAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS CAPABILITIES.				
11	SEEK RESPONSIBILITY AND TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR YOUR ACTIONS.				

━━━━ = MOST IMPORTANT   ∼∼∼∼ = LEAST IMPORTANT

FIGURE 10. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPLES: SENIOR NCO

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THE APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES

IS DEFECTIVE IN SEVERAL RESPECTS WHICH

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HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY GRADE LEVELS AND

FINDING

PERSPECTIVE (SUPERIOR, SUBORDINATE, SELF)

IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR.

<u>DISCUSSION</u>. The data presented thus far support the idea that, while
the relative importance of the leadership principles may vary, they
are accepted by Army leadership as valid and appropriate. The problems
of leadership appear to lie not in the principles themselves, but
rather in the application of these principles.

The study design can identify defective application with consid-
erable precision. It can identify defects by specific grade level.
It can identify also defects by perspective, i.e, the degree to which
the defect is evident to superior, subordinate, or the leader himself.
And finally, the study design can identify defects in application not
in terms of generalities of leadership, but rather in terms of specific
items of leadership behavior.

In the middle 1950's, scientists at Ohio State University working
for the Office of Naval Research succeeded in isolating a list of human
activities which, in a sense, represented or described relatively pure
leadership behavior. This list distinguished between those things that
a man does that are leadership activities and those things that are
unrelated to leadership. These findings are generally regarded as a
milestone in leadership research because they gave definition in an area
which previously had been highly subjective. Extensive follow-on
research established the validity of these items of leadership behavior.
Selected items of leadership behavior from the Ohio State research were
adapted to the military environment and used in the USAWC study as an
operational definition of leadership which, for purposes of the study,
represents the application of leadership principles.

The specific items of leadership behavior and their mode of use in
the data collection effort are shown in the questionnaire at Annex B.
Examples of the list of 43 items are:

· He Was Technically Competent to Perform His Duties.

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· He Was Approachable.

· He Knew His Men and Their Capabilities.

· He Let the Members of His Unit Know What Was Expected of Them.

· He Rewarded Individuals For a Job Well Done.

The questionnaire asked the respondent three questions about each of the 43 items of leadership behavior: how often the behavior occurred; how often it should have occurred; and how important it was to the respondent. A numerical response scale for each of these questions permitted the respondent to record his answers quantitatively. Figure 11 illustrates how one of these items appeared in the questionnaire.

► "HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES"

HOW OFTEN DID HE?		HOW OFTEN SHOULD HE HAVE?		HOW IMPORTANT WAS THIS TO YOU?	
A GREAT DEAL	7	A GREAT DEAL	7	CRITICAL	7
USUALLY	6	USUALLY	6	VERY IMPORTANT	6
MOST OF THE TIME	5	MOST OF THE TIME	5	IMPORTANT	5
NOW AND THEN	4	NOW AND THEN	4	SOMETIMES IMPORTANT	4
HARDLY EVER	3	HARDLY EVER	3	SELDOM IMPORTANT	3
RARELY	2	RARELY	2	RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT	2
NOT EVER	1	NOT EVER	1	UNIMPORTANT	1

FIGURE 11. QUESTION DESIGN

To illustrate the nature of the information generated by this particular question design, assume that the respondent is answering that version of the questionnaire which asks questions about the leadership behavior of the respondent's immediate superior in the

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respondent's last assignment. In describing this behavior, the respondent notes that his superior communicated effectively with his subordinates "most of the time" (5). However, the respondent feels that his superior should have done this even more--he should have done it "a great deal" (7). At this point, the question has identified a performance shortfall; in this case, a performance shortfall in the degree to which the superior is not meeting the expectations of the subordinate with regard to one particular item of leadership behavior.

It is logically necessary to also consider the relative importance of the shortfall. A small shortfall with respect to adherence to ethical standards, for example, could be of far greater significance to the respondent than a much larger shortfall with respect to handling administrative details. The third scale for each item of leadership behavior (the importance scale in Figure 11) was designed to measure this relative importance dimension. By first determining performance shortfall, then multiplying this by the importance score, a "weighted" performance shortfall value was obtained. Since there were three versions of the questionnaire (superior, subordinate, and self descriptions), it was possible to compute a weighted performance shortfall for each item of leadership behavior from each of three perspectives: the leader as seen by his immediate subordinate; as seen by his immediate superior; and as seen by himself.

Data thus organized, and then grouped by grade level, gave a unique tri-dimensional or tri-focal view of leadership as seen simultaneously by the leader's superior, subordinate, and by the leader himself (Figure 12).

FIGURE 12. TRI-FOCAL VIEW OF LEADERSHIP

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This diagnostic design made it possible to determine the degree to which leadership at any selected level was or was not meeting the expectations of the three people most closely involved with the leadership process, i.e., the leader's superior (with responsibility for results); the leader's subordinate (as the recipient of the leader's actual leadership); and the leader himself (with the capability of introspection). When the weighted performance shortfalls as seen from each of the three perspectives are combined or added together, the result can be expressed numerically (in total "units of weighted shortfall") or graphically to show the degree to which any given level of leadership is not meeting the expectations of superiors, subordinates, and self. This computation can be made for any of the 43 items of leadership behavior and for any of the six grade levels used in the study.

Figure 13 shows, numerically and graphically, the degree to which a selected level (the Senior NCO in this case) is not meeting the combined expectations of superiors, subordinates, and self with respect to

►"HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES"

PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL

DEGREE TO WHICH SR NCO DID NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS OF SUPERIORS, SUBORDINATES, AND SELF

SR NCO

0   10   20   30

(THE LONGER THE BAR
THE GREATER THE PROBLEM)

FIGURE 13. PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: ONE ITEM OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

one of 43 items of leadership behavior--in this example, effective communication with subordinates. A zero value in total performance shortfall would represent that hypothetical condition where all leaders at a given

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level were meeting completely the expectations of superiors, subordinates, and self. Since this condition is highly improbable, there will be, almost without exception, some degree of performance shortfall for any given leadership behavior at any given grade level.

The identification of performance shortfall is only part of the diagnostic problem. Another and major facet of the overall problem of defects in the application of leadership principles is the degree to which performance shortfall is recognized by the leader himself. Examination of the data shows that, true to human nature, leaders deceive themselves with respect to their own leadership effectiveness.

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FINDING

A MAJOR DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING CORRECTLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP IS THE FREQUENT MISPERCEPTION OF HOW WELL ONE'S OWN LEADERSHIP IS MEETING THE LEADERSHIP EXPECTATIONS OF SUPERIOR AND/OR SUBORDINATE (INDIVIDUALS CONSISTENTLY PERCEIVE THEIR OWN SHORTFALL AS BEING LESS THAN THAT OF THEIR SUPERIORS OR SUBORDINATES).

DISCUSSION. The same data used to derive perceived performance shortfall can also be used, with a different statistical manipulation, to determine the degree to which leaders at a given level are unaware that they are not meeting the expectations of superior and subordinate.

Study of the data from the self-description version of the questionnaire shows that leaders at all levels recognize their own performance shortfalls to some degree for every item of leadership behavior. In virtually all cases, however, they see their own performance shortfall as less than that of their superiors and subordinates. There is a difference between the leader's perception of his own performance shortfall and his immediate superior's perception. There is also a difference between the leader's perception of his own shortfall and his immediate subordinate's perception of that shortfall. These two difference scores, added together, permit quantitative expression of the degree to which the leader is unaware of his own performance shortfalls as seen by his

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superiors and subordinates. This datum can be termed a perception shortfall, or an "index of self-delusion." In terms of practical utility, this index gives the leader the opportunity to see himself as others see him--the "others" being the two parties closest to and most concerned with his leadership, i.e., his immediate superior and immediate subordinate.

As was the case with performance shortfall, perception shortfall can be expressed quantitatively or graphically. Figure 14 illustrates perception shortfall, and shows how measures of both performance and perception shortfall can be combined using a common zero value baseline.

➤ "HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES"

FIGURE 14. PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: ONE ITEM OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

The bar in Figure 14, then, is a composite depiction of defects in the application of leadership principles--for a given grade level (Senior NCO), and for a given item of leadership behavior. The portion of the bar to the right of the zero value baseline shows the degree to which the leader at this level is not meeting the expectations of superior,

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subordinate, and self. The portion to the left of the baseline shows the degree to which the leader is <u>unaware</u> that he is not meeting these leadership expectations.

At this point, the theoretical concept of leadership climate can be brought to bear to aid in the diagnostic task. When the data are organized so that performance and perception shortfalls are computed for all six grade levels, then plotted on a common zero baseline, interlevel comparisons can be made for any given item of leadership behavior.

Figure 15 shows how all levels compare with respect to performance and perception shortfalls on one item of leadership behavior. The bar for the Senior NCO in this figure is the same as that described in the

"HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES"

PERCEPTION SHORTFALL   0   PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL

SR FLD GRADE

JR FLD GRADE

SR CO GRADE

JR CO GRADE

SR NCO

JR NCO

30   20   10   0   10   20   30

TOTAL UNITS OF SHORTFALL X IMPORTANCE, FROM THREE PERSPECTIVES.

FIGURE 15. PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: ALL GRADE LEVELS

previous illustration. Examination of the data depicted in Figure 15 shows that, for this item of leadership behavior, performance shortfall is greatest for the Senior NCO level; least for the Senior Field Grade level. Perception shortfall is greatest for the Senior NCO level; least for the Junior Company Grade level. In a composite sense, the data would indicate that the greatest problem in the application of leadership

principles with respect to this particular item of leadership behavior lies at the Senior NCO level.

The dashed, vertical lines in Figure 15 have been added to provide further diagnostic assistance. These lines are control lines. When they intersect a horizontal bar, they identify the largest 10 percent of performance shortfalls and the largest 10 percent of perception shortfalls--considering all grade levels and all items of leadership behavior. The control lines provide a means for determining which shortfalls are at a "critical" stage. By the same token, an additional set of control lines could be computed and plotted to identify the 10% least critical shortfalls. (The selection of 10% as a level of criticality is discretionary, and is used here only for illustration.)

The figures which follow (Figures 16 through 20) show interlevel comparisons on a number of items of leadership behavior, and illustrate a variety of combinations of performance and perception shortfalls at different grade levels. The data base includes similar graphic displays for all 43 items of leadership behavior. Partial interpretations of the figures used for illustration are outlined in subsequent paragraphs to indicate the type of information that can be obtained from these interlevel comparisons.

➤ "HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH"

FIGURE 16. INTER-LEVEL COMPARISON: AWARENESS OF MORALE

> HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES
EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES

FIGURE 17. INTER-LEVEL COMPARISON: FREEDOM TO FAIL

> HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT
MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR

FIGURE 18. INTER-LEVEL COMPARISON: LOYALTY TO SUBORDINATE

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➤ HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND

FIGURE 19. INTER-LEVEL COMPARISON: EASY TO UNDERSTAND

➤ HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT

FIGURE 20. INTER-LEVEL COMPARISON: OVERLY AMBITIOUS BEHAVIOR

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• Figure 16. Three grade levels at a critical state in terms of not meeting expectations of superiors and subordinates for this item of behavior. The three grade levels are those normally in closest contact with the individual soldier. One of the three grade levels is critically unaware of its own problem in this area.

• Figure 17. One critical problem in awareness. First Lieutenants and Captains have the least problem of all levels on this item, in terms of both performance and perception shortfall. (This relatively "good" condition of Senior Company Grade leadership is found in most of the 43 interlevel comparisons.)

• Figure 18. One grade level in much better shape than the others. Junior NCO's and Colonels critically unaware that they are not standing up for their subordinates to the degree expected by their subordinates _and_ combined.

• Figure 19. One grade level falling critically short in meeting expectations of superiors and subordinates. Could illustrate either a communication problem between 2d Lieutenant and Senior NCO, or may reflect the 2d Lieutenant's problems in becoming adjusted to the Army. All levels relatively well aware that they are not as easy to understand as their superiors and subordinates expect them to be.

• Figure 20. Majors and Lieutenant Colonels demonstrate overly ambitious behavior far more than their superiors and subordinates think they should. Majors and Lieutenant Colonels have a greater problem than any other level on this negative item of leadership behavior--in terms of negative performance as well as awareness of how superiors and subordinates view this performance. Could be a graphic illustration of "ticket-punching" syndrome.

The data used to compute and plot the interlevel comparisons can be manipulated in a different manner to provide a comprehensive diagnosis of the leadership problems at any selected level of leadership. This mode of data organization depicts, for a given grade level, performance and perception shortfalls (representing defects in the application of leadership principles) for each of the 43 items of leadership behavior. Figure 21 on the following page illustrates this particular diagnostic capability.

In Figure 21, the selected grade level is the Junior NCO. Performance and perception shortfalls for each of the 43 items of leadership behavior can be computed and plotted as shown by the heavy bars. Figure 21, for purposes of illustration, includes only seven of the 43 items. Vertical control lines, discussed earlier, have been omitted for clarity. The items shown are rank-ordered in terms of "improvement opportunity," which will be explained in a subsequent section.

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PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP
JR NCO (E-4-6)

(ARRANGED IN ORDER
OF IMPROVEMENT
OPPORTUNITY)

PERCEPTION SHORTFALL

PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL

		PERCEPTION SHORTFALL	PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL
1	HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.		
2	HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.		
3	HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.		
4	HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.		
5	HE WAS SELFISH.		
6	HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.		
7	HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.		

FIGURE 21. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: JR. NCO

Some of the problems illustrated in Figure 21 might be termed
"simple," others "compound." Item 2, for example, shows considerable
shortfall in meeting expectations (right side of bar), but the Junior
NCO's are relatively well aware of this (left side of bar). They
recognize that they are not meeting expectations, and in this regard,
the problem is comparatively simple. A compound problem is illustrated
by items 1 and 6. In these instances, there is considerable shortfall
in meeting expectations, plus considerable unawareness that this
shortfall exists. These data suggest, then, that in helping the Junior
NCO improve his leadership in these two illustrative items of leadership
behavior, efforts to teach him to communicate better or to be more
considerate of others will be of limited value unless he is first made
aware that he has significant leadership difficulties in these two areas.

Figure 21, and the figures which follow (Figures 22 through 26)
depict the extent and complexity of the first seven leadership problems
for each of the grade levels used in the study.

PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP
SR NCO (E-6-9)

(ARRANGED IN ORDER OF IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITY)

PERCEPTION SHORTFALL		PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL		
20	10	0	10	20	30

1 HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.

2 HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.

3 HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.

4 HE WAS APPROACHABLE.

5 HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.

6 HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.

7 HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

20   10   0   10   20   30

FIGURE 22. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: SR. NCO

JR CO GR (0-1)

(ARRANGED IN ORDER OF IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITY)

PERCEPTION SHORTFALL		PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL		
20	10	0	10	20	30

1 HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.

2 HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.

3 HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.

4 HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY.

5 HE WAS SELFISH.

6 HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.

7 HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.

FIGURE 23. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: JR. CO GRADE

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SR CO GR (0-2,3)

(ARRANGED IN ORDER OF IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITY)

PERCEPTION SHORTFALL — PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL

20   10   0   10   20   30

1. HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.

2. HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.

3. HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.

4. HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.

5. HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.

6. HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY.

7. HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH.

FIGURE 24. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: SR. CO GRADE

JR FLD GR (0-4,5)

(ARRANGED IN ORDER OF IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITY).

PERCEPTION SHORTFALL — PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL

20   10   0   10   20   30

1. HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.

2. HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.

3. HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.

4. HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.

5. HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.

6. HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.

7. HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.

FIGURE 25. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: JR. FLD GRADE

SR FLD GR (0-6)

(ARRANGED IN ORDER OF IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITY)

PERCEPTION SHORTFALL			PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL	
20	10	0	10	20

1 HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.

2 HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.

3 HE WAS APPROACHABLE.

4 HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.

5 HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.

6 HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

7 HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.

FIGURE 26. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: SR. FLD GRADE

Comparison of these figures shows that the items of leadership behavior listed appear in a different rank-order for each grade level. This phenomenon is explained in the next major finding.

8 FINDING

CERTAIN ITEMS OF LEADER BEHAVIOR FOR EACH

GRADE LEVEL HAVE HIGH POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFI-

CANT IMPROVEMENTS IN OVERALL LEADERSHIP

EFFECTIVENESS IN RETURN FOR A SMALL IMPROVE-

MENT IN THE PARTICULAR BEHAVIOR.

DISCUSSION. Findings 6 and 7 illustrated the diagnostic capability of the study design. By using the same raw data with different statistical manipulations, then combining the results with measures of satisfaction with leadership, the prescriptive capability of the study design can be demonstrated.

For purposes of the present study, effective leadership at a given level is operationally defined as leadership which is simultaneously satisfactory to both superior and subordinate. As discussed under a previous finding, the questionnaire generated data which provided measures of satisfaction with leadership. Finding 8 is derived from the results of a statistical analysis procedure (linear regression analysis) which examined the relationship between two factors or variables: the items of leadership behavior, and satisfaction with leadership.

In essence, this statistical examination shows that satisfaction with leadership is affected more by certain items of leadership behavior than by others. Viewed positively, this says that small improvements in some items of leadership behavior will produce far more satisfaction with leadership (in the eyes of both superiors and subordinates) than will improvements in other items. When these more sensitive, more powerful items of leadership behavior are identified, they represent opportunities for improvement of leadership. The analytical procedure identifies these opportunities, and provides the information necessary to arrange them in rank-order, beginning with the item of leadership behavior which offers the greatest opportunity for increasing satisfaction with leadership. Figure 27 on the following page illustrates this prescriptive capability.

The overall ranking in the left-hand column of Figure 27 shows the 10 most "powerful" items of leadership behavior in terms of the opportunity they offer for increasing superior and subordinate satisfaction with leadership. The relation between the Principles of Leadership and the 43 items of leadership behavior (the items hypothetically representing the application of the principles) is evident in the comparison of the most important principle (discussed previously under Finding 4) and the most "powerful" item of leadership behavior, shown in Figure 27.

The overall ranking of opportunity is computed from the data of all 1800 respondents, without regard to grade level. Finding 5 established that the relative importance of principles of leadership varies by grade level. The same is true of the relative opportunities offered by the items of leadership behavior. The right hand columns of Figure 27 show the improvement opportunity rank-order positions when the data are analyzed by grade level. The item that is number 1 (i.e., offers greatest opportunity for leadership improvement) for leaders overall is number 2 for the Junior NCO, 2 for the Senior NCO, 6 for the Junior Company Grade, and so on. (The procedure for determining these rank-order positions is based upon 5 separate statistical analyses--rank-order positions for all grade levels combined will not "average out" to equal the overall ranking.)

OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT

OVERALL RANKING		JR NCO	SR NCO	JR CO GR	SR CO GR	JR FLD GR	SR FLD GR
1	HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES	2	2	6	8	3	2
2	HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND	4	5	7	2	4	12
3	HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES	1	1	24	1	5	9
4	HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES	16	8	1	5	10	5
5	HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER	3	3	32	4	1	8
6	HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS	12	16	2	12	6	4
7	HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY	10	12	4	6	8	16
8	HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE	25	14	9	11	2	1
9	HE WAS APPROACHABLE	14	4	16	14	18	3
10	HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES	11	7	20	19	9	6

FIGURE 27. IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITIES: ALL GRADE LEVELS

In terms of practical utility, the variation in rank-order positions by grade level permits the establishment of priorities in efforts to improve leadership--and the priorities can be "tailored" to fit each grade level. Figure 27 includes only those items of leadership behavior which were in the top 10 in terms of improvement opportunities for all grade levels combined. The data base for the study can provide the improvement opportunity rank-order for all 43 items of leadership behavior for each grade level.

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SEVERAL FACTORS WERE FOUND TO BE COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM OF APPLYING CORRECTLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP:

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FINDING

A. LEADERS' PERCEPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE AS IMPEDING THEIR ABILITY TO ENFORCE STANDARDS.

B. DIVERSION OF SOLDIERS FROM PRIMARY DUTIES BY DETAILS AND LEVIES.

C. MISUSE OF SOLDIERS' TIME.

D. LACK OF AUTHORITY TO REWARD GOOD PERFORMANCE WITH TIME OFF.

E. FEELING BY JUNIOR OFFICERS AND JUNIOR NCO'S WITH PRIMARILY VIETNAM EXPERIENCE THAT THEY ARE ILL-PREPARED FOR PEACETIME LEADERSHIP.

F. APPARENTLY WIDE VARIATION IN THE STANDARDS BY WHICH GENERAL OFFICERS MEASURE LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES.

G. SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS (LACK OF COMMUNICATION, INATTENTION TO HUMAN NEEDS, ETC.) IN THE PROFESSIONAL CLIMATE CORROBORATING FINDINGS OF OTHER PERTINENT RECENT STUDIES OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

DISCUSSION. This finding presents recurring themes derived from the qualitative data (interviews). The qualitative data analyzed consisted of the detailed notes of the field survey teams, the recorded debriefings of field survey team members (audiotape: 20-25 hours), and the recorded interviews with the general officers who participated in the study (audiotape: 20-25 hours). The data were analyzed by various content analysis procedures over a three-week period. The themes thus derived represent a condensation of the composite replies of leaders at all grade levels to the common interview agenda:

· What are the leadership problems at your particular level?

· What sort of leadership behavior do you expect from your immediate superiors? Your immediate subordinates? Your contemporaries and yourself?

The themes represent factors of the overall organizational climate which make it difficult to apply correctly the principles of leadership, irrespective of the leader's effectiveness. The factors are seen, at this time at least, as negative aspects of the "system." Amplifying comment for each of these factors is provided in the paragraphs which follow.

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A. LEADERS' PERCEPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE AS IMPEDING THEIR ABILITY TO ENFORCE STANDARDS. Particularly at the lower enlisted grade levels, there was strong and pervasive animosity toward what some individuals referred to as "those long-haired junior JAG officers." Leaders at company commander level felt that their range of options for handling leadership problems was restricted severely by current developments in the application of military justice. Many NCO's saw this condition as a lack of downward loyalty by the chain of command.

B. DIVERSION OF SOLDIERS FROM PRIMARY DUTIES BY DETAILS AND LEVIES. This historical source of complaint by leaders at many echelons further compounds the already epidemic problems created by personnel turbulence.

C. MISUSE OF SOLDIERS' TIME. The lower grade levels are apparently far more sensitive to the use and misuse of their time than is commonly realized by leaders at all echelons. It is in regard to this item that many young soldiers first see the organization beginning to default on the terms of the informal contract. An irritant of perhaps unrecognized importance, the misuse of soldier's time, particularly in Advanced Individual Training, exacts a heavy price in terms of satisfaction with Army leadership.

D. LACK OF AUTHORITY TO REWARD GOOD PERFORMANCE WITH TIME OFF. NCO's, in particular, felt that if they were to be held responsible for "getting the job done," then, reciprocally, they should be trusted with the authority to control this simple reward. At all levels, "a little time off" and "a pat on the back now and then" were seen as the best rewards that a superior could give--overall, far more significant than awards, letters, plaques, office ceremonies, and the like.

E. FEELING BY JUNIOR OFFICERS AND JUNIOR NCO'S WITH PRIMARILY VIETNAM EXPERIENCE THAT THEY ARE ILL-PREPARED FOR PEACETIME LEADERSHIP. The junior officers and NCO's, trained for the Vietnam War, recognized that leadership in a peacetime, garrison situation was more complex than in combat. Many wanted (and expected) the Army to help them become better leaders.

F. APPARENTLY WIDE VARIATION IN THE STANDARDS BY WHICH GENERAL OFFICERS MEASURE LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES. In view of the visibility and strong downward influence exerted by those at the upper echelons, this factor affects the entire leadership climate of the Army since it impacts directly on the organization's formal and informal systems of reward and punishment.

G. SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS (LACK OF COMMUNICATION, INATTENTION TO HUMAN NEEDS, ETC.) IN THE PROFESSIONAL CLIMATE CORROBORATING FINDINGS OF OTHER PERTINENT RECENT STUDIES OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION. Almost without fail, when professionals talk about professionalism, there is the recurring theme of the "ambitious, transitory commander--marginally skilled in

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the complexities of his duties--engulfed in producing statistical
results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen
to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic
reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks at
the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates." This
recurring theme was brought to light more than a year ago in a study
of officer values. Despite concerted efforts to remedy much of the
non-professionalism illustrated by the theme, the theme persists. This
cautions patience, and illustrates the snail pace of organizational
change when that change affects the attitudes, values, and standards
of the members of the organization.

10 FINDING

THE OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD MVA CONCEPT WAS

MODERATELY FAVORABLE ALTHOUGH THERE WERE

WIDE VARIATIONS WITHIN AND BETWEEN GRADE

LEVELS.

DISCUSSION. This finding was the result of ancillary research conducted
as part of the overall USAWC Leadership Study. Since "Leadership for
the 1970's" could be equated with Leadership for the Modern Volunteer
Army, interpretation of data and implementation of proposals might be
offset badly if the respondents held a strongly biased overall attitude
toward the Modern Volunteer Army concept.

A group of questionnaire items was designed to examine the
respondent's attitude toward the concept (Part V, Annex B). To
preclude contamination of the leadership data, the MVA questions were
administered separately, after the respondent had completed all other
parts of the questionnaire. The principal result of the analysis of
the MVA questions is shown in Figure 28 on the following page.

Figure 28 depicts overall attitude toward the MVA concept among
all 1800 respondents. The figures in circles are percentages. The
question shown is essentially the same as the primary MVA item in the
questionnaire. Approximately three-quarters of the respondents approved
the concept; one-quarter disapproved. The question design permitted
further analysis of the intensity of approval or disapproval.

OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD MVA
► ALL RESPONDENTS ◄

"BASED UPON WHAT YOU HAVE RECENTLY HEARD, SEEN, AND READ, WHAT IS YOUR OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY IDEA?"

DISAPPROVE 26

6 STRONGLY

11 MODERATELY

9 SLIGHTLY

APPROVE 73

20 SLIGHTLY

31 MODERATELY

22 STRONGLY

FIGURE 28. OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD MVA

Since grade level had proven to be a major variable in other analyses, its effect on overall attitude toward the MVA concept was examined. The data appear in Figure 29 on the following page. In general, they show that within NCO and officer categories, the higher the grade level, the less the approval of the concept. The exception to this general rule is the Senior Field Grade level (Colonel). Although the data in this case were not examined in detail, a

tentative conclusion regarding this grade level's relatively greater approval is that it is an effect of leadership climate, i.e., it might be the result of an influence process moving downward from the upper echelons.

HOW DO YOU PERSONALLY FEEL ABOUT THE MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY IDEA?

FIGURE 29. ATTITUDE TOWARD MVA: BY GRADE LEVEL

Examination of the quantitative MVA data and the interview content indicates that attitudes toward the MVA did not contaminate the leadership data (the subject came up only infrequently in the leadership discussions). Depending upon the method used, implementation of proposals resulting from this study should encounter "normal" organizational resistance to change in accordance with the general proposition: "the higher the grade, the greater the resistance."

FINDINGS--SUMMARY DATA TABLES

The following tables, extracted from the data base, provide additional diagnostic and prescriptive information related to Findings 6, 7, and 8.

GRADE LEVEL SUMMARIES (Tables 1-6). These tables present the highlights of diagnostic and prescriptive information for each grade level. They list (in rank-order) the first five items of leadership behavior in various functional categorizations used in the study.

RANK-ORDERINGS OF ITEMS OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR (Tables 7-9). Tables 7-9 list the rank-orders for all 43 items of leadership behavior in terms of performance shortfall, perception shortfall, and opportunities for improvement. Tables are organized to present the rank-orders for all respondents combined, as well as the rank-orders for each grade level. Asterisks indicate the first five items in each rank-ordering.

TABLE 1

JUNIOR NCO LEVEL

<u>ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL</u>
<u>PERCEPTION OF QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP</u>
<u>BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR</u>

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Was Selfish.

<u>ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY</u>

He Resisted Changes In Ways of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE</u>
<u>SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE</u>

He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could
To Make It High.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.
He Was Thoughtful And Considerate Of Others.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT</u>
<u>BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE</u>

He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)</u>

He Treated People In An Impersonal Manner--Like Cogs In A Machine.
He Failed To Show An Appreciation For Priorities Of Work.
He Kept Me Informed Of The True Situation, Good And Bad, Under All
Circumstances.
He Stood Up For His Subordinates Even Though It Made Him Unpopular
With His Superior.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION</u>

He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Stifled The Initiative Of His Subordinates.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.
He Hesitated To Take Action In The Absence Of Instruction.

TABLE 2

SENIOR NCO LEVEL

<u>ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL
PERCEPTION OF QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP
BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR</u>

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Was Approachable.
He Was Easy To Understand.

<u>ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY</u>

He Stifled The Initiative Of His Subordinates.
He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE
SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE</u>

He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could
To Make It High.
He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT
BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE</u>

He Demanded Results On Time Without Considering The Capabilities
And Welfare Of His Unit.
He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Fought The Problem.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)</u>

He Counseled, Trained, and Developed His Subordinates.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Kept Me Informed Of The True Situation, Good And Bad, Under All
Circumstances.
He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could
To Make It High.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION</u>

He Was Selfish.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.
He Fought The Problem.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Was Easy To Understand.

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TABLE 3

JUNIOR COMPANY GRADE LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL
PERCEPTION OF QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP
BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.
He Backed Up Subordinates In Their Actions.
He Distorted Reports To Make His Unit Look Better.
He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Was Selfish.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Saw That Subordinates Had The Materials They Needed To Work With.
He Expressed Appreciation When A Subordinate Did A Good Job.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE
SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could
To Make It High.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.
He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Was Easy To Understand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT
BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Fought The Problem.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Let Subordinates Share In Decisionmaking.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Kept Me Informed Of The True Situation, Good And Bad, Under All
Circumstances.
He Counseled, Trained, And Developed His Subordinates.
He Failed To Show An Appreciation For Priorities Of Work.
He Set High Standards Of Performance.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.

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TABLE 4

SENIOR COMPANY GRADE LEVEL

<u>ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL
PERCEPTION OF QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP
BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR</u>

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

<u>ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY</u>

He Let Subordinates Share In Decisionmaking.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE
SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE</u>

He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT
BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE</u>

He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Let Subordinates Share In Decisionmaking.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)</u>

He Kept Me Informed Of The True Situation, Good And Bad, Under All
Circumstances.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Treated People In An Impersonal Manner--Like Cogs In A Machine.
He Was Approachable.
He Expressed Appreciation When A Subordinate Did A Good Job.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION</u>

He Sought Additional And More Important Responsibilities.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Fought The Problem.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.

TABLE 5

JUNIOR FIELD GRADE LEVEL

<u>ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL</u>
<u>PERCEPTION OF QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP</u>
<u>BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR</u>

He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Set High Standards Of Performance.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.

<u>ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY</u>

He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Let Subordinates Share In Decisionmaking.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE</u>
<u>SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE</u>

He Was Easy To Understand.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.
He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT</u>
<u>BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE</u>

He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Fought The Problem.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)</u>

He Backed Up Subordinates In Their Actions.
He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could
To Make It High.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.
He Was Willing To Support His Subordinates Even When They Made Mistakes.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION</u>

He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Sought Additional And More Important Responsibilities.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.

TABLE 6

SENIOR FIELD GRADE LEVEL

<u>ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL
PERCEPTION OF QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP
BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR</u>

He Set High Standards Of Performance.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.
He Was Approachable.
He Backed Up Subordinates In Their Actions.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

<u>ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY</u>

He Fought The Problem.
He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE
SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE</u>

He Was Easy To Understand.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could
To Make It High.
He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT
BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE</u>

He Was Willing To Make Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Hesitated To Take Action In The Absence Of Instruction.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)</u>

He Stood Up For His Subordinates Even Though It Made Him Unpopular
With His Superior.
He Counseled, Trained, And Developed His Subordinates.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Was Willing To Support His Subordinates Even When They Made Mistakes.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.

<u>LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION</u>

He Was Willing To Make Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Fought The Problem.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.

TABLE 7

**STATISTICAL RANK-ORDER OF PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE)
AMONG 43 LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS**

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH.	1*	2*	1*	1*	5*	6	4*
HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.	2*	12	3*	2	1*	3*	3*
HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY.	3*	1*	2*	4*	6	8	17
HE CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS.	4*	3*	8	10	9	7	6
HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.	5*	11	24	5*	2*	5*	1*
HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.	6	5*	5*	3*	5*	13	11
HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.	7	19	6	12	4*	2*	2*
HE LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM.	7	10	11	13	3*	4*	7
HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.	9	16	10	14	8	5*	5*
HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.	10	15	9	7	12	12	10
HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.	11	8	4*	9	13	9	32
HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.	12	7	7	6	16	21	19
HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.	13	6	27	17	10	14	13
HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.	14	9	16	15	11	20	20
HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.	15	28	13	8	14	16	15
HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CON-SIDERATE OF OTHERS.	16	4*	14	18	18	22	21
HE WAS SELFISH.	17	17	23	11	21	19	9
HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.	17	31	21	20	17	10	16
HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.	19	14	12	22	15	25	31
HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.	20	23	32	24	20	18	8
HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.	21	13	28	19	25	17	27
HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.	22	20	17	21	22	32	33

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TABLE 7 (Continued)

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.	23	26	15	23	19	29	24
HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.	24	18	18	19	24	28	29
HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.	25	21	29	25	32	23	12
HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.	26	35	31	28	26	15	14
HE WAS APPROACHABLE.	27	22	26	26	29	26	25
HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.	28	36	38	30	28	11	18
HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.	29	30	22	34	27	27	28
HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.	30	32	36	29	23	31	22
HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.	31	27	30	32	37	24	23
HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.	32	25	39	31	30	30	34
HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTION.	33	34	20	27	31	37	43
HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.	34	24	19	33	35	42	42
HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.	35	37	37	36	36	36	26
HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	36	38	25	38	34	35	39
HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.	37	42	40	35	33	38	35
HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISIONMAKING.	38	33	34	43	42	34	37
HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	39	39	33	39	40	33	40
HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.	40	29	42	40	38	41	36
HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.	41	40	35	41	39	40	41
HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.	42	41	43	37	43	43	30
HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.	43	43	41	42	41	39	38

TABLE 8

STATISTICAL RANK-ORDER OF PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION) AMONG 43 LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.	1*	3*	3*	1*	1*	10	17
HE CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS.	2*	5*	9	5*	24	3*	5*
HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.	3*	32	2*	6	2*	9	3*
HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH.	4*	22	4*	8	8	2*	10
HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.	5*	33	1*	2*	10	12	2*
HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY.	6	15	8	12	12	21	9
HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.	7	4*	31	13	28	6	1*
HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.	8	7	25	32	6	1*	13
HE WAS APPROACHABLE.	9	9	24	30	4*	12	6
HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.	10	15	10	18	14	13	16
HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.	11	1*	30	26	3*	22	7
HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.	12	21	15	10	38	5*	4*
HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.	13	19	13	4*	16	31	12
HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.	14	10	27	15	5*	18	21
HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.	15	11	11	22	11	35	11
HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.	16	30	5*	25	9	26	14
HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.	17	14	6	39	19	15	20
HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.	18	20	19	29	13	32	19
HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.	19	6	12	38	21	20	32
HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.	20	18	17	35	18	23	18

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TABLE 8 (Continued)

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE WAS SELFISH.	21	31	39	16	7	14	23
HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	22	5*	23	23	27	24	33
HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	23	24	20	9	17	28	39
HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.	24	34	33	17	36	11	8
HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.	25	36	37	7	15	21	24
HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.	26	2*	34	3*	37	38	29
HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.	27	16	38	27	20	19	35
HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.	28	40	22	36	29	17	22
HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.	29	8	7	31	25	16	30
HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.	30	17	26	28	22	39	40
HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.	31	41	21	19	34	25	25
HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.	32	27	40	40	43	4*	27
HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISIONMAKING.	33	25	28	33	32	37	26
HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.	34	26	32	14	30	40	41
HE LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM.	35	42	18	43	23	43	15
HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTION.	36	43	16	20	35	34	36
HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.	37	23	14	37	39	42	31
HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.	38	35	43	21	26	36	28
HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.	39	28	42	11	42	41	37
HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.	40	29	29	41	40	27	34
HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.	41	12	41	24	41	43	42
HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.	42	38	35	34	31	33	43
HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.	43	37	36	42	33	30	38

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TABLE 9

**STATISTICAL RANK-ORDER OF LEADERSHIP PERFORMANCE OPPORTUNITIES
(SENSITIVITY TO PERFORMANCE CHANGE) DETERMINED BY REGRESSION OF LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE
OF 43 LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS AGAINST OVERALL SATISFACTION WITH LEADERSHIP**

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.	1*	2*	2*	6	8	3*	2*
HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.	2*	4*	5*	7	2*	4*	12
HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.	3*	1*	1*	24	1*	5*	9
HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.	4*	16	8	1*	5*	10	5*
HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.	5*	3*	3*	32	4*	1*	8
HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.	6	12	16	2*	12	6	4*
HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY.	7	10	12	4*	6	8	16
HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.	8	25	14	9	11	2*	1*
HE WAS APPROACHABLE.	9	14	4*	16	14	18	3*
HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.	10	11	7	20	19	9	6
HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.	11	8	17	3*	15	25	7
HE LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM.	12	20	15	18	10	16	11
HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH.	13	9	13	38	7	11	13
HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTION.	14	24	19	11	18	13	19
HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.	15	27	18	36	3*	7	18
HE WAS SELFISH.	16	5*	11	5*	23	32	34
HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.	17	19	22	10	21	19	20
HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.	18	15	9	40	20	22	14
HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.	19	26	6	26	22	15	27
HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.	20	33	29	17	9	17	21
HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.	21	18	10	35	16	30	21
HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.	22	6	20	31	24	26	23

TABLE 9 (Continued)

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.	23	22	28	12	33	28	10
HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.	24	29	26	14	26	20	35
HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	25	34	30	22	31	12	22
HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.	26	31	23	23	30	14	30
HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.	27	13	24	28	34	21	31
HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.	28	32	39	19	17	31	15
HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.	29	7	31	8	32	39	37
HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.	30	17	21	41	25	23	28
HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.	31	37	36	27	13	24	26
HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.	32	28	35	15	36	34	25
HE CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS.	33	30	32	30	29	27	32
HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.	34	21	33	33	27	33	33
HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.	35	36	27	25	35	36	29
HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.	36	42	38	13	37	37	24
HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	37	39	40	21	28	35	40
HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.	38	23	25	34	42	42	38
HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.	39	38	34	29	38	29	39
HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISIONMAKING.	40	35	37	37	39	40	36
HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.	41	40	41	39	41	41	42
HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.	42	41	42	42	43	38	41
HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.	43	43	43	43	40	43	43

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SOLUTION CONCEPTS

The AWC Leadership Study does not provide specific recommendations.
It seeks instead to offer broader "solution concepts" which will serve
to create in time an Army-wide leadership climate characterized by
recognition and fulfillment of the informal contract. Each solution
concept is related directly to some facet of the study itself, and each
is sufficiently nonspecific to permit the exercise of ingenuity and the
application of expertise by those responsible for implementation. The
solution concepts and amplifying discussions are presented in the para-
graphs which follow.

1. USE THE MAIN FEATURES OF THIS STUDY ON AN ARMY-WIDE
   SCALE TO PROVIDE:

   A. THE INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS ACCRUING
      FROM PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH.

   B. DIAGNOSTIC INFORMATION APPLICABLE TO INDIVIDUAL
      AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT.

   C. A BROADENED DATA BANK OF INFORMATION TO BE USED
      BY ARMY PLANNERS, EDUCATORS, AND RESEARCHERS.

DISCUSSION. A strong and positive effect is created within the
individual and the unit as a result of participation in a project whose
potential impact in improving the Army is obvious to both. The concept
of the informal contract, which is a central theme of the questionnaire
and the group interview, represents the individual _and_ the organization.
If both are given feedback on the results of their contribution, the
contribution gains significance and importance in their eyes--the
individual and the unit have been recognized by the larger entity of
which they are a part. At every installation, the field survey team
found strong and positive interest in the study and its evident potential.

This survey team also found that, because of the content of the
questionnaire and the interview agenda, participation as a respondent

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constituted unique and provocative instruction in the process and
problems of leadership. The survey team reported numerous requests,
at all levels, for more information on the study, its data and its
concepts. Group interviews were joined frequently by volunteer respondents
far in excess of the number specified, and on several occasions, the
group interview sessions continued (in accordance with the respondents'
wishes) for several hours beyond the scheduled time. In one case, at
Fort Benning, student officers, of their own volition, actually gathered
in the mess hall after the evening meal to continue the discussion of
leadership begun earlier during the group interview sessions. At the
more senior levels, completion of the questionnaire and subsequent
discussion brought to mind leadership principles, problems, examples,
and techniques that had not been considered for years.

Another advantage of an Army-wide repetition of the study is
that this will provide a far more sensitive and responsive data base.
With this enlarged data base, it would be possible, for example, to
furnish a major unit commander with comprehensive diagnostic and
prescriptive information for studying and improving the leadership
of his command. Additionally, a larger and more sensitive data base
can give more accurate prescriptions for specific individuals or groups
of individuals. The greater the number of respondents, the greater
the number of statistically significant comparison groups that can be
derived.

Academic professionals who have studied the data of the present
study are impressed favorably by the potential the data offer. Depending
upon how the data are organized and analyzed, the data base can answer
leadership-related questions which arise in the formulation of personnel
policies, in the development of educational programs, and in the academic
study of organizational leadership. A ten-fold increase in the size of
the data base (which could result from Army-wide repetition) would give
the Army a potential for the study of leadership largely absent in
current military or academic research. There would be, conservatively,
enough information and enough worthwhile research objectives to keep a
reasonably staffed "Institute of Leadership" fully and gainfully employed
for several years. At the present time, there is still an enormous
wealth of untapped information in the design and data base--information
which could have powerful implications for Army leadership. In terms of
both scientific progress and potential application, there is a pressing
need for continuation of this research effort by an adequately staffed
agency.

2. MAKE WIDE DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED PORTIONS OF THIS STUDY AS A MEANS OF PROVIDING, BY LEVEL, DIAGNOSES OF LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR LEADER-SHIP IMPROVEMENT.

DISCUSSION. As noted in the findings, it is possible to generate, for any grade level, a rather detailed and rank-ordered listing of the leadership problems at that level. The data base can also point up specific areas where efforts at leadership improvement can be most profitable. Further, part of the prescription generated by the data provides the information necessary to establish an order of priority among efforts at improvement. A school charged with the development of leadership at a particular level could build an entire course of leadership instruction around a detailed study of the problems and prescriptions for a given grade level. Additionally, such a course might well include insight into the problems and prescriptions for the immediate superiors and subordinates of a given grade level. Such a multilevel approach has obvious implications for facilitating mission accomplishment and improving interlevel communications.

Further, a detailed analysis of leadership at a given level has applicability extending well beyond school situations alone. Through officer calls, noncommissioned officer calls, or counseling programs, a unit commander could use the analysis to better fulfill his respon-sibilities for the development of subordinates. Finally, in some cases the analysis might be used by the individual determined to apply the second principle of leadership: "Know yourself and seek self-improvement."

3. CONDUCT SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF THE ATTITUDES, VALUES, AND CONCEPTS OF LEADERSHIP HELD BY OFFICERS AT 06 AND HIGHER GRADES.

DISCUSSION. The concept of leadership climate is strongly supported by extensive research which shows conclusively that the attitudes and values of those at the upper level permeate the entire organization, filtering down to all subordinate levels. This scientific and common sense phenomenon is recognized by the professional soldier in the often-heard comment: "If you want to do anything about leadership

problems, you've got to start at the top." The upper levels set the example, be it good, bad, or something in between.

The Army's studies of the attitudes and values at the upper levels of leadership have been mostly subjective or autobiographical. It is difficult, therefore, to identify and control for bias, to isolate variables, or to study the effects of those variables. A carefully controlled, tightly disciplined study of these most visible, most influential levels could provide information of great value in officer selection, appraisal, and development, as well as in understanding of the role of the officer and many phenomena of the Army's leadership climate.

4. REVISE LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION CONCEPTS WITHIN THE ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM TO ENSURE THAT CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO THIS SUBJECT ARE BEING EXPLOITED.

DISCUSSION. Within the past 30 years, there has been a major growth in the academic study of leadership. In many cases, this research has been supported and furthered by large organizations when it was determined that the research results could be applied to increasing organizational effectiveness. A survey of leadership instruction throughout the Army school system, conducted as a part of the USAWC Leadership Study, indicated that (with the exception of significant input from HumRRO) much of our leadership instruction was behind the times in terms of method and content.

A need exists for an integrated, sequential approach to leadership development throughout the Army school system. However, an even greater need exists for each echelon of the school system to know and take advantage of scientifically valid leadership research with proven applicability in increasing the effectiveness of practical organizational leadership.

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5. ESTABLISH AN EXTENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE PROGRAM

OF ACADEMIC AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION , FOR CAREER

NCO'S.

DISCUSSION. When comparing all levels of the Army's leadership climate
in terms of the relative amount, complexity, and severity of leadership
problems, the Senior NCO level appears to be the one in greatest need of
help and leadership maintenance. Many of the problems at this level
are related directly to difficulties in communicating effectively--
communicating with immediate superiors as well as with immmediate
subordinates. At a deeper level, a root cause of this communication
difficulty is not the traditionalism or obstinacy of the Senior NCO;
indeed, there is probably no level more loyal or more concerned with
the Army's future effectiveness. Rather, the difficulty appears to lie
in the Senior NCO's relative lack of education, both academic and
technical. In interlevel communication, this relative lack of education
makes it difficult for the Senior NCO to establish the common or shared
frame of reference which is critical to effective communication. The
Senior NCO has been fulfilling his role as "backbone of the Army."
Over the years, he has been the doer, and the price exacted has been
in terms of his progressive professional development. In the planning
stages, programs exist (e.g., the Noncommissioned Officer Education
System) which are designed to enhance the development of the career
noncommissioned officer. In light of the Army's reliance on this grade
level, and the severity of the leadership problems which apparently
exist therein, plans for the professional development of the career
noncommissioned officer should be expanded, intensified, and accelerated.

6. BEGIN DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAM OF "COACHING" DESIGNED

TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIFIC

EXPECTATIONS BETWEEN SUPERIOR AND SUBORDINATE.

DISCUSSION. Many of the leadership problems identified earlier in this
report are reflections of inadequate communications between levels.
The "perception shortfalls" discussed in the Findings are themselves
proof positive of poor interpersonal communications, irrespective of
the grade levels involved. Further, the need for improved interpersonal
communications is a principal recommendation of many of the studies of
the pressing personnel problems of today's Army (retention, race, drugs,
dissent). Counseling may be the answer--but there are sizable problems
involved.

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A review of Army publications, school curricula, and the limited in-house research done in this area shows an incompleteness in the overall approach to counseling, as well as several general misconceptions which impede seriously an effective counseling program.

Within the Army's existing leadership climate, counseling is viewed largely in two respects: as advice for career progression and assignments; or as a corrective, quasi-punitive measure taken by a leader when a subordinate has done something wrong. These views are respectively incomplete and incorrect. In terms of mission accomplishment and job satisfaction, by far the most important type of counseling is that which deals with day-to-day performance on the job. Further, experts in the field of counseling state unequivocally that this type of counseling--performance counseling--is just as essential (perhaps even more so) for the successful, experienced subordinate who has done an excellent job as for the new, inexperienced subordinate who has done poorly.

Army leadership should view counseling more in terms of "coaching"-- needed frequently by the best player as well as the worst, and directed toward the success of the team through development of the individual members. If "performance coaching" can become a normal and frequent feature of the senior-subordinate relationship, there can only be improvement in the interlevel communication (both directions) of what is expected and of the degree to which these expectations are being met.

7. PROVIDE STAFF MEMBERS (MILITARY) WHO ARE FORMALLY TRAINED IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF LEADERSHIP AND INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS TO ALL ARMY SCHOOLS AND STAFF SECTIONS DEALING WITH THEORETICAL OR PRACTICAL LEADER-SHIP EDUCATION OR TRAINING.

DISCUSSION. Leadership is a highly complex dimension of human behavior which, beginning in the early 1950's, has become a major area of interest in the field of social psychology. Social psychology can be viewed as the scientific study of man in interaction with others. As an academic discipline, social psychology includes the study of leadership as well as other subfields which are closely related to leadership--e.g., interpersonal relations, attitudes, group dynamics, and decisionmaking. As a science, this field has much to offer to Army leadership.

The Army's institutional concept of leadership, not formally spelled out, has two principal components which are understood by every Army leader: mission accomplishment and welfare of the men. The Army has applied academic expertise to the mission accomplishment component. The findings of the scientific study of management are used frequently at all levels, and major staffs and Army schools have numerous individuals assigned who are formally trained in theory and techniques of management (to include comptrollership and systems analysis).

The Army's approach to the other component of leadership, welfare of the men, is by no means as thorough. Academic expertise and scientific research are applied to the meeting of the soldier's physical needs, but in the far more significant aspect of his welfare, that which comes from interaction with others, there is hesitancy, even resistance, among professional soldiers in applying the scientific approach. This accounts in part for many of today's serious "people" problems. It accounts in part also for the need to go to someone other than the professional soldier in order to develop policy and procedures for training the Army leader (HumRRO), or to investigate major leadership problems such as junior officer retention (Franklin Institute) and personal and social characteristics of incoming personnel (Research Analysis Corporation task, ODCSPER "American Soldier in the 70's" study).

As the methodology for this study was formulated, as the data were gathered, and as the initial results were compiled, the study team visited and talked with leaders of every echelon at various posts, camps, and stations. The team found a wealth of experience in virtually every type of leadership problem, and they found brilliance in some of the intuitive approaches to these problems, but the other essential dimension of problem-solving, i.e., the application of scientific knowledge and fact, was largely nonexistent in the area of leadership. The team visited numerous leadership departments and other agencies and individuals charged with the development of Army leadership. Nowhere, except at the US Military Academy, did they find professional soldiers with formal training in the scientific study of leadership. The relative newness of leadership as an area of scientific endeavor, no doubt, accounts for this phenomenon, but it is essential that the Army establish its requirements for officers formally trained in the scientific study of leadership and enlarge the advanced degree program in this area without delay.

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8. PRECLUDE EVOLUTION OF AN "ANTI-LEADERSHIP" SYNDROME BY ENSURING QUALITY CONTROL OF LEADERSHIP STUDY ACTIVITIES THROUGH CENTRALIZED COORDINATION OF FIELD SURVEY OPERATIONS.

DISCUSSION. The positive value of "participative research" as a means of developing a sense of commitment and contribution among the members of an organization has been discussed elsewhere in this report. Further, there is substantial organizational research to show that, when organizational change is planned (as is the case in the Army's move toward a zero-draft), participation by the members beforehand in formulating the method of change makes it far easier for the members to accept the change, or at least to consider it objectively with a minimum of unfounded bias. Evidence of both of these good effects was noted when a USAWC briefing team presented the results of the study at various Army schools to classes whose members had participated in the field survey.

These good potential effects can be negated if efforts to study leadership and to implement change are not derived from a common objective and a coordinated program. A multitude of disparate surveys and seminars on the subject of leadership could create, in the field, a feeling that the Army, aware of a need but lacking a specific sense of purpose, was "shotgunning" efforts to improve Army leadership.

An earlier solution concept noted the need for a progressive and sequential approach to leadership development in the Army school system. The same need for coordination applies to data collection and dissemination/application of results. Ideally, leadership research and the application of this research should be managed centrally.

SUMMARY COMMENT

This study can be of assistance to leadership in today's Army as well as to an Army which must rely for personnel sustainment upon its own ability to attract and retain. The potential of the study lies not so much in its findings alone as in its emphasis upon the requirement for Army leadership to recognize fully and fulfill wholeheartedly the terms of the "informal contract." The Army and the professional soldier both recognize that periodic breaches of the contract occasioned by situational factors are unavoidable. Both can accept this, but neither

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the organization nor the individual can, will, or should accept a long-term condition where one party to the contract consistently fails to participate fairly.

Like it or not, the Army's lifeblood and continued existence are directly dependent upon the youth of this nation--a youth whose educational level is increasing rapidly; a youth driven not by the physical needs of bygone eras, but rather by the quest for fulfillments of human values.

The task for Army leadership, then, is to insure that, in all his interactions and relationships with the Army, the professional soldier-- in light of his background, values, and expectations--will view his relationship with the Army as one which is supportive and which builds and maintains his sense of personal worth and importance. He is a party to the contract--and the Army's investment in the interests of his human values will, in time, create the loyalty and dedication which are the cornerstones of true discipline, and which will lead the soldier to sacrifice his own needs on those few critical occasions where there must be a showdown between mission and men.

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY--LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1970's

Beginning in January 1971, the US Army War College, at the direction of General Westmoreland, conducted a study to determine the type of leadership that would be appropriate as the Army approached the zero-draft conditions of the Modern Volunteer Army.

Using a carefully selected research team composed of staff, faculty, and students with appropriate leadership experience and academic expertise, the US Army War College designed the study on the proposition that the type of leadership appropriate for the Modern Volunteer Army (or for today's Army, for that matter) would be leadership which, at all levels and in all processes, would recognize and honor the terms of the "informal contract" that comes into being between the Army and the individual when the professional soldier dedicates his life effort to an Army career. This difficult and idealistic commitment, on the part of the organization and the individual, would require each to know and attempt to fulfill the legitimate expectations of the other--the Army in terms of worthwhile work, a sufficiency of pay, and fair and honest treatment; and the individual in terms of task proficiency, disciplined response to direction, and full support of assigned missions. This reciprocity of professionalism was seen as the critical essential under those conditions where the long term effectiveness of the Army depended upon the existence of a satisfactory relationship between the Army as an organization and the professional soldier as an individual. Army leadership was viewed as the mediating influence--the context within which and by which the informal contract is supported or negated.

The 18-man research team, using a scientifically designed questionnaire and group interview techniques, collected data from 1,800 individuals, representing a broad base of Army leadership up to and including 8-10 percent of the Army's general officers. The data, analyzed quantitatively by computer and qualitatively by content analysis techniques, spoke significantly in terms of the expectations of the organization and the individual, represented respectively by the perspectives of superior and subordinate.

The findings show dramatically that the Army's time-honored Principles of Leadership are accepted overwhelmingly by leaders at all levels as appropriate for the coming decade. The data show further, however, that there are serious deficiencies in the application of the principles--deficiencies which, through the study findings, can be identified precisely by grade level, by perspective, and by specific kinds of leadership behavior; and which evidence unrecognized failures by one or both parties to meet the expectations of the informal contract. The same data, reciprocally, using satisfaction with Army leadership as a criterion, identify with identical precision the leadership behavior necessary to produce a condition wherein

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the legitimate expectations of the organization and the individual are perceived as being fairly met--this condition being the essential prerequisite to a satisfactory relationship between the Army and the professional soldier.

A listing of abbreviated statements of findings and abbreviated statements of solution concepts follow:

ABBREVIATED STATEMENTS OF FINDINGS
OF USAWC LEADERSHIP STUDY

1. THE STUDY METHODOLOGY IS A RELIABLE DEVICE FOR MEASURING LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS AND DIAGNOSING PROBLEMS.

2. DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP VARIES SIGNIFICANTLY BY GRADE LEVEL (HIGHER GRADE, HIGHER SATISFACTION), VARIES ONLY SLIGHTLY BETWEEN COMBAT AND NONCOMBAT CONDITIONS, AND DOES NOT VARY BY RACIAL GROUP.

3. IN GENERAL, SOLDIERS ARE SATISFIED WITH LEADERSHIP IN BASIC TRAINING AND DISSATISFIED WITH LEADERSHIP IN ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING. (SOLDIERS ARE DISAPPOINTED IF HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE ARE NOT SET AND MAINTAINED.)

4. OUR LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES (AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT THEY EXPRESS) ARE VALID, AND APPROPRIATE FOR THE 1970'S.

5. THE PERCEPTION OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIFIC LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES VARIES AMONG GRADE LEVELS.

6. THE APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES IS DEFECTIVE IN SEVERAL RESPECTS WHICH HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY GRADE LEVELS AND PERSPECTIVE (SUPERIOR, SUBORDINATE, SELF) IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR.

7. A MAJOR DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING CORRECTLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP IS THE FREQUENT MISPERCEPTION OF HOW WELL ONE'S OWN LEADERSHIP IS MEETING THE LEADERSHIP EXPECTATIONS OF SUPERIOR AND/OR SUBORDINATE (INDIVIDUALS CONSISTENTLY PERCEIVE THEIR OWN SHORTFALLS AS LESS THAN SUPERIORS OR SUBORDINATES PERCEIVE THEM TO BE).

8. CERTAIN ITEMS OF LEADER BEHAVIOR FOR EACH GRADE LEVEL HAVE HIGH POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN OVERALL LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS IN RETURN FOR A SMALL IMPROVEMENT IN THE PARTICULAR BEHAVIOR.

9. SEVERAL FACTORS WERE FOUND TO BE COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM OF APPLYING CORRECTLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP:

A. LEADERS' PERCEPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE AS IMPEDING THEIR ABILITY TO ENFORCE STANDARDS.

B. DIVERSION OF SOLDIERS FROM PRIMARY DUTIES BY DETAILS AND LEVIES.

C. MISUSE OF SOLDIERS' TIME.

D. LACK OF AUTHORITY TO REWARD GOOD PERFORMANCE WITH TIME OFF.

E. FEELING BY JUNIOR OFFICERS AND JUNIOR NCO'S WITH PRIMARILY VIETNAM EXPERIENCE THAT THEY ARE ILL-PREPARED FOR PEACETIME LEADERSHIP.

F. APPARENTLY WIDE VARIATION IN THE STANDARDS BY WHICH GENERAL OFFICERS MEASURE LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES.

G. SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS (LACK OF COMMUNICATION, INATTENTION TO HUMAN NEEDS, ETC.) IN THE PROFESSIONAL CLIMATE CORROBORATING FINDINGS OF OTHER PERTINENT RECENT STUDIES OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

10. THE OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MVA CONCEPT WAS MODERATELY FAVORABLE ALTHOUGH THERE WERE WIDE VARIATIONS WITHIN AND BETWEEN GRADE LEVELS.

ABBREVIATED STATEMENTS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS
OF USAWC LEADERSHIP STUDY

1. USE THE MAIN FEATURES OF THIS STUDY ON AN ARMY-WIDE SCALE TO PROVIDE:

A. THE INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM PARTICIPA-TORY RESEARCH.

B. DIAGNOSTIC INFORMATION APPLICABLE TO INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT.

D. A BROADENED DATA BANK OF INFORMATION TO BE USED BY ARMY PLANNERS, EDUCATORS, AND RESEARCHERS.

2. MAKE WIDE DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED PORTIONS OF THIS STUDY AS A MEANS OF PROVIDING, BY LEVEL, DIAGNOSES OF LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS AND PRESCRIP-TIONS FOR LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT.

3. CONDUCT SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF THE ATTITUDES, VALUES, AND CONCEPTS OF LEADERSHIP HELD BY OFFICERS AT 06 AND HIGHER GRADES.

4. REVISE LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION CONCEPTS WITHIN THE ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM TO ENSURE THAT CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO THIS SUBJECT ARE BEING EXPLOITED.

5. ESTABLISH AN EXTENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE PROGRAM OF ACADEMIC AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION FOR CAREER NCO'S.

6. BEGIN DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAM OF "COACHING" DESIGNED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIFIC EXPECTATIONS BETWEEN SUPERIOR AND SUBORDINATE.

7. PROVIDE STAFF MEMBERS (MILITARY) WHO ARE FORMALLY TRAINED IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF LEADERSHIP AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS TO ALL ARMY SCHOOLS AND STAFF SECTIONS DEALING WITH THEORETICAL OR PRACTICAL LEADERSHIP EDUCATION OR TRAINING.

8. PRECLUDE EVOLUTION OF AN "ANTI-LEADERSHIP" SYNDROME BY ENSURING QUALITY CONTROL OF LEADERSHIP STUDY ACTIVITIES THROUGH CENTRALIZED COORDINATION OF FIELD SURVEY OPERATIONS.

The support for each finding and the rationale for each solution concept are explained in detail in the accompanying abbreviated report.

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TRANSACTIONAL LEADERSHIP THEORY AND LEADERSHIP TRAINING

T. O. Jacobs, Ph. D.
Director, HumRRO Division Number 4
Fort Benning, Georgia

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it will describe transactional leadership theory, a relatively new concept which originated with research done in the mid and late 1950's by Edwin P. Hollander. Transactional theory has been amplified more recently by Julian and Hollander (1969) and myself (Jacobs, 1970). The second purpose is to describe and discuss leadership training methods and techniques which are suggested by transactional theory.

POWER--A CENTRAL VARIABLE

Recognition of the importance of power has been increasing at a rapid rate, particularly over the past 10 years or so. In a 1965 review of a portion of the literature on influence, leadership, and control, Dorwin Cartwright noted the importance of the power variable. He also commented on the disjointed nature of the research that has been done on it and called for more systematic and better work. To a substantial extent, the work of Dr. Arthur Sweeney, which you have just heard discussed, has contributed to greater understanding of the dynamics of power in formal organizations. Transactional leadership theory also deals with power, but, in particular, addresses questions such as the following:

. How is power generated?

. How are relationships formed between individuals with different degrees of power?

. What is the effect of power differences on both the more powerful and the less powerful?

. What tactics are employed by less powerful individuals to equalize power?

. What is the effect of power relationships on organizational goal accomplishment?

TRANSACTIONAL THEORY--ORIGINS

While a number of leadership researchers (e. g. , Jacobs, 1962; Jacobs, 1963; Adair, 1968) have emphasized the _functional_ nature of organizational leadership, Hollander (1959) was perhaps the first to recognize that group leaders _acquire_ influence potential by contributing in some unique way to the attainment of group goals. Hollander was more concerned at that time with conformity than he was with leadership. That is, some group members appeared to develop the capability to deviate from group expectations, while others did not. He was quite interested in how that capacity developed. However, this led him to formulate a way of looking at emerging leadership in informal groups, which looks much like the sequence shown in Figure 1. The block diagram shown there is a simplification of Hollander's idiosyncrasy credit model. Examination of Figure 1 shows the process by which status develops. Individual status in this model is roughly equivalent to influence potential and capacity to deviate from group expectations. Examination of the sequence of blocks explains many features of Hollander's model. First, it is necessary to assume that members are motivated to belong to the group.

If it is an informal group, the motives are generally to obtain social approval, and/or to participate in the group's focal activity. Each member brings to the group some competence that bears on attainment of group goals. He may also bring to the group other characteristics, such as the ability to resolve tensions or, perhaps, the ability to produce them. Another basic assumption in this model, which is shown in the block labeled "Relevant Behavior, " is that the group must have goals in order for influence potential to emerge. Each member of the group acts as a part of the group, as the group pursues its goals. The behavior varies in relevance and in value for goal attainment.

Figure 1.

The next block shows two things. First, the group makes judgments about its members based on the value of the behavior of the member to attaining goals. The group judgments are cast against a background of group expectations. These expectations exist as norms and role expectations. (Norms are general expectations that apply to all group members equally; roles are expectations specific to positions within the group, e.g., leader.) The group's judgments about its individual members then reflect prior expectations and the value of the indivudal's contribution to the attainment of goals against that background of expectations. The arrows from the block labeled "Status" show another significant factor. The expectations the group has for its members are conditioned in part by the status of the member in the group. Specifically, high status individuals are expected to contribute more than low status individuals.

Given expectations for group member behavior, and the behavior of the member in helping to achieve goals, the group forms a balance of impressions about the member. If he is positively regarded, basically for his contribution to attainment of goals, he acquires what might be called a "bank account." Hollander's term was "idiosyncrasy credit." This particular term probably was chosen because Hollander was interested in issues of conformity group norms. Basically, what he is saying is that the more valuable a member is to the group, the greater will be his freedom to deviate from norms, especially norms that are not grossly important, without being censured by other members of the group. The more valuable he is, the more freedom or latitude he has. The implication for leadership, of course, is that the same thing holds true for influence potential. This is something that Hollander found later. Idiosyncrasy credit and leadership or influence potential are very highly correlated. The more valuable the individual is to the group, the greater his capacity to influence others will be.

The origin of the term "transactional" therefore comes from the fact that there is, in fact, an exchange going on. It is a transaction. By contributing uniquely to the attainment of goals, a benefit to the group, the individual obtains status and influence potential (a benefit to the individual). In part, this arises as a function of the group's respect for the individual who can contribute uniquely to attaining group goals. In addition, however, it is a payment--and research has shown this in fact to be true- -for the individual, to motivate him to remain in the group and continue contributing uniquely.

At a very simplistic level, there is no better illustration than the social status of the varsity quarterback in the fraternity to which he decides to belong. He is allowed enormous latitude or idiosyncrasy credit, because he has enormous capacity to aid the fraternity in its competition for the most desirable of the freshman crop each year.

This seemingly undue *emphasis on idiosyncrasy credit* has arisen for two reasons. First, this is an excellent illustration of transaction between influential members and followers. Second, the influence processes, and the power games that are played in formal organizations are built on the substrate of this kind of informal emergence of influence, during preadolescent and adolescent days. It is necessary for leadership training to take such prior social learning into account if it is to be fully effective.

One simple illustration will show why this is so. A central fact in this model and in other exchange models which will be discussed shortly, is that status and influence potential are satisfying in themselves. Esteem from others is intrinsically rewarding. It must be recognized that all persons, to the extent they feel they can be successful, are competing for status and self-esteem satisfactions, virtually at all times. If one asks why Johnny runs, this must be the answer. However, take into consideration the individual who has competed unsuccessfully for status in his various informal groups during preadolescence and adolescence. Place him in a positions in a formal organization in which he has position power. Position power feels a great deal like status to the individual who has it. Remember that status is intrinsically rewarding. The outcome is that the individual may very well, lacking an understanding of the power role he is playing and the impact of the exercise of power on subordinates, seek to "make up" for his long status deprivation by visibly displaying his power. Alienation of subordinates and major problems in goal accomplishment are the inevitable outcome.

The extension of this line of thinking into the leadership area has drawn heavily on three major subsequent developments:

(1) Homan (1958) developed a concept of communication and interaction within groups as a social exchange process. That is, he postulated that stable relationships between people depend on an exchange of benefits between them. Said more simply, a relationship between two people--and these can be either equals or seniors and subordinates--can be regarded as stable and permanent only if it is mutually rewarding. Blau (1964) developed social exchange theory concepts into a framework for examining the development of power relationships in both informal groups and formal organizations. In social exchange theory terms, leadership consists of a transaction between leaders and subordinates, whereby each profits from the relationship in some significant way. Power emerges in a transaction of that sort when one controls benefits or resources that the other needs and can get in no other way except by complying with what the other says.

This is such a crucially important point that it must be underscored. Power, in social exchange theory terms, consists of the capacity to deprive others of something they need. It can be said no more simply and it can be made no more palatable. Power, in its essential sense, is coercive. The essential aim of leadership in formal organizations is for the superordinate--the boss--to develop the capacity to influence subordinates without having to rely on coercive power. There are two reasons for this. First, the response to the exercise of power is almost always negative. The exercise of power generates resistance, primarily because it demonstrates to the individual who must comply that he is subordinate to the other person and therefore comparatively lacking in status. Second, through the exercise of leadership, it is possible to develop a feeling of responsiblity, self-discipline, and commitment to attaining goals that can in no way be developed through the exercise of power. Leadership consequently is absolutely essential in formal organizations, the only question being how to teach the skills of leading.

(2) Hollander and Julian (1969) demonstrated the relevance of social exchange theory to leadership. In this article, they emphasized the transactional nature of the leadership relationship between senior and subordinate, particularly emphasizing Hollander's earlier notions that the leader is accepted and valued by subordinates to the extent that he makes unique and valuable contributions to the attainment of group goals.

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(3) Finally, a number of researchers have developed concepts pertaining to roles and role expectations in formal organizations. When a person occupies a position in an organization, e.g., a platoon leader, there are certain expectations to which he must conform. His company commander has expectations as does his platoon sergeant and squad leaders. The individual soldier will have a few expectations, and, to the extent that he is visible to the battalion commander, there may even be expectations from that level as well. The expectations from below and the extent to which the individual conforms to them, thereby keeping his bargain, is what LTC D. M. Malone called the "informal contract." However, the informal contract is not all. There are several contracts operating. Expectations extend from a variety of directions and the position incumbent needs to "keep his contracts" in order to be regarded as acceptable in the position.

However, expectations for the position incumbent (from both seniors, peers, and subordinates) may extend beyond the normal boundaries set for "leadership." When they do, deviation from these expectations may lead to negative judgments about the position incumbent's leadership ability. Thus, in order to study "leadership," it may be necessary to consider requirements of the position that go beyond the influence processes of leadership itself. What we are really concerned about here is the requirement of the role that the individual occupies. Specific examples are the manner in which the position incumbent uses the power of the position, and for what purposes, and the manner in which he defines the scope of his authority.

SOCIAL EXCHANGE-- THE TRANSACTION

Social exchange in its most elementary form is shown in Figure 2. This is a trading of benefits which may be either tangible or intangible. One of the most important kinds of equal exchange is shown at the right, where two people mutually reinforce one another. The maintenance of self-esteem is extremely important. Exchange relationships like these help maintain self-esteem, the feeling that we are worthwhile persons. Relationships of this sort are essential for cohesive groups and for the maintenance of stability in the face of threat, particularly combat stress. The relationship at the left side of Figure 2 shows a combination of tangible and intangible benefits, which is another kind of trade that is commonplace.

This Figure also illustrates two other aspects of exchange theory. Reciprocity is a key expectation in such exchanges. In sociological terms, it is a norm. Norms are rules, or expectations, for how to behave. The rule of reciprocity is simply that a favor given obligates the recipient to return that favor. Fairness is another key norm. That is, the favor not only must be returned, but must be returned equally. However, sometimes an equal return is not possible. Figure 3 shows unequal exchange in which one member cannot respond equally to the benefit he receives from the other. This may occur for many reasons. As an example of one, one member may have either more social status or more prestige, as is shown at the top left. Such a relationship could exist between a varsity football player and his non-football-playing friend. It could also exist when one person can give another advice that is quite valuable, for which gratitude alone may not be a sufficient return. This is shown at the upper right. In either of these cases, exchange is unequal. The member with more to offer obligates the other through that exchange. This obligation, which results from unequal power to reward, is a basis for the development of power relationships between people in informal groups and in formal organizations. We adults have been concerned with developing and living within power relationships since early childgood. The way we react to leadership in formal organizations is built on the foundation of this early learning.

One further point is worth making. Compliance, as shown at the bottom of Figure 3, is not volunteered. It usually must be required or demanded before it is given. The implication is that leaders in formal organizations must require subordinates to keep their end of the bargain in exchange relationships. Figure 4 shows a basic exchange relationship between the organization and its members. However, it should be pointed out that the organization cannot rely alone on this basic exchange contract. If it does, organizational performance will exceed only the bare minimum specified by rules, regulations, and organization-wide standards. As we will find shortly, leadership is the tool for eliciting performance that substantially exceeds that minimum. One further observation might be that the more rules and regulations there are, the more difficult it is for leadership to prosper.

EQUITABLE EXCHANGE

SOCIAL APPROVAL (INTRINSIC)

SOCIAL APPROVAL

O=P

(INTRINSIC-INTRINSIC)

EXPRESSION OF THANKS

LOW COST FAVOR:
LENDS PENCIL
GIVES PIECE OF PAPER

(EXTRINSIC-INTRINSIC)

Figure 2.

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UNEQUAL EXCHANGE

Figure 3.

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This view of social exchange may sound commerical, unreasonable, and unrealistic. However, there is accumulating evidence that it is a realistic picture of the real world. The fact of social exchange is that relationships do exist on the basis of an exchange of benefits. Further, there is accumulating evidence that power does in fact flow from unequal exchange. One person gains power over others by controlling scarce resources or necessary benefits that the other must have, cannot obtain elsewhere, and cannot gain equally by force himself.

POWER, AUTHORITY, AND LEADERSHIP

The leadership and management literature uses the three terms, power, authority, and leadership, interchangeably and confusingly. A review of this Literature (Jacobs, 1970) led to the conclusion that it would be useful to make distinctions among these terms so they could be used to mean specific things. Consequently, a logical approach was developed to separate them from one another. The criterion selected for this purpose was the reaction of the subordinate to the influence attempt. This seemed to be a logical criterion, based on conventional definitions of leadership which imply favorable reactions of subordinates, willing compliance to the leader's desires, and cooperation and effort beyond the minimum as results of leadership. Power, authority, and leadership consequently were defined as shown in Figure 5:

(1) Power. This primarily is the capacity to deprive someone else of satisfactions or benefits, or to inflict "costs" on him if he does not comply with an influence attempt. (This also then would clearly require the capacity to provide rewards for compliance.) Universal reaction to the use of power is resistance. (This is so because it demonstrates that the holder of power has higher status than the indiviudal on whom power is exercised. Therfore, the use of power deprives the influence target of self-esteem and pride. This is always a cost, and is always resented.) The use of power in formal organizations increases supvisory requirements, decreases esprit, and causes subordinates to attempt to escape the consequences of noncompliance.

(2) Authority. In contrast to power, authority is a function of relationships between positions in an organization, and is ultimately derived from the mission or task objectives of the organization as a whole. Where goals exist, their attainment is generally easier when someone is the leader or boss. The leader has a special role, which includes organizing, directing, setting subgoals, and so on. This makes overall goal attainment more efficient. Organizational authority is derived from this basic fact. Authority therefore exists to facilitate the accomplishment of goals. The position incumbent in a formal organization usually has authority to the extent that he has responsibility for organizational goal attainment. Authority relationships require effective two-way communication between leader and subordinate, to insure that they share frames of reference and understand their mutual responsibilities. (Most influence attempts between seniors and subordinates in formal organizations fall into this category. That is, it is the job of the more senior individual to tell the more junior one what to do.)

(3) Leadership. This is persuasive interaction between persons such that one becomes convinced that what the other suggests is a superior course of action, or that he will gain worthwhile approval from the other for taking that action. In this sense, leadership is persuasive in nature, involves specialized interaction skills which others have defined as interpersonal competence, and demands effective two-way communication between leader and follower. Because it is a persuasive approach to influencing others, it is time consuming. Consequently, position incumbents in formal organizations engage in actual leadership (as defined herein) a relatively small portion of the time. However, that small percentage of the time is responsible for most of the differences between really outstanding units and those which must struggle to maintain the minimum standard.

IMPLICATIONS

This analysis suggests two things. First, it is essential for leaders to understand the distinction between position power, authority, and leadership, and to use these influence bases appropriately in order to achieve optimum goal attainment (together with subordinate satisfactions). Second, it is essential that the junior officer be taught and have a chance to practice the actual interaction skills that constitute leadership.

As was suggested earlier, leadership is a transaction between leader and follower, such that each profits from the relationship. The diagram below shows a simplified view of that exchange.

POWER, AUTHORITY AND LEADERSHIP

	COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS	CONSEQUENCES OF NONCOMPLIANCE	BASIS OF INFLUENCE ATTEMPT	ORGANIZATIONAL CONSEQUENCES
POWER	Unilateral, communication upward not a requirement and not desired except when power figure may desire to reduce the apparent power differential.	Coercive deprivation by power figure, or assessment of coercive penalties.	Control of positive and negative sanctions.	Resistance, non-compliance where possible, high costs of supervision, low morale, and turn-over where possible.
AUTHORITY	Two-way, influence is exerted primarily downward, but may be reversed. Upward communication essential for confirmation of mutual understanding of basis for and scope of authority.	Possible negative sanctions by peers in the work group, and/or by organizational representative because of nonattainment of goals.	Mutual understanding between superordinates and subordinates of the requirements placed by the organization on the various position incumbents between whom authority relations exist.	No negative consequences for influence attempts based only on authority. However, compliance probably requires supervision or control systems or both.
LEADERSHIP	Two-way essential. While the influence is primarily directed from leader to follower, receptivity to counter-influence attempts is essential.	None, except where there might be (A) net loss of benefits by not acting in intrinsically beneficial manner, or (B) reduction in approval by a respected leader.	Capacity to interact successfully with subordinate to influence belief systems, etc., and (probably) a means of earning the subordinate's respect.	Increased organizational effectiveness to the extent, that the leader's influence attempts are competent, i.e., do identify more adaptive courses of action.

Figure 5.

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-Status
-Esteem satisfactions

Leader   Follower

-Unique contribution to
 Group Goal Attainment
-Self-esteem satisfactions
 from work

Transaction Between Leader and Follower

Figure 6.

Clearly, the situation is more complex than Figure 6 shows. However, key elements in the exchange are shown. The primary motivation for leaders almost certainly is the status and esteem satisfactions they derive from being leaders. However, this is a relative deprivation for followers which is worth-while only if the leader uniquely facilitates goal attainment. Further, the leader probably must also provide self-esteem satisfactions to followers as a reward for high performance toward goal attainment.

Bowers and Seashore (1966), in a review of a number of factor analytic studies, identified four dimensions of leadership behavior:

(1) Support. This is leader behavior that enhances the subordinate's feeling of personal worth and importance. As suggested by Figure 6, support is reinforcement of the subordinate's self-esteem needs , and should be contingent on his work performance.

(2) Interaction Facilitation. This is behavior that encourages or permits the development of close and mutually satisfying relationships within the group. Such social satisfactions have been found important work groups in a multitude of studies covering a time span of nearly 40 years.

(3) Goal Emphasis. This is leader behavior that underscores the need for achieving group goals. This has also been a research finding for a long time.

(4) Work Facilitation. This consists of helping to achieve goal attainment by such activities as scheduling, coordinating, planning, etc. Technical knnowledge of the job also falls within this area.

Analysis of these four general dimensions of leader behavior raises several questions for the junior officer in his initial duty assignment. First, he does not have very much exchange leverage. He can do little in the way of uniquely facilitating group goal attainment. Emphasizing the need for excellence in achieving group goals may "backfire," unless he has the technical knowledge to show how to do it. Finally, he has little ability, at least at the beginning, to satisfy esteem needs of subordinates. (A basic rule is that subordinates' self-esteem needs can be satisfied only by a respected leader.) These observations serve to underscore the fact that the junior officer's initial duty assignment will pose difficult problems, for which he needs serious preparation.

ANALYSIS OF THE JUNIOR OFFICER ROLE

As was suggested earlier, a role theory approach facilitates understanding of the leadership performance requirements of the junior officer. This contrasts with earlier leadership approaches, which were considerably more concerned with the personality of the leader and principles that should govern his behavior.

The leader's role in the organization is conceptually much easier to deal with. The main reason is that roles focus on behavior--what people do. While it is quite difficult to specify what behaviors constitute leadership, it is hard to see how effective training can be developed without taking this approach. We already know from a variety of other applications that best results are obtained from a logical sequence such as the following:

(1) Identify the behavior that is needed for the job.

(2) Teach the behavior.

(3) Require practice on the behavior until the necessary skill level is reached.

(4) Test acquisition of skill through the use of performance tests.

There are two aspects of a role which must be considered. First are the specific behaviors expected of the individual in his position. These behaviors must be proper and they must be effective in accomplishing their purpose--facilitating goal attainment.

The second aspect of role is the appropriateness of performance. This refers specifically to the _manner_ in which performance occurs. Proper role behavior may not be effective if it is performed inappropriately.

The importance of these aspects of role can well be illustrated by the inexperienced junior officer's questions, when dealing with older and more experienced NCO's:

. What am I supposed to do?

. How do I go about doing it?

. How do I _talk_ to a Platoon Sergeant?

Role Behaviors

It is beyond the scope of the present paper to define officer role behaviors suitable for training purposes. However, substantial work has been done in this area, and examination of this work will illustrate the potential value of such an approach to developing the content of training.

The first step in the identification of leader role behaviors is to find out who expects the leader to do what. Lange, et al (1958) and Lange and Jacobs (1960) studied Army platoon leader behaviors to establish a basis for the development of junior officer leadership training. More recently, Jacobs (1973) tested the extent to which these same role behavior areas apply to junior officers in the U.S. Coast Guard.

It is instructive to examine the role behavior areas emerging from such studies. They are shown in Table 1. A caution in examining these areas is that they may not be comprehensive for any given leader position. Further, not all may be critical for some leader positions. Finally, some may be more important than others for any given job. The point is that a list like this probably is applicable to most leader jobs, but that an "optimized" list could be developed only through study of each specific job.

TABLE 1

Role Behavior Areas

Planning
Organizing
Coordinating
Initiating
Directing
Controlling
Interacting with Others
Solving Problems
Setting Personal Example
Controlling Own Emotional Responses
Evaluating Others Fairly (Work)
Differentiating Own Role from Others
Involving Subordinates in Planning
Supporting Subordinates to Others
Emphasizing High Performance
Maintaining Goal Orientation
Developing Teamwork
Developing Subordinates' Pride in Good Work
Training and Developing Subordinates
Providing Performance Feedback
Helping Subordinates with Personal Problems
Assessing Subordinates
Hygiene Factors

Examination of these role behavior areas leads to several conclusions. First, there is a lot of what is normally thought to be management in the total list. From my own point of view, this is proper. Except where we are talking about something like mathematical models or accounting systems, it does not make sense to define management and leadership as two separate things. They are both tools that the position holder uses as appropriate, and he needs both sets of tools in order to do the job right. Another observation is that there are several areas which imply interaction with subordinates--and with others. Interaction effectiveness is an extremely important part of the leader's role.

Finally, there are a host of areas that deal with goal attainment. This suggests, and correctly so, that the major reason for the leader's existence is to see that group goals are achieved, with strong emphasis on skills of motivating subordinates and developing their personal involvement with group goal attainment.

Transactional Aspects of Role Behaviors

It may be overkill to comment on transaction between leader and follower again. However, it is such an important point that it is worth the risk. The areas of role behavior shown in the Table represent what the leader needs to do in order to keep the show on the road, and to maintain all his "contracts," informal or otherwise, in good order. They consequently constitute the skills he needs in order to be able to enter exchange relationships effectively with others.

TRAINING IMPLICATIONS

Several training implications can be drawn from the preceding parts of this paper.

(1) Leadership consists of behaviors, mostly interactive, that are effective in producing high motivation in followers to achieve goals.

(2) The relationship between leader and follower is a kind of transaction, in which each provides benefits for the other. The primary benefit provided by followers is loyalty and commitment to goal attainment. The primary benefit provided by the leader is facilitation of goal attainment and giving followers a feeling of pride and self-esteem through good work. The skill with which this transaction is conducted probably affects organizational effectiveness strongly.

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(3) Effective leadership requires that leader behaviors be executed skillfully. That is, leadership is a performance skill. It therefore should be taught as a performance skill.

(4) Leadership is different from most other performance skills in the feedback from performance of leaders skills may be delayed, disguised, or otherwise distorted, so that it is difficult for the leader in a formal organization to get good feedback from subordinates as to how effective his leadership is, or how he can improve. This is because, first, adults normally conceal negative reactions to others, and are careful about showing very positive reactions as well. Second, in a formal organization, subordinates are often especially careful about giving negative feedback to their superordinates, who usually have some power over them.)

Because leadership is a performance skill, there are certain principles that should be considered in the design of leadership training. These principles have been drived from substantial prior experience with teaching performance skills.

● First, the most important requirement for learning a performance skill is the opportunity to practice the skill until it has been mastered.

● Second, the practice must occur in a situation in which there is feedback. Without feedback, it is difficult if not impossible to improve performance effectiveness. A feedback situation is particularly valuable for leadership practice, because of the paucity of feedback in real world situations. (This underscores the importance of formal training in leadership, as opposed to on-the-job training. Because the real world situation generally provides a low level of feedback, it is a poor learning situation.)

● Third, when theory is judged important to the acquisition of skill, the FUNCTIONAL CONTEXT principle should be used. This principle holds that most theory is poorly understood and badly remembered unless it is taught in the context of skill practice. That is, if the theory is functional (useful) in the context of the practice of some skill, it will be more meaningful and will be remembered to a much greater extent. (If there is no skill practice which involves a given part of the theory, then that part of the theory probably is not really relevant to the job.)

● Finally, the lecture method is usually not effective in teaching performance skills. It probably is not very effective in teaching leadership either.

It may fairly be asked, if lecture is not effective for teaching leadership, then what is? The answer to this question is straightforward. It is basically a question of identifying training objectives that relate to behavioral criteria, and then design situations which provide for practice of the behavior to achieve the objective. Some examples follow:

● For development of planning skills--

Planning consists essentially of anticipating the future and developing ways of dealing with it. The identification of priorities and allocation of resources by priority is a part of the skill. Planning skills, as thus defined, can be acquired through participating in so-called management games. Simulations can be used, as could be in-basket exercises. Simulations are probably more effective (Olmstead, 1967). However, they require a vast amount of effort to develop and implement. In-basket exercises required less effort on both counts, and are usually effective in developing planning and organizing skills (Lopez, 1966).

● For development of interaction skills--

Interaction skills can be defined here much in the same way as interpersonal competence has been defined by Argyris (1968). It is the ability to cope effectively with interpersonal relations, and consists of two subordinate abilities: (a) the ability to perceive and accurately interpret the verbal cues in the behavior of other persons; and (b) the ability to respond to those cues in such a way that the outcome of the interaction is favorable.

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Interpersonal competence skills can be taught in a variety of situations, such as:

.. Perceptual Skills.   The ability to perceive and accurately interpret cues from subordinates (and others) is likely to be lower when these subordinates have substantially different value systems from that of the leader, or where their cognitive orientations are different. (As an example of the latter, higher ranking NCOs tend to be concrete thinkers, practical men. The newly commissioned second lieutenant is more likely to be an abstract thinker, having probably just graduated from college. Concrete thinkers and abstract thinkers generally communicate less effectively than concrete to concrete and abstract to abstract, unless each recognizes the frame of reference of the other and is able to translate while communicating.) As a way of teaching the perception of cues, and of providing information about the value systems and ways of thinking of key subordinates the following are worthy of considerations:

... Tape-recorded or videotape-recorded discussions could be held, in which senior NCOs discuss issues that are significant to them, such as how they desire to have unit leadership responsibilities shared between themselves and the platoon leader; how best to organize, implement, and supervise work; techniques for execution of junior officer responsibilities; and so on. (This does not mean that the junior officer necessarily would then do it this way, but rather that this would give him insight into how his senior subordinates think about such matters. This insight would then help him perceive their responses to him more accurately.) Such discussions would be recorded in five to eight minute sections. The typical classroom presentation would consist of playing the segment, then using small group discussion techniques during which junior officers in groups of not more than five or six each could explore the meaning of what they had heard, their reactions to it and techniques for reacting effectively. (Small group discussion methods are highly useful for teaching this type of content.)

... A variation of this approach would be to identify a variety of commonplace leadership problem situations. These could be identified through interviews with NCOs, junior officers, and company commanders. The OFFTRAIN leadership work cited earlier (Lang and Jacobs, 1960) is an example of this kind of approach. A simple frequency count procedure gives a reasonably reliable identification of the most probable leadership problem situations. (Most probable is to be desired over most dramatic because most probable will give more utility. These will be the ones the junior officer will encounter most often; the training will therefore be put to use most often.) Typical--most frequent--problem situations could be written in script form, and recorded on videotape. Each problem might be presented during a 3-5 minute segment, which would then be discussed by junior officers in small groups. They would be asked to identify the problem, the motives of the individuals involved, and the reasons why the situation probably developed as it did. This approach is particularly effective for the development of situational diagnosis (perceptual) skills.

... Where leadership problem situations have been presented, the small group discussions could be followed by role playing in which junior officers act the parts of the individuals they saw on videotape, acting out effective solutions to the problem situation. If these role plays are videotaped also, they can be played back so role players can explore their reasons for acting as they did. This technique would enable junior officers to explore their own value systems and motivations, which could then be contrasted with what they had discovered about the motivations and value systems of their high ranking subordinates. Skillful feedback from instructors at this point could also give junior officers insight into how their own values and motivations, and the sometimes mistaken belief that everyone else thinks the same way, may serve as an obstacle to effective communication and leadership

.. Action Skills. Interpersonal interaction skills are an essential part of interpersonal competence, and of leadership. For skill development to occur, it is necessary that the individual actually practice the skill, and receive feedback as to how effectively the skill was performed. As was mentioned earlier, one reason why leadership skills are difficult to develop in a real world environment is that feedback sometimes is either delayed, not given, or is too subtle to be identified. Normally, adults do not like to give negative feedback to other adults. A major objective of the training would therefore be to allow the junior officer to practice the skill, assess his level of competence--perhaps in a small group setting--through viewing a videotape, and then to receive constructive feedback as to how to improve. Further practice opportunities could then be provided with further opportunity for feedback. The value of videotape for feedback purposes cannot be overstated. As probably has been found in the Instructor Training Course a

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number of times over, students may well argue with and resent critical feedback from other persons. However, they rarely will attempt to refute their own observations of themselves, obtained by viewing videotapes of their performances.

... Skills Practiced. The content of the role plays should be developed from knowledge of the types of leadership interaction situations that are most likely. The same techniques can be used for selection of content as have been described above. The main difference would be that that students would be required to role play for videotape recording, rather than observe existing recordings. Further, role players should probably be given objectives to accomplish during their role plays. (That is, these interactive skills are aimed at accomplishing purposes, and transfer of the training to the real situation would therefore be facilitated by increasing the similarity between practice situation and the real situation.)

... Group Problem Solving Skills. Fry (1972) has developed training for use in Army battalions whereby leaders use groups of subordinates for decision making purposes. It is recognized here that superordinates in formal organizations normally do not and probably should not frequently use this approach to decision making. However, they should frequently use what might be called consultative leadership, whereby key subordinates are consulted where appropriate to develop more effective decisions, or ways to implement decisions. The development of group problem solving skills therefore is an overkill kind of training. That is, if the junior officer receives sufficient training in group problem solving skills that he feels fairly confident that he can apply that leadership technique, he should feel strongly confident that he can use consultative leadership with individual key subordinates. Better decisions then are a near certainty.

... Contingency Management Skills. Social exchange theory views of leadership suggest that one of the major advances to be made in future leadership training will be to teach skills of contingency management. This is the skill of managing reinforcement within a situation to develop through reward means those performances the leader desires. Let me reemphasize that transactional theory is a reinforcement model. It assumes that effective leadership must be reinforcement or reward oriented. By this I do not mean that tangible rewards must be passed out for every little thing, or that the leader must bribe subordinates. Nor can power and discipline be dispensed with. However, it is certain that outstanding unit performance cannot be attained on a stable basis unless the men in the unit feel pride and inner satisfaction from doing their tasks in an outstanding manner. To a major extent, pride in achievement develops because someone important approves of the person doing the work, when the work is done well. Such approval is a reward, and the leader must have skill in using both that reward and others like it.

... Team Building Skills. Many models of leadership training seem to assume that the leader deals with subordinates as individuals. This is usually far from the truth. Most real world situations involve groups of subordinates, with whom the leader must be able to work effec-tively. Further, he needs to be able to build such groups into harmoniously goal-oriented units. Team building skills involve interacting with subordinates to set goals, identify signifi-cant contributors to goals, define subordinate responsibilities, facilitate communication and action taking among subordinates, encourage development of group solidarity (through mutual interdependence in attaining goals), and provide group rewards for superior perform-ance. The development of team building skill probably requires performance situations, where the leader can see the difference in outcomes between techniques which involve his directing everything (close supervision) and those which involve genuine autonomy for subordinates.

These suggestions for training probably are near-overwhelming. It is clear that the time required for their implementation, especially with high through put courses like the Infantry Officer Basic Course, would require enormous amounts of time. However, let us consider an analogous situation. I doubt that many would argue the assertion that leadership skills are probably as important to the officer as individual marksmanship skills are to the individual soldier. The soldier uses his weapon to achieve military objectives. The officer uses his unit to achieve military objectives. But consider for just a brief moment the difference in the amount of time spent in giving the soldier his basic skill, and the amount of time spent teaching leadership to the officer. Surely it would seem that if two weeks (approximately) are spent on Basic Rifle Marskmanship, a skill that is not overly complex, more than a day and a half is warranted on leadership, a skill that is horribly complex.

A final point. I have talked about leadership in terms of behavior--not in terms of attributes or personality or principles. At this point in time, the behavioral approach may or may not sound reasonable. Let me retreat a little, by saying that I do not challenge the importance of personality. Personality is an asset to the leader. However, it is less of an asset than one might think. And it is something that little can be done about in a short training experience. Behavior is more important, and can be modified relatively more easily. So it is the strategic objective of leadership training.

If transactional theory is correct, and it probably is, then leadership is much more a skill performance than has previously been thought. Leadership training probably should reflect this fact.

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RESULTS OF LEADERSHIP SEMINARS
Major Gerald Weigand
Senior Instructor
Command and Leadership Committee
Leadership Department, USAIS

Gentlemen and representatives from the Women's Army Corps:

The purpose of my brief discussion today is to tie together the information presented this morning by Dr. Jacobs with the groundwork which is necessary for Dr. Sweney this afternoon. More specifically as LTC Vail has indicated, it is to inform you of the significant results which were gleened from the three two-week seminars conducted at the Center for Human Appraisal and Communications Research for Army service school leadership instructors during January and February of this year.

As a basic starting point, you'll recall much of what has been said about the "Informal Contract." This was one of the focal points of the second Army War College study. The Informal Contract is an unwritten agreement between the Army and the individual soldier based upon the expectations of superiors, self and subordinates with respect to behavior.

Figure 1. Informal Contract.

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As indicated in Figure 1 the Army expects the individual to be proficient and disciplined; the individual expects the Army, his superiors, to be fair, provide worthwhile work, and provide him with an adequate salary. Even though the emphasis is on behavior, there is no implication toward permissiveness, molly-coddling, or fear of hurting someone's feelings. Rather superiors must demand technical and tactical proficiency and discipline from subordinates. The leader, then, is the mediator construct between his superiors and subordinates and must balance the expectations of each. We might even superimpose upon the Informal Contract, mission and men in place of army and individual. For the leader must also fulfill these two basic responsibilities. In so doing we mentioned the leader must not lose site of the necessity for discipline. And so, the first major point of the leadership seminar was an analysis of discipline.

Dr. Graham at Wichita presented what the Wichita folks call "The Hot Stove Approach to Discipline." So let's turn our attention to that approach.

It is assumed that an individual will act a certain way, that human behavior is geared toward certain goals, is based on the satisfaction of needs, and that these needs should be tempered. As such this approach requires the leader to take immediate action, provide advance warning to subordinates of what to expect if future infractions occur, be consistent, and be impersonal in his dispensation of punishment.

'HOT STOVE' APPROACH TO DISCIPLINE

Figure 2. "Hot Stove approach to discipline."

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After taking immediate action, we must provide the advance warning "That if it happens again soldier ... this is what will occur"--that we'll go through the procedure of written reprimands, Articles 15, and judicial action or elimination as appropriate so that the individual knows what to EXPECT if he again errs. We, as leaders, then must be consistent, fair and impartial which we probably all recognize. Lastly, the hottest burner, is impersonal action on the part of the leader. This may seem strange when we approach discipline from a behavioral scientist's viewpoint. What we mean is that we must judge the act itself and not the individual. Was it incorrect; was it a violation of rules, regulations; was it a violation of the Uniform Code? However, we do subsequently consider the individual-- but only from the standpoint of extenuating and mitigating circumstances which we've always considered during judicial proceedings--after we have personally evaluated and judged the act as wrong. This then is a smooth, methodical approach to discipline and could easily be incorporated within service school programs of instruction.

Questions occasionally arise concerning authority, responsibility and power. That brings us to the second major point of the conference--an analysis of power and obligation.

Delegation of formal power and obligation within Army doctrine is somewhat limited in scope. Dr. Sweney has presented a 2X2 matrix which affords us an expanded perspective of power and obligation.

	POWER	OBLIGATION
FORMAL	AUTHORITY "Right to act"	ACCOUNTABILITY "Have to do"
INFORMAL	LEADERSHIP "Motivate" "Problem solve" "Generate obligation"	RESPONSIBILITY "Want to do to contribute"

Figure 3. Analysis of power and obligation.

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In the upper spectrum of the matrix lies the formal criterion. It's within the formal criterion that our jobs, our positions, our organizations impact. In the upper left quadrant we recognize the superior has the "right to act" by virtue of his rank and position--a legitimate, reward or coercive power. In the upper right the subordinate is obliged and accountable to perform that which he "has to do" in accordance with regulations, SOP's, standards and suspense dates. This relationship is orga- nizational and formal.

If asked to give an example of a leader we might reply: The Chairman of the Board of Westinghouse Electric Corporation. However, that man probably acts only in the formal area with the power and obligation that is ascribed to his position.

True leadership enters stage front when we look at the lower left quadrant--one so appropriately labeled "leadership"--which treats the psychological spectrum of power. The Center's approach adds the human dimension to this formal analysis by incorporating the _informal_ power of the leader: influence, persuasion, motivation, diagnosis, counseling, communications, problem solving, and generating obligations within subordinates. Informal obligation is termed responsibility. It's what a man wants to do to contribute to the unit's effectiveness. "I realize I don't have to do it but it would help get the job done more efficiently." It is compatible with the ninth and eleventh Principles of Leadership: Develop a sense of responsibility among subordinates, and Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions. General Aubrey Newman in the November '72 issue of ARMY Magazine refers to the lower right portion of the matrix as follows:

> "All too often I have heard...officers complain, 'They don't give me enough to do, not enough responsibility.' These...officers never seem to realize that in saying this they have confessed their failure to meet the one responsibility of any officer that cannot be delegated: the responsibility to be a self-starter."

Simply stated formal obligation is a liability imposed from above; informal obligation is initiative developed from within. Leadership effectiveness, then, is the ability to influence men in such a way as to obtain their willing obedience and loyal cooperation which ultimately contributes to mission accom- plishment. Hence leadership is an informal process and not necessarily relegated to rank and assign- ment.

In order to further understand the senior-subordinate relationship in terms of the interpersonal transactions of power and obligation, we should address Dr. Sweney's Response to Power Model. This brings us to the third and final point synthesized from the Wichita Seminar.

The Response to Power Model and its associated instruments were developed to measure social climate as defined by leadership styles, but also to inspect the didactic relationship between superior and subordinate roles from a number of perspectives as well. Superior-subordinate role combinations have been systematically defined and standardized. Most of us recall the 1939 studies of Lewin, Lippet and White, the work of McGregor, Blake and Mouton and others who concentrated on only the leader. Now, for the first time, two of the basic variables of leadership--the leader and the led--have been pitted against each other to analyze their interaction.

Figure 4. Response to Power Model.

Within the RPM, Dr. Sweney analyzes three superordinate and three subordinate roles interacting with each other to accomplish a mission. So let's turn our attention to these individual leader/follower styles.

AUTHORITARIAN

I MUST MAINTAIN THIS "RIGID" POSITION, OR ALL IS LOST. SO, DO IT MY WAY.

Figure 5. Authoritarian.

The Authoritarian leader is autocratic, paternalistic, coercive, subjective, 9-1, and a problem seeker. He blames others, accepts few, and prefers theory X in that he believes people are bad, lazy, stupid and need to be forced to work. He is unable to organize functionally, is personally competent and desires to be intimately involved in all activities of his unit.

PERMISSIVE

WHAT EVER YOU WANT TO DO...

Figure 6. Permissive.

The other extreme leadership style is the Permissive. The Permissive is subjective, seductive, indulgent, kind, and dependent. He accepts many, blames self and believes people are weak, need love, and repays kindness with work. To him anything that anyone wants to do is fine and dandy. He has utmost trust in everyone and rarely disciplines.

EQUALITARIAN

THESE ARE MY STANDARDS. WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO ACCOMPLISH OUR MISSION.

Figure 7. Equalitarian.

The Equalitarian is the preferred role. He is participative, rational, motivated, objective, knowledgeable, and seeks solutions. He accepts and rejects others moderately and prefers theory Y in that he believes people are intelligent, motivated and know their own job best. The term democratic has a negative connotation in that it implies that unit members "take a vote" in the assembly area to decide whether or not they should seize a hill. As a result the term equalitarian is used to indicate that there must be an equitable balance both between the expectations of leader and led and mission and men. He sets and enforces the standards and maximizes effective involvement of subordinates to produce quality output. He grows and develops subordinates.

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REBEL

WHEN YOU SEE ME COMIN, BETTER STEP ASIDE ...

Figure 8. Rebel.

The first follower role is the rebel. The Rebel is a trouble maker, complainer, protestor, mutineer, and seeks power. He blames others, rejects many, is sadistic, and believes his superiors are greedy, unintelligent and wrong and cause problems. He believes there is no situation so minute that a crisis can't be developed.

INGRATIATOR

YES SIR; WHAT EVER YOU SAY BOSS...

Figure 9. Ingratiator.

The other extreme followership style is the Ingratiator. The Ingratiator is the true "organization man." He is submissive, masochistic, and blames self. He believes superiors are threatened and must be humored, that they have a right to avoid personal blame, and that might makes right. When the boss tells him to do something, whether appropriate or inappropriate, he replies: "Yes sir, yes sir, three bags full." He never does more than the boss requires and doesn't qualitatively or selectively analyze heirarchical requirements.

COOPERATOR

**GIVE ME THE POWER
TO DO MY JOB...**

Figure 10. Cooperator.

The third and most preferred follower style is the cooperator. He is honestly critical, an idea man, not preprogrammed, creative and imaginative, and seeks solutions. He assumes superiors are reasonable, want the truth, and reward subordinates according to real contribution. He tolerates the Authoritarian, works with the Equalitarian, and pities the Permissive boss. He wants to maximally contribute to the mission but recognizes the resources he needs to accomplish the mission.

Let's return then to Figure 4 and analyze the relationship that occurs when leaders and followers act, react, and interact with each other.

We can say that the optimal relationship that can occur between leader and led is Equalitarian and Cooperator. I say optimal because both of these individuals share the power, are turned on by the mission and mutually contribute toward quality output.

The relationship between the Authoritarian and Ingratiator is productive but not as qualitative as the former relationship because only the Authoritarian is creatively contributing to the accomplishment of the mission. The Ingratiator is merely following orders--nothing more. There is much short term success and little long range accomplishment.

The Permissive and the Rebel relationship is similar in that only the Rebel contributes. The Rebel seeks power but doesn't accept accountability for his actions.

The Permissive and Ingratiator spend all of their time congratulating each other on what great folks they are--to the detriment of the organization--because very little gets accomplished.

On the other hand the Authoritarian and Rebel combination is confrontive in nature because the Authoritarian wants to retain power and the Rebel seeks power. Both have their own way of doing the same thing and hard-headedly remain fixed in their closed-mindedness. The more they are at odds with each other, the more detrimental and debilitating they are upon the organization. They are both creative and capable; but little is accomplished.

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Very briefly then that is an overview of the Response to Power Model, what it is and how it works. It is heuristic, but also an applied guide. When coupled with the power and obligation matrix, the third basic variable of leadership--situation--can be plugged into the relationship to indicate what the leader should do to maximize the potential of followers within the Informal Contract. His actions manipulate power to generate responsibility within subordinates. Numerous interpersonal techniques are available. But, if all else fails, the Center's "Hot Stove Approach" is definitely in order.

Consequently, I see Dr. Sweney's efforts complementing Dr. Jacobs' and the War College's work within the leadership literature, having developed their material through different techniques, but arriving at the same conclusions.

Thank you for your attentiveness.

CONTINUING EDUCATION FOR LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTORS

Arthur Sweney, Ph. D.
Director, Human Appraisal and Communications Research
Wichita, Kansas

INTRODUCTION

The processes involved in education are currently undergoing careful scrutiny. As research and other empirical results accumulate, it becomes apparent to many conscientious people that some basic changes in methods and objectives may be in order.

Civilian education has in many ways failed to meet the test of self scrutiny. Military education, although conducted in a more controlled environment, suffers from a lack of definition and a lack of clear cut objectives. This paper shall be directed toward analyzing the instruction of leadership from the view point of a civilian academician. It will, however, be tailored to the specialized needs perceived to exist in the host organization and also to suggest remedies for some of the most glaring blemishes which appear on the academic complexion.

OBJECTIVES

Probably the greatest problem facing instruction in any setting is the lack of clear cut objectives. It would seem that sometimes the objectives may in actuality be the continuation of the system, regardless of its value. At least one cynic suggests that the system of higher education may actually be committed to the process of "nonlearning" by which the student defines his role as learning as little as possible and the instructor defines his role as teaching as little as possible. Jaundiced as this point may be, many of the observed behaviors might justify these conclusions. In spite of these failures some fairly well defined goals seem indicated for leadership instruction.

Social Insight:

Leadership is an interpersonal behavior involving informal power and the exertion of influence. One of the primary characteristics needed by the leader is an ability to evaluate interpersonal situations. The term "social insight" summarizes some of the characteristics associated with this process.

A great deal of education and instruction can be identified as being descriptive rather than prescriptive. Whereas training prepares an individual to handle specific situations, education is most frequently directed toward providing the individual with the analytic tools which increases his ability to understand and define the pertinent parameters of the situations in which he is involved. It is assumed that armed with insight, he can select the options available to him at that time in order to launch appropriate corrective measures. The development of analytic skills is highly central to controlling interpersonal situations. Thus, one of the primary objectives of a leadership instructor's program should be the development of skill in analyzing social interactions.

Self Understanding:

Many would place self understanding at the highest position in any list of needed qualifications for a leader. Without knowledge of one's own goals and without insight concerning one's impact on others, it becomes extremely difficult to function effectively in the interpersonal power exchange which is involved in leadership. Unfortunately, most of our efforts to develop self-understanding are self-instituted and self-mediated. This may provide positive motivation but often limits the objectivity of the results.

It seems fitting that a leadership training program should set as one of its objectives the development of self-understanding in its leaders. The leader is at a disadvantage if his followers know more concerning him than he does himself and yet this occurs in many cases. Our self-perceptions are too often filtered through rose-colored glasses of wishful thinking. Outsiders having less vested interest may perceive us more objectively than we do ourselves.

Objective Use of Self:

Leadership can be considered a profession, and as such it requires that the individual learn to use himself as a tool. Objective attitudes toward oneself seems to be central and essential to the development of the ability to use oneself effectively. Just as the doctor circumscribes his subjectivities with codes of ethics and the assumption of a professional role, so the leader must subordinate many of his own personal interests in order to develop a functional self. To optimally utilize his interpersonal relationships, it becomes necessary to subordinate many of one's short-term motives in favor of furthering the long time objectives of the unit. Only a very objective person can carry out this effectively.

In the leadership field the process is particularly important since the individual's self is in many cases his only tool for furthering these objectives. If he seeks to satisfy his intrapersonal or ego needs first, he will more than likely fail in helping his unit further its mission. Thus, it is essential that one of the essentials of leadership training should focus upon the development of ability to utilize one's self as an effective change agent.

Understanding Interpersonal Power:

Leadership can be defined as the informal power derived from the psychological rather than from the institutional relationships. It becomes extremely important for the leader to understand the leadership implications in the environment about him and how they affect his role as a leader. One of the primary objectives in leadership instructor's training is the development of a clear understanding of power. Power as a concept has tended to be de-emphasized by modern society because many persons place upon it connotations of force and coercion. The basis for psychological influence, however, is firmly rooted in power concepts and derives its strength from the control of needs satisfaction in one's self and others. Very often coercion and force have been a last resort when other systems of power have failed and when interpersonal influence has not been properly cultivated; often the result of being ignorant concerning the power implications of personal behavior. Power has often been lost unintentionally through ignorance, and the has to be regained through the less legitimate processes of coercion and reliance upon formal authority.

Enhancing Power Potentials:

If a leader is to be successful in influencing others, he must learn to emphasize those behaviors which contribute to power and eliminate those which detract from it. Since this is a relatively new way to look at the leadership function, considerable research and instruction may be required to carry out this objective.

The leader must tool himself to handle objectively each situation in a way which optimizes his own power and the affecting obligation of his subordinates. Power is not a finite commodity to be distributed as the reward for winning a zero-sum game. It is, instead, a medium of exchange between the leaders and the led, and can be maximized in such a way to more exactly use their potentiality and to more fully meet their own individual needs. Power in one area can be exchanged for obligation in another, in ways which allow the participants to trade off his surplus powers in the transaction to meet their most demanding needs in other areas. Everyone wants power over his own needs but fortunately one person's need usually occurs in another person' area of surplus. This provides a basis for an honest transaction in which the power of all parties can be effectively increased. The leader's position is to catalyze this process and hence he serves as the most needed member of the group; since his contribution helps all parties.

Reduction of Defensiveness:

The psychological environment in which any mission is pursued provides one of the primary sources of implementation of deterrence. The leader should be taught to create an environment in his unit which minimizes the defensiveness and maximizes openness to transact honest interactions. In order to enhance his own influence--his effective power--over his subordinates, the leader must maximize the opportunities for individuals to grapple directly with their areas of incapabilities. Dishonest and closed relationships provide a false basis for interaction. In many cases this leads to minimal satisfaction at any level and to decreased effectiveness in the pursuit of their joint mission. Defensiveness and false assumptions concerning each other's needs leads to reduced power for meaningful performances. It is extremely important that the leader eliminate from his own behavior as much defensiveness as possible so that his subordinates can be free to drop theirs.

OBSTACLES TO AN ADEQUATE LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION

Before a course of implementation can be prescribed for the objectives just described, it is important to view the obstacles which may be inherent to frustrate them. These barriers to effective instruction probably exists in many areas and many institutions. Experience has shown, however, that unless these obstacles are understood prior to implementing a plan of instruction, they may very well serve as unsurmountable barriers.

Lack of Knowledge:

In the physical sciences a fairly large body of knowledge is drawn upon as an unquestioned foundation for instruction. In the behavioral sciences, however, the focus has been much more diffused and the generalizations developed have been much less exact. This does not excuse nor justify the tendency to disregard conclusions drawn from the behavioral sciences. It only emphasizes the need for more focal research in the areas in which instruction is contemplated.

In order to develop a clear cut curriculum of instruction and to provide the necessary instructional tools, it is necessary to draw upon a specific research base which can be related to concrete experiences of the student population. Many of the models and principles developed in the behavioral sciences have not dealt with military problems nor been conducted with military personnel. This, therefore, has been a significant obstacle in the past and it becomes essential to provide the proper focus of instruction upon relevant problems in the future.

Contradictory Theories:

There is significant variance concerning the concepts and the principles which have been derived, and how they apply to human behavior in general--particularly to those behaviors which are appropriate in a leadership setting. The information derived from various experiments conducted in various settings often lead to contradictory pronouncements concerning what is functional and what is dysfunctional in the accomplishment of successful outcomes. There have been some tendencies for a polarization to occur between the conclusions drawn by behavioral scientists and the results obtained by the pragmatic practitioners in the field. Isolated models have tended to give isolated results. The conclusions drawn from pragmatic experience often seems to specialize in confirming earlier prejudices and supporting personal value systems. It is small wonder that everyone seems to possess his own individualistic theory concerning leadership. The existence of these disparate points of view stand as an obstacle to the instruction of a unified set of behaviors in this area.

Although there seems to be considerable convergence of results drawn from research and direct experience, many of the laboratory scientists still disagree. The operations, which they utilize in their research, establish the basis for interpreting the differences in the results which they obtained. These differences sometimes, however, lead to contradictory concepts and to opposing prescriptions for appropriate leadership behaviors.

Short Term Assignments:

Teaching skills like leadership skills require a great deal of time for development. Civilian faculties are usually tenured for life. Military instructors, however, often find their tour of duties too short to develop the skills which their position requires.

Teaching is a profession and this professionalism requires that in addition to his education, the instructor must be trained to use himself effectively in the conduct of his classes. Learning individual ways to instruct requires a great deal of trial and error before an effective delivery can be developed.

In order to develop generalists, the military shifts its personnel from one assignment to another. This, undoubtedly, serves the purpose for which it is intended but most frequently it spoils the efforts to develop highly specialized instructors.

.Heterogeneity of Audience:

Another obstacle in the development of first-class leadership instructors is the wide range of capacities and experiences available in the student group. In secondary schools and colleges, the teacher can expect and even require a certain level of competence before the student is able to attend a course. In the military the problem is somewhat different. A large range of intellectual experience is represented in each class and the instructor is required to adapt his presentation to meet the various requirements implied. Leadership training suffers from this difficulty more than most military areas.

Unlike some of the more technical specialty areas, leadership training is needed by all levels of commissioned and noncommissioned officers. Thus it seems to be an inevitable reality that in many leadership classes there will be present persons of widely varying backgrounds and ages even though attempts are made to select from a particular grade level. This, therefore, constitutes an obstacle which the instructor must overcome conscientiously if he is to be effective as a teacher.

Situational Constraints:

Civilian instruction has become standardized in its application and settings. Universities across the country are highly similar and so are the public schools. Classrooms the world over seem to have become standardized and hence have developed a transferrable psychological set for the participants. Seasonal schedules have also become uniform and students in a civilian setting have learned to know what to expect at what time and when to expect conditions to change.

In their short history, educationally, the military setting has been much less uniform and standard. A great deal of variability seems to exist between bases and there still seems to be many areas for individual approaches. It does, however, have its redeeming virtues because it places upon the instructor the obligation of helping the student become adjusted to what seems to be an unnatural situation. The student, the time, the place, and the total set of circumstances seem artificial and unfamiliar. This establishs another obstacle which must be surmounted if effective instruction is to transpire.

Cognitive vs. Behavioral Approach:

Most experts agree that the success in leadership depends both upon conceptualization of processes and the utilization of behavioral experience. Colleges often perceive that the training aspects of professional preparation will take place after the student has been reexposed to the outside world and hence they concentrate on cognitive and ideational development. The military instructional program has been more pragmatically conceived. Its primary in-house function is to train persons to immediately function in the job to which they will be assigned.

Leadership would have to be perceived as an outstanding exception to this pragmatic rule, although there still seems to be very good reasons to avoid the civilian pattern. Military organizations have quite appropriately defined the problem of leadership to exist in a complex integrative system involving the leader, the led, and the situation. To be properly prepared to deal with these complexities, involved by such a complex system, a great deal of intelligent instruction is necessary. At the same time, however, it becomes obvious that these complex idealization patterns must be tried out in realistic settings. If the student is to develop his behaviors in an appropriate manner, both education and training are necessary in the leadership area, and concentration on either level would foil the goals sought. This does pose an obstacle for the process, however, since the instructor who is successful at teaching often lacks the skills associated with training. The psychological set which the student brings to each process is often very different. His behavior will, therefore, depend on which of these processes which he perceives to be most crucial. Unless the student is properly prepared, one or the other of these two processes will occur but probably not both.

Motivation:

It is usually easy to demonstrate to the student the relevance and necessity for the technical training in the military specialization to which he is going to be assigned. The need for leadership may seem much more intangible and remote to his immediate needs. Many individuals perceive that leadership is an innate function rather than a learned one. Others hold the simplistic view that personally held knowledge can automatically be communicated to others.

Another motivation obstacle lies in the experiential base which the student brings to the learning experience. If he is an experienced leader, he perceives he has already established his own processes of learning the correct way to lead. If he is an inexperienced leader he is apt to despair from the likelihood of ever having the opportunities to apply these principles which he is learning in the classroom. In either case, the student is likely to lack the motivation to actively acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to improve his performance in the leadership area.

Subjective Inertia:

All of us would agree that the concepts of self respect and personal dignity are highly desirable. Unfortunately, however, these very principles establish an obstacle for the incorporation of the new knowledge and skills which would require an individual to change himself. We tend to perceive and act upon those messages which require the least amount of personal change. The training of individuals for effective communication may require them to assess themselves in negative ways and change their mode of behavior in ways which they would initially resist. This subjective inertia constitutes a major obstacle to the success of any formal professional instruction program.

Individuals change at a very slow rate. In order to change external behavior in a consistent way, certain changes in concepts are also frequently required. Individuals behave in ways which are consistent in their concepts of themselves. Drastic changes in behavior require drastic changes in self conceptualization. Experiences of the clinical psychologists have shown that a great deal of modifications can occur. The classroom setting is not conducive to these kinds of changes unless special techniques for group commitment have been developed.

Sometimes the great obstacle to valuable developmental growth is the individual's own defensiveness and resistance to change. To accept the need for change is to accept imperfection in one's own personal behavior. This is threatening to the ego and, therefore, often sets into motion a wide variety of ego defenses to compensate for the threat that it poses. Defensiveness is not only an obstacle to the learning process, but it is also one of the greatest impediments to good leadership. If the instructional process generates defensiveness as a by-product, then it would very likely thwart the very objectives which it sets out to accomplish.

Defenses of rationalization, projectionism, repression, and wishful thinking often clouds our perceptions of ourselves and others. They serve as some of the most important obstacles to both the instructional process and to our interpersonal relationships. The seriousness of defensiveness can not be overrated. The necessity for defenses as a protective device, however, is also highly essential. A great deal is required of the instructor if he is to help the individual maintain his sense of personal dignity at the same time that he provides guidance and direction toward areas of productive change.

Fictional Heritage:

The area of leadership is particularly permeated with subjective biases and inherited mythology. An aura of magic has developed around the leadership topic which suggests that leadership is a supernatural process. Mysticism is associated with the successful practitioners. There are still influential persons who insist that leadership is an innate or inherited characteristic. Others feel that God determines who will be successful in their interpersonal influence. This kind of mysticism has interfered with both the research of the topic and the incorporation of research findings into an integrated instructional program. If we accept that leadership as an inalterable characteristic, then leadership instruction is fruitless. If we accept it to be a mystical process, then the contents of leadership instruction would tend to perpetuate the falsehoods of the past eras. This tendency toward magical thinking has therefore become one of the greatest obstacles to the development of leadership skills.

The personality cult which tends to congregate around the successful individual often depends for its existence upon the perpetuation of mysticism. Many of the mystical attitudes about leaders and leadership are direct manifestations of the human need for heroes. Today as in the time of the Greeks, heroes are expected to be part God, and to possess leadership characteristics which are unattainable to the simple mortal.

For subjective reasons, therefore, the mystical approaches toward leadership have been perpetuated and, unfortunately, these factors will continue to exist unless they are systematically eradicated. The "natural leader" may very well exist and his leadership ability may even have been developed without his conscious knowledge. But it was developed and it did develop through natural and predictable processes. These same processes can be simulated and accelerated through the intentional measures which can be brought to instructional settings.

THE FACILITATION OF A MEANINGFUL LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION

Having carefully outlined the objectives and the obstacles to meaningful leadership instruction, the solutions may seem obvious. It may be beneficial, however, to trace the specific implications of these points to operational systems for facilitation. Just as the topics already discussed were not perceived to compose an exclusive list, but were illustrative, only a few samples of facilitators will be mentioned. Many of these programs and activities have already been incorporated in the Leadership Instructor's Workshop which has been sponsored by the Center for Human Appraisal and Communication Research at Wichita State University. Some of the solutions, however, will require the greater period of instructional exposure which is available to an instructor at his home base but not provided in his own instructions. The process of teaching instructors should incorporate many of the same principles which the instructor will ultimately utilize in carrying out his own instructional mission. It is hoped, however, that the instructor will augment and further these processes as his personal knowledge of the field increases.

Personal Insight:

To deal effectively with the leadership system composed of the leader, the led, and the situation, the individual instructor must understand him as both the superordinate and subordinate. His own personality, his preferred role and his perceptions of what is expected of him must be clearly understood and analyzed if he is to develop the information needed to use himself effectively. For this purpose, it is suggested that training programs include personality, motivation, and role tests to serve as standards by which the individual can compare his attitudes to those of his peers, and with other successful individuals in his field. At this point it is not justified to establish a single success profile for leadership but there are many characteristics which tend to diminish an individual's effectiveness, with these he should become highly familiar, particularly as they apply to his own operation. In many cases, they reflect activities over which he has control and areas in which he makes voluntary judgments. Whereas it is essential not to mold individuals into any single pattern, there are many dysfunctional behaviors which can be eliminated if the individual is cognizant of them. Even though our personality characteristics develop through an unrecognizable process of trial and error they still can be gradually revised to more nearly fit our own needs as the nature of our existing personalities known more clear to us.

Dynamic Theory:

The literature concerning leadership has evolved into a fairly complex set of theoretical formulations. The experimental and empirical evidence suggests that the trait approach to leadership effectiveness explains too little of the variance to provide effective predictors when used by themselves. Recently leadership has been viewed as a complex dynamic system involving numerous facets with which should be properly integrated if effective leadership is to be obtained. A number of systemic approaches have been developed and they are currently vieing with each other to demonstrate their effectiveness as explanatory or predictor devices. It is too early to determine whether any of these systems are sufficiently potent to stand by itself. It is, therefore, extremely important that the student obtains leadership instruction concerning a large number of these models in order to enrich his capacities to handle complexities.

These theories should be taught as theories and their value should be identified as explanatory systems. Results have indicated that they work with some degree of accuracy, but none of them explains all behaviors of all peoples. The student in his search for certainty often discounts their value completely or over-emphasizes their validity in solving all of his problems. His exposure to a large number of models will increase his tolerance for ambiguity and will teach him to apply that model which best describes the situation in which he finds himself.

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Training Students:

If we distinguish education from training, based upon the level of performance which is expected, the modification of behavior would be defined as a training objective. Most academicians hope that their students' behaviors will conform to their cognitive and ideational constructs. It is perceived to be important, however, to accelerate this process through providing the student with realistic experience calling for the actual behaviors. Leaders learn to lead by carrying out leadership functions. He must, however, be started on the ladder of a self corrective process and taught to benefit from the feedback which he receives.

Many successful leadership instruction programs depend almost solely upon group activities to develop meaningful leadership behavior. The author questions the use of a single source of instruction, but recommends it as one of the facets which are necessary for ultimate acquisition of skills. Whereas real experiences are usually impossible to contrive, realistic experiences can be generated through simulation, role playing, psycho-drama and group discussion.

In establishing these opportunities for behavior, it is extremely important to remember that leadership is furnished by every member in a group, and hence that leadership as a function is distributed. Situations should be contrived to allow for leadership and followership participations which not only develop skills in these roles but which will illuminate principles which can be generalized to a larger number of other circumstances. One of the legitimate criticisms of the encounter and sensitivity experience is the limited degree to which it can be generalized to other ongoing functions which require leadership. As an opportunity for obtaining feedback and to increase personal insight, this kind of an exercise is highly valuable. It fails, however, to create the kind of realistic experiences from which an individual can readily generalize.

Anticipation of Real Contingencies:

Too frequently the leader in training is provided with generalized solutions for problems which he does not fully understand. A meaningful instructional program in leadership should establish as one of its procedures, the development and analysis of actual contingencies and obstacles affecting leadership decision. By anticipating treatment at the hands of captors, the military has prepared its members for being prisoners of war. Equal emphasis should be placed by leadership instructors on preparing the students for the realities of the situation in which they will practice their professional art.

Many leadership problems are universal in their underlying source, but manifest themselves in such a wide variety of ways that similarities are not easily recognized. One contingency with which military leadership has primarily concerned itself is insubordination. There are many other areas, however, which should be considered and studied in order that they can be more readily recognized and neutralized. Among these would be apathy, defensiveness, lack of authenticity, informal power structures, group norms, breakdown in information systems, and many others. Many manifested behaviors can be directly associated to these underlying sources. A comprehensive instructional program in leadership would have to include not only an understanding of these problems but some practice in deriving solutions to them.

Sensitivity:

The concept of sensitivity to feedback has been distorted by many to mean introspection and a loss of confidence. In a real sense, the latter may indeed, be the result of a failure to acquire the former rather than as a component of it. If a leader is to be successful, he must have the kind of feedback which will demonstrate to him the success or failure of his own actions. The desire to be right clouds the leader's vision concerning his own mistakes and clouds his view of ways to develop and polish his skills in the leadership area. Being available to inputs from his peers and subordinates is essential to the development of a self correctional system for improving his skills.

If one recognizes that the process of actual leadership is still only a continuation of the process of learning to lead, it is much easier to accept negative feedback concerning one's own performance. If a superordinate perceives himself to be a born leader, he would perceive this kind of correction to be unnecessary. If, however, he considers himself a neophyte in his interpersonal relationships and in his efforts to influence, he will be prepared to productively use the results accumulated from the success and failures of his leadership ventures.

Faith in Rationality:

Short term outcomes often shake our faith in the rationality of interpersonal relationships. Superficial analysis of personal dynamics frequently leads to false expectations. As the complexity of the behavioral systems grows there is an increased temptation to fall back upon simplistic thinking to explain the results which are perceived. Many ideals concerning interpersonal behavior are shaken by the temporary success of an individual who seems to be violating the laws of rationality. Autocratic, selfish leadership will not work over a long period of time but many individuals seem to make it operational in specific circumstances. Irrational, emotional behavior begets irrational and emotional behavior. We can not expect people to behave in impossible ways any more than we can utilize superstition for explaining scientific phenomena. Human behavior is lawful and can be charted in predictable patterns. To revert to truisms and magical concepts represents a cop-out to avoid acknowledging the true complexity of any situation.

A successful leadership program must be well-founded on a basic faith in the rationality of man's behavior. Whereas emotional behavior may be justified in critical situations, it usually does not contribute to the solution of the problems associated with the crisis. Rationality is required more during crisis than any other time. Man's characteristics as an emotional animal can be rationally exploited but this is not accomplished through unpremediated emotionalism.

Followership:

The emphasis on leadership has frequently obscured the nature of followership. The instruction of leadership should direct itself toward followership as well. A number of the research articles have shown that good leaders and good followers possess many of the same characteristics and that often it is only the focal aspects of the situation which determines the roles which a given individual will assume. By learning more about the process of followership, the potential leader can better understand his objectives and his sources of influence. His followers are a very important part of the system which he must learn to manipulate and control. Their needs, their perspectives, and the nature of their interaction become essential characteristics contributing to the relationships which he will establish with them. By learning their roles well he becomes able to better predict and control the outcomes of their behaviors.

In any hierarchical system there is always a larger number of subordinates than superordinates. Most individuals find themselves both as leaders and followers to different individuals. Their ability to utilize their followership roles efficiently has direct implications for the latitude with which they will be able to exercise their leadership function. The strong follower preserves for his own subordinates and himself the prerogatives of power which they need to use.

Expand Influence:

Central to leadership are questions of power. A good leadership program should include activities which teach the student how to analyze and expand both his formal and informal powers. In most formal organizations a job description delineates areas of obligation, but these are extremely vague in identifying formal power and authority. The individual is often left to infer through subtle feedback systems the nature of the authority which he has been given. His ultimate relationship with his superordinate as well as his subordinates depends upon his correct assessment. It is extremely important that he learn quickly and efficiently where his area of authority lies.

A more important area of power, however, is not his authority but the leadership which he actually exerts on a psychological level. It is important, therefore, that the student learn to attribute correctly his sources of influence over others. By knowing how he influences, he will learn how to expand his influence. By knowing how he generates antipathy, he can learn to diminish those activities which reduce his influence.

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SUMMARY

Leadership training is clearly desirable but like freedom and justice hard to define. Our under-standing of the process may always be fragmentary but it behooves us to make use of the most advanced sources of information available at any point in time.

The author's objectives for a meaningful leadership training program include the development of social insight, an increase in self understanding, learning to objectively use one's self, understanding interpersonal power, enhancing personal power potential, and the reduction of defensiveness. Global though these objectives are, they represent the considerations which would enter into the development of interpersonal effectiveness for a large number of areas. They replace in the author's mind some of the more specific subgoals which often confuse the issues. Curriculum issues are secondary and act only to implement those broader objectives which can be agreed upon.

Some very basic obstacles separate most leadership instruction from success. Although surmount-able, these obstacles need to be anticipated and properly neutralized in order to develop a program with an optimal impact. Once the official obstacles are overcome the following seem to be the most important: lack of knowledge, contradictory theories, short-term assignment of the instructors, heterogeniety of the audience, situational sets and constraints, low intergration of cognitive and vehavioral approaches, lack of motivation, the subjective inertia of both teachers and students, defen-siveness, and our fictional heritage. Very often we fail in reaching our objectives because we have not effectively defined these and other obstacles which confound our efforts.

Leadership instruction should be more than the enumeration of a doctrine or the communication of some content ideas; it should be an integrated process for basically altering attitudes and behaviors. Some of the facilitators in this process should be: the development of personal insight, the exposure to conflicting dynamic theories concerning interpersonal behavior, training in realistic experiences, brainstorming reactions to real contingencies, developing sensitivity to feedback in real as well as simulated situations, fostering a faith in science and other rational approaches to problems, focusing upon followership as well as leadership roles and teaching skills for analysing and enhancing the effec-tiveness of power and obligation systems.

The process of leadership instruction can be considered an opportunity to increase interpersonal effectiveness in the broadest way in preparation for future contingencies which are never completely known or subject to anticipation. This kind of instruction can serve as a motivational theme that enriches the experience of the individual exposed and enhances his effectiveness in handling whatever difficulties lie ahead for himself and his command.

PRACTICAL EDUCATIONAL TECHNIQUES IN TEACHING POI'S

Colonel Billy E. Rutherford, Director
Directorate of Educational Technology
United States Army Infantry School

I was very interested in Dr. Sweney's list of subjects because I saw many of the things we talk about every day, many of the things we find are obstacles to doing what we would like to do as teachers. First and foremost is the fact that we have these students in our way. The student is not motivated, and, as pointed our earlier the students have the wrong attitude. Someone else said they're regressive pragmatists: they don't want to accept the fact that things are changing and that's right, things are changing. They're changing in leadership and they're changing in education, but I don't find too much problem in dealing with leadership people when we talk about methods of instruction and how to present instruction because in leadership I find that probably we have our most creative people and probably our most open-minded people and you're forced to be that way. You really don't have much of a choice. We know more about leadership than we're able to teach in the time available. We know more about leadership than we can really diagnose and determine what it is we want to teach.

What do we want them to know? We find this is almost a daily chore, more so in leadership because we have an added problem--how well did we do the job once we did it? It's very simple and Dr. Sweney alluded earlier to the fact that if you're teaching a skill you can measure it. You can measure how well you were able to teach that individual to assemble and disassemble an M16 rifle. Did he, in the process of putting together his forces to attack, use all the available forces? You can measure him very easily on his ability to do this and do it to your satisfaction. But in the average teaching model, we have somthing out at the end in a little block called the Performance Assessment Block. This is the most critical area because this is the proof of the pudding. The examination is the only way you can measure how well you did your job. A subjective subject such as leadership is particularly difficult to test in the classroom. I sympathize with you, but at the, same time I think that in teaching leadership we have really begged the issue of looking more closely at another item on Art Sweney's list of behavioral objectives. Many say no, you can't really use those with leadership instruction. But about two weeks ago I went over to visit Dr. Jacobs to verify that yes, we can use performance objectives in leadership training. We talked for a long time about it and certainly recognize that there are many problems in defining behavioral objectives for leadership training. It becomes very very easy if you sit down and first take the time to figure out--what do I really want to teach? What does he have to know to do the job that we're asking him to do? CONARC has clearly defined this now in a process they call systems engineering where you do the job task analysis. We're all working on this and it has its good points and it has some that are not so good. The point remains that the systems engineering process forces us to look very logically and methodically at what it is we want to teach. Periodically in the job I now have, we have the opportunity to evaluate instruction and people come and say, "Gosh, I have a block of instruction and people are falling asleep." They are not doing well on the examination and we need to jazz it up some." We want to do something different to this instruction to make it more interesting. Just last week I visited a friend's class of instruction and when he got through I asked him: "Are you really sure you want to teach this class?" He said: "What do you mean?" and I said: "Do they really have to know that?" He said: "Well, we've always taught this. Gosh, we just can't get along without teaching that." "Do they really have to use it in anything else you will be giving them later on?" And he said: "No, not really." and I said: "Then why are you teaching it?" The point that remained was do you have something that you could better put into that hour of instruction? So it brings up the point to something that was brought out earlier, about how well we do our jobs and I think in the service schools we do a tremendous job of presenting instruction throughout. One shortcoming was pointed out earlier when we asked how many of you have been teaching leadership for more than two years and very few people stuck up their hands. If we asked the same question: How many of you have been involved in education for more than two years, probably even fewer hands would go up. So we think that we have two areas that we can work on. One we are doing right here with the leadership seminar. We have people we can hire with master's degrees in psychology, leadership, and in the various areas, but still we have one area that I think we need to look at even closer. O. K. you have this knowledge, now how do you put it across? What are the techniques involved. One of the things we were finding out was that our instructors did not know what

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was available. They were re-inventing the wheel, as the old saying goes. They didn't know the capabilities, facilities, and were not aware of the research material available. In looking at this, we decided about a year and a half ago that we had to do something to improve the educational side of the house that we had. We had to provide some expertise to the instructional departments to assist them in developing instruction.

Many things have taken place in the field of education which have application now to how we present instruction. What I would like to do for the next few minutes is briefly discuss the organization of the directorate; how we provide a service to the Infantry School. I think similar services could be available in your own schools. During the last hour, we will divide into three separate small groups and visit some of the facilities that we have, primarily our Television Studio, Individual Learning Center, and Dr. Hirata will give you a short presentation on the Student Response Teaching System and Computer Assisted Instruction.

I would like first to show you our mission at this point. I was reluctant when we were determining the directorate name. The word technology relates to the hardware side of the house. But the philosophy that we have taken is that yes, we use hardware, but are more interested in the design of the instructional material used on the hardware. The mistake I find most schools making is that they get money to buy the hardware but don't pay the bill to hire people to develop instructional materials. I have visited civilian organizations where they had the most beautiful computer you could ever see but no one was using the facility. If instructional technologists are available and the academic departments have been involved in a particular media such as Computer Assisted Instruction (CAI), you can develop some outstanding instruction. We found out we can teach fire direction center procedures for indirect fire adjustments better and quicker with a computer than with a classroom instructor. I would like to walk you through some of the organizations that we have in the directorate. In addition to supporting Ft. Benning, we also support the National Guard, Reserve, and ROTC detachments in 81 counties. I would like to first mention the Training Aids Service Office (TASO) because this is the facility which CONARC has directed each installation to have. In the past, it has sometimes been a mystery as to where you can go on a post to get training aids. The purpose of establishing this office was to provide a one stop service which will be known to everyone where they can come in, talk to someone, get some advice and the assistance they need to get training aids or devices made. The TASO should be able to provide catalogs of materials that are available and can give them a general rundown of what they have available.

Major Russell, who heads up our Educational Television Division (ETV), is, in my opinion, the best in the Army as far as running a TV studio. He is very positive. I have never heard him say no to anyone and we are able to produce almost any kind of TV program you could imagine. He has a fine studio system and we generally do most of our production in the studio. He can make you a bar or a barracks, anything you want, right in the studio. Our Leadership Department probably consumes 50% of the effort of our TV Division. The Reserve, National Guard, and ROTC detachments are scheduled to receive cassette players this summer. I think we will soon be distributing more TV cassettes than 16-mm film because video tape is cheaper, more durable and easier to work with. Several training films have good leadership situations in them that you would like to have for a class. This is ideal for TV since they can extract these segments to make a TV tape. I think another trend that you will see in your own service schools is a move away from the central playback. We are finding now that we can do a much better job and be more responsible by providing about a $800 playback machine to the instructor with a cassette. He puts in in the classroom and he controls it. An instructor oftentimes doesn't like to do anything unless he has the actual control of the item. We found that it's much more gratifying to them to be able to walk over and punch the button themselves and they also get full credit for everything that is taking place. When you go to a central playback, you have to do it by going on call and saying: "Run it in 10 seconds or run it in a minute" and then hope that it comes out. There is another way we can do it and that is by putting it on time. I am sure that most of you have used this system, too. On a central clock system you say: "Run it at 15:05" and at 15:05 you are right in the middle of a particular pitch and the TV comes on. In this classroom we have 10 receivers. We can put this small, $800 unit, with a $50 amplifier, right by the podium here and the instructor controls it himself. SONY has recently announced a new set that will soon be out where it will freeze action so you can stop it and leave the picture on or you can stop it and it will go black. There is a tremendous capability being developed in portable television systems. Major Russell will discuss with you later in more detail some of the portable camera systems that we have and how we are using those here at the Infantry School.

For your information, Combat Arms Training Board (CATB) plans to distribute two of the portable camera systems to every battation in the Army over a period of the next year. I will give you a warning right how: when they receive these portable camera systems and they have the capability to playback in a 1/2 inch format, what you are going to find is a demand to distribute information from service schools to units. I caution you that they are going to have them and they will want something to put on them. You might be thinking towards a 1/2 inch format.

You will see the learning center. We have combined the library and learning center in one division and called it learning resources. Right now our library cross files every program which we have on file in our learning center. For example, if you are thumbing through the card index and you want to see something on tactics, you will see a series of books, monographs, and other documents and you will also see learning center programs catalogued there. We are simply talking about a different format. In our education and consultation division, this is where I feel like we pay the bill for what we are trying to do because it is in this division that we have assigned the civilian and military personnel who have the education background and military background so that they can act as a project officer with an academic department to develop instruction. It is here, where if they say we want a learning center program or we want to develop a (CAI program,) then we put a project officer with that academic department and he works pretty much full time until they have developed the program, tested it, developed the examination, and validated the instruction. We are currently working with the leadership department on three separate learning center programs. We find that the learning center probably has some of the greatest potential. Generally, an hour's worth of platform instruction converts to about 20 or 25 minutes in the learning center format. Now this is great for many reasons. We can say O.K. that is for an average learner going through and he will pick it up in about 20 to 25 minutes. But what about the slow learner and the fast learner? The capability is there for him to review for as long as he has to. The point is that we acknowledge individual differences in students and the Individual Learning Center (ILC) accommodates both slow and fast learners.

Certainly we get people in our branch schools who have been away from the branch for sometime. We put a notice in the bulletins and the student bulletin that if you are getting ready to take your Land Navigation Test, come in to the learning center and see a program on Land Navigation. In some instances the learning center can do a better job than platform instruction because it does account for individual differences. Again, we are not attempting to replace instructors. What we are looking for is an optimum method to present a particular block of instruction. Our faculty division is the instructor training course. In this area we found we had the same problems we were faced with in our other courses. Every officer who comes to the Infantry School, if he is a Lieutenant Colonel or below, must go through instructor training. We found that the senior NCO'S and the senior officers, particularly those with a background in instructor experience, were bored sitting through four weeks of instructor training. We converted the first week of this course which was formerly the platform instruction to a self-paced format using a variety of media. In some cases it was a programmed text, a learning center program in a tape/slide format, or a TV tape. But at any rate we looked at what we thought was the best way and converted it to 19 hours worth of program viewing time or average working time on a programmed text. Now rather than everyone taking four weeks we find that some people very easily complete the course with the same standards as before in 10 days or less. We are then able to send them back to their instructional departments and put them to work. We have been delighted with the results and the people seem to be much more motivated when you tell them--okay here's what you have to do, these are the standards you have to meet. When you meet them they have finished this course. We use Faculty Development instead of Instructor Training now for this division because we are looking for ways to continue educating our instructors throughout their tenure here. We would like to think in the three years they are here that we are going to do more than just send them to the platform and back everyday. In this regard we're thinking of specialized courses in programming for programmed text, television utilization other media utilization courses, as well as complementing what they are doing with college courses.

I've shown the Training Aids Division within the Directorate of Educational Technology. One thing we found is that the Training Aids Center publishes a very complete catalog of the items available. Each instructor as he does through the Instructor Training Course receives a copy of the Training Aids Center Catalog.

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Before I leave the chart here, there is just one item which I'd like to bring up which I think is probably the one I hear the most of today, from all the generals who visit Fort Benning and all the other people. The subject today seems to be in training trainers. When they refer to this they refer to training the people who are coming through the school system to be able to train when they leave the school system. I think here at the Infantry School to foster this philosophy we have tried to adopt the attitude that every student who is coming through here goes through in a dual capacity . . . he goes through first as a student to learn and improve his own professionalism and secondly he goes through as a potential trainer. We think he should accept the obligation that he is attending the course in this dual capacity.

I have enjoyed this opportunity to speak with you and if, during your tour of our facilities, you have any questions, please ask the briefing officer or come by to see me in my office.

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THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICER AS A LEADER/MANAGER

Colonel Guinn Unger
Director, Management Review and Analysis
Office, Comptroller of the Army
Washington, D. C.

It is always a pleasure for an Infantry Officer to return to Fort Benning and I am certainly no exception. It was here that I took my basic training in 1943 and 1944. It was here that I went to jump school in 1944 and it was here that I went to the Officer's Basic Course in 1950 and the Advanced Course in 1955-56. I welcome not only the opportunity to return to Fort Benning but also the chance to talk about one of my favorite subjects--The Professional Officer as a Leader/Manager.

I purposely refrain from getting involved in semantic arguments such as the difference between a leader and a manager. I think that there are some differences and I think there are many similarities. But for officers to be successful in the Army of the future, they must certainly be prepared to be both leaders and managers.

Last summer General Palmer, then the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, was required to make a decision about the Army Stock Fund. General Palmer indicated that he really didn't know enough about the stock fund to make an intelligent decision. So prior to making the decision he was given a briefing by a civilian from CONARC on the Army Stock Fund. (I might digress here to state that it is perhaps a sad commentary when we must go to a civilian in a subordinate headquarters to give a briefing to the Vice Chief of Staff, Army. However, in all fairness, perhaps it was because the stock fund problem was at Fort Hood.) After the briefing General Palmer indicated that while his knowledge was still less than he would like, he was now prepared to make the decision. He then went further and asked if his lack of knowledge of the Army Stock Fund was typical or atypical of the officer corps. It was generally agreed by all in the room that it was typical. At that time, General Wright, then Comptroller of the Army, and General Kalergis, now Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army, both made the point that in their opinion Army service schools were not giving sufficient attention to the field of management. They both felt quite strongly about this matter. As a result of their comments, General Palmer tasked the DCSPER to determine the amount of management training and specifically the amount of financial mangement training given in each of the advanced courses and to the Command and General Staff College students.

DCSPER collected the data from CONARC and presented it to the Vice Chief. The results showed, and they may or may not be correct, that the Engineer Advanced Course taught 2/10's of 1 hour of financial management and that the other schools varied upward from that amount to the Chaplain's Advanced Course which taught more than 70 hours. As a result of this reply I was tasked to visit several service schools to check the validity of the report and to encourage additional management instruction if I found the low numbers to be accurate. I went to the Infantry School, Armor School, the Field Artillery School and the Command and General Staff College.

In general, I found the report to have been accurate and in every case I found the school commandant or deputy commandant to be in complete agreement that additional training was needed. I guess it was as a result of these trips that I was asked to talk to you today.

I can see no possibility of the Army returning to the pre-World War II method of operation that we have all heard described. Thus, the very small Army, the half-day soldier, the emphasis on athletics, the unsophisticated equipment and disinterest in exactly what the Army was doing by the general population, all seem to me to be things of the past. Gone is that Army and with it the leadership that was appropriate at that time.

Today we have an Army of about 800,000, much sophisticated equipment, a need for greater skills by all our people, a public which is greatly interested in everything that we do, although popular support is probably declining, daily debates in Congress on the size of the Defense Budget, a declining budget, more and better physical accounting for our funds all of which results in an increased emphasis on every aspect of management. With this new Army comes a requirement for new leadership. We now need the officer that I call the leader/manager. You might well say that these are just words and that you would like a few examples of just how things are changing for company and junior field grade officers. So, let me give you a couple of examples. In Europe, General Davidson has put comptrollers at division level in order to help the division commander accomplish his management chores. In addition, he is extending financial management to the battalion level. It is true that it is a very unsophisticated kind of financial management but it accomplishes the results that he desires. Each battalion commander is credited with a certain amount of money. Everything that he does that costs money is subtracted from this sum and when he has used it all, he is finished. In addition, commanders are evaluated in comparison to one another on how they manage their funds.

In Alaska the 172d Brigade submits a budget to USARAL. When his budget is approved, the Brigade Commander must then make management decisions that involve trade-offs to attain the highest level of training for the brigade within his budgetary constraints. As an example, if he wants to conduct an exercise somewhere in Alaska, he might have three means of getting there: (1) He could go by the Alaskan Railroad to the area of the exercise; or, (2) He could go by organic ground vehicle; or, (3) He could go by air; using, primarily, helicopters. It is probably cheapest to go by rail and most expensive to go by helicopter. On the other hand, cost is not the only factor involved. The objective of the exercise is to train the units and different methods of movement have different training value. Thus, the commander is faced with a very real management decision in determining the method of movement to the exercise area. The more expensive way may result in the best training for that particular exercise, but since his resources are limited, he will not be able to conduct as many exercises as if he had selected a less expensive way.

In our MAPTOE training, we have placed a lot of emphasis on management techniques. We have attempted to train the first line supervisor as a manager and we have put emphasis on behavioral sciences. Thus, you can see that we are concerned about everyone from the first line supervisor to the Army Chief of Staff being a leader/manager.

After the CONUS reorganization, there will be more emphasis on the role of the installation. Who are the staff officers at installations? They are the graduates of the advanced courses and Command and General Staff College. Where will they learn about installation management? How will they know their job? I think the answer is obvious. They must learn it from the courses that you are teaching.

Management instruction must be progressive through all of our service schools. Perhaps we must start with the entry level courses or perhaps we should start even earlier than that in teaching basic management techniques such as those of MAPTOE. The fundamentals are general management and resource management. It is difficult for me think of any Army leader who does not need this training. I said that perhaps we should start at the basic course, but certainly we must give such training in the advanced courses. Management training must be considered just as important, although we will certainly not devote the same number of hours of instruction, as tactical training. I hope that you will come to believe that as strongly as I do. That doesn't mean that I think tactical training is unimportant. It is very important. But how much of an officer's career is spent in positions that require extensive knowledge of tactics? How much in assignments where he must be the leader/manager? But, you say, if combat comes he must have learned his tactical lessons well! Would you go a step further and say that in combat he need not be a good leader/manager? I think not!

Each of your courses must prepare the student for the assignments he will get before he attends his next school. For a certain number of your students the Advanced Course will be his highest level of schooling. Many of these officers will have installation staff assignments for a substantial part of their career. At the Command and General Staff College the situation is similar; although the majority of the students there can expect assignments at a higher level and thus need a more sophisticated treatment of management. But again, the key is that the student must be taught those things that he needs to know for all assignments prior to his next school. For most officers there is no next school after C&GS so that this means preparation for the remainder of his career. As some examples, at Command and General Staff College we might want to teach resource management; the planning, programing and budgeting system; qualitative management techniques; systems management approach; humanistic

management approach; general management theory; and labor relations. I would not mean to indicate that this list is all inconclusive or that everything I have mentioned is absolutely essential. And I do not mean that none of this is currently being considered. In fact, I know that a number of these things are being taught now.

You might very logically ask the question of how you are going to get more management instruction in the POI. Perhaps you don't need more, perhaps you only need better. In any event, you must visualize the student's needs until he can attend his next school. You must brainstorm the future. You can't rely solely on past experience, for things are changing and changing rapidly. You must analyze the constraints within your school. Perhaps you have limited hours, lack of qualified instructors, a status quo attitude, or many others. Then depending on what you conclude to be the students' needs and the constraints of your school, you must review your alternatives. Perhaps you can increase the number of hours of instruction. Almost certainly you can make the instruction better and more meaningful. Perhaps you can teach more management as an elective. (The main drawback to this is that normally the people who take the elective are those who need it least. They select the elective because it is an area they think important and thinking it is important they have already studied it to an extent greater than most students.) Perhaps you make it as a correspondence course, but that suffers from the same drawback as an elective or from the fact that the student only takes the course after he has determined his inadequacy in this particular area after failing to perform it adequately, and that may be too late. Perhaps you can come up with some sort of an idea on individual learning packages. In any event the need for more management training for tomorrow's leaders is with us today. I have had the easy task of stressing its importance. You have the tough task. You must determine how this instruction will be developed and taught.

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MANAGEMENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

Major Forrest V. Graves
Chief, Command Subcommittee
Command and Leadership Committee
Leadership Department, USAIS

In order to analyze and understand management and the managerial process, various scholars and thinkers have developed concepts and theoretical models to explain the objectives, required resources, and functioning of the management process. In addition, other thinkers and scholars have studied these ideas and have grouped similar ideas into categories called schools of management thought. There is little common agreement on what these schools of thought should be called or indeed even how many of these schools there are. Part of the problem becomes apparent when one views some of the significant management concepts which have surfaced in the 20th Century. Some feel that eventually these schools' of management thought may disappear, but for the moment, they are very real. One of the ways in which the schools have been organized is: human relations, structuralist, behavioral humanist and decision making schools.

Another way in which management has been categorized is, "Streams of thought on management." These streams are behavioral sciences, human relations, scientific management, universals of management, managerial economics and accounting, and quantitative approaches.

Harold Koontz classified these events into six major schools of thought: the management process school, the empirical school, the human behavioral school, the social systems schools, the decision theory school, and the mathematical school.

Military students of management theory have not been reluctant to develop their own subdivisions of managerial thought and, as an example, Commander D. A. Morton, USN, classifies them into seven groups: scientific management, behavioral sciences, organizational structure, optimization approach, management by objectives, the empirical school, and management science.

With the precedent fully established, the temptation is great to muddy the waters further with our own conceived categories. We have, however, opted to use the four generally understood categories: the traditional or scientific school, the behavioral school, the functional or process school, and the quantitative school.

The traditional or the scientific school. There is at least one fact about the development of management thought that is not subject to controversy or debate. Frederick Winslow Taylor is accepted as the "father of scientific management." An illustration of Taylor's impact is the 1918 writings of Lenin in Pravda and I quote: "We should immediately introduce piecework and try it out in practice. We should try out every scientific and progressive suggestion of the Taylor system." Taylor's work included time and motion studies to identify how fewer and shorter motions could be used in a particular task; initiation of "differential piecework" practices which provided one rate up to a certain standard and an increased rate for all work if a higher standard was achieved. In addition to the engineering approach of Taylor, his ideas called for reorganization of the means of supervision. His system called for separation of planning and doing and functional leadership. The separation of planning and doing was simply an extension of the time and motion studies. Taylor suggested that the individual worker should not be permitted to plan his own work and select the necessary tools based solely on his own experience and the experience of others performing similar tasks. Instead, a definite plan, prepared in a scientific and impersonal way, should be prepared and furnished to the worker. The plan would include the steps and specific tools necessary to most efficiently accomplish the job. Taylor is credited with the formalization of four basic principles of management.

Besides the work of Taylor there were other significant contributors to the scientific school of management that preceeded, paralleled, and followed Taylor. Perhaps the most famous of these pioneers was Frank Bunker Gilbreth of "Cheaper by the Dozen" fame. While Taylor concentrated primarily on the time required to do a particular task, Gilbreth concerned himself with wasted motion. His techniques included methods for studying movement using motion pictures, construction of three dimensional wire models of movements in a given task, and the use of motion picture techniques using a light and flashing light to measure speed and direction of movement. Other contributions made by Gilbreth were the process chart and flow diagram. Many of Gilbreth's techniques are still used today in the most sophisticated time and motion studies. In fact, he is widely recognized as the "father of motion study."

The works of Taylor and Gilbreth, and numerous others have been hailed as the second industrial revolution. Their work began the process of building a framework around the discipline and practice of management as many know it today. Although the "scientific or traditional theory is the oldest management school, one theory links it with the quantitative school, which is of course chronologically the newest school.

Functional school or process school. Henri Fayol is the father of the functional school of management thought. During the first two decades of the 20th Century, he lectured and published articles promoting his universal concept of management. Since Frederick Taylor dominated management thought in the U.S. during this period and since Fayol's works were not translated from French until the late 1940's, his contribution to management thought received delayed acceptance in the United States. The school concentrated upon the functions of management as the important activities of managers.

The advocates of the management functional school are concerned with the functions of management which have been listed as forecasting, planning, organizing, staffing, coordinating, directing, communicating, evaluation and adjustment, and motivation of personnel. In development of the functional management concept, other terms and theories have become an integral part of the concept, for example - authority, command and control, line and staff, span of control, chain of command, unity of command, delegation, responsibility, accountability, centralization, decentralization, and management by exception among others.

To keep in line with material contained in AR 1-24 (Army Management Doctrine, 21 Nov 1958) and DA Pamphlet 5-2, Improvement Tools for Managers, we here at USAIS use these five functions of management and these seven tasks of a manager.

The functional concept promotes the premise that the management process is essentially similar in most areas of endeavor and, therefore, generalized principles and guidelines may be established and learned by managers. This should aid them in the managerial process. Because of the assumed similarity, advocates of this school believe in the transferability of these skills from one line of work to nearly any other. Therefore, they are often credited as promotors of the general manager, the all purpose manager, or the super manager concept. The idea they propose is that a manager who fully understands the management process can be placed in any management situation and function well. This concept has come under increasing attack in recent years, and the controversy is still quite active. The principle criticism of the concept is that a manager fully aware of the functions of management is unlikely to work equally well in such dissimilar atmospheres as a prison warden, university dean or president, business executive, museum curator, or military leader.

The behavioral school. The behavioral school has provided a great deal of empirical and theoretical data about man as an individual; the motivation of man in response to various stimuli; and the interactions of man-in-organization. However, it would be unfair and also incorrect to credit the behavioral school with the discovery of man's true nature.

It may also be unfair to classify Maslow and his writings as part of behavior or the human relations school. Yet, it was his writings and those of the behavioral scientists who modified Maslow's hierarchy of needs, who codified the knowledge of the nature of man. Such thinking has been developed over the years by administrators and scholars since the age of Babylon.

The investigation of Elton Mayo and his fellow workers during the period 1927-1932, was the first attempt to show, through scientific research, that man was something more than economically oriented in his work environment; that man was more than just an extension of a mchine.

The behaviorists have not developed any universal truths but they have been able to provide some useful generalizations. They have developed an awareness about the nature-of-man, especially what stimulates man, and how man acts in organizations. The successful manager and/or leader of an organization must surely borrow from these findings in his efforts to better understand and provide for man's needs.

Quantitative school. The generally accepted significant event and date which signaled the formation of the quantitative school of management thought was the work of operations research by the British and United States military services during World War II. From these beginnings, the school has broadened its perspective and the most current academically acceptable classification of the school is the "systems approach."

The quantitative school in its narrowest sense, the strictly operations research view, includes inventory control, linear programming, probability theory, queuing theory, sampling theory, and statistical decision theory, among others. This listing is by no means complete nor are the techniques necessarily mutually exclusive. Further, if one were to view the school in this very narrow sense, it would be difficult indeed to justify the techniques as representing a management school. Rather, a better classification would simply be quantitative aids for managers.

However, when one goes beyond the strictly operations research approach and moves toward the systems analysis view, the true worth and possibilities of the school become apparent. The quantitative school, when the systems approach is incorporated, is much more than a bag of tools, it is a way of thinking, a conceptual approach or a point of view. In its truest sense many believe it is a conglomeration of all the schools that have gone before. P. M. S. Blackett is associated with the beginnings of the quantitative school with his development of the mixed team approach to problem solving. The use of operations research and greater use of computers and automatic data processing have made this the fastest growing of the four emerging schools of management thought.

Current Army applications. As a first step towards a discussion of the Army philosophy of management, it is appropriate to identify what precepts and techniques have been borrowed from the four schools previously discussed. A determination of what the Army has perceived as useful for the accomplishment of its goals and objectives should suggest a framework upon wnich the entire structure of Army management is based.

The Army has been a strong teacher and practitioner of the functional school of management thought since the end of World War II. An indication of the strength of the functional school in current Army management thinking is the 1971 "Army War College Study of Leadership for the Professional Soldiers" which has been previously discussed by our guest speakers. This study concludes that the traditional principles of leadership are both appropriate and worthy of application today and in the Army of tomorrow.

Beyond the functional, school the "Leadership Study" suggests a deep interest and belief in the general findings of the behavioral school. To quote--

> "The organization has certain needs or expectations of the individual. It expects, for example, job proficiency and disciplined response. The individual has expectations as well. He expects, for example, sufficiency of pay, worthwhile work and respect for his dignity as an individual."

The expectations of the organization and the individuals form the informal contract which has also been discussed. However, the recognition of this informal contract and the fact that Army management/leadership creates the leadership climate in which this contract is mediated, parallels a behavioral approach to management. This approach suggests that a manager in executing his responsibilities should recognize the effect of his actions on others, and conversely, the effect of their actions on himself.

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The Army application of the techniques of the quantitative school provided impetus for the recognition of this school as a separate school of management thought. The use of quantitative methods and the concept of the systems approach has been recognized as valuable in different, yet overlapping, categories of Army management. An example is management of logistical operations which includes certain mathematical techniques for the establishment of such things as inventory levels and maintenance procedures. These mathematical techniques have proven to be the most successful application of systems analysis and are used by both private industry and the Army.

Although the Army's decision-making process has been modified significantly to take advantage of the tools and techniques that fall into the quantitative school, to suggest that a truly systems view is representative of current Army management policy would be both incorrect and unfair to the proponents of the systems approach.

The impact of the traditional school can be best illustrated by the application of the traditional school's techniques to TOE units. Until recently these techniques have not been a matter of general Army management policy, but the new Army management program, MAPTOE (Management Practices for TOE units) brings these ideas to all Army units.

In February 1972, the Army published DA Pam 5-2, "Improvement Tools for Soldier Managers," which is a distinct departure from AR 1-24 in the approach to the subject of management in both style and content. An analysis of DA Pam 5-2 reveals that the Army has attempted to combine the four management schools of thought to form a management doctrine. Chapter 2 of the pamphlet clearly outlines the Army management process. The behavioral school gets full treatment in Chapter 3 in the discussion of motivation, soldier's needs, goal setting, job satisfaction, and job enrichment. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 deal with traditional or scientific management methods to include work measurement, work standards, and performance effectiveness. Chapter 7 deals with quality assurance and introduces basic qualitative techniques; for example, lost sampling techniques using the theory of mathematical probabilities. This combination of management techniques and schools of thought may lead to the disappearance of distinctive categories of schools.

Irrespective of Army efforts to make use of the best of all four of the schools of management thought, the full integration of these concepts in a way suggesting a system approach to management is not evident. Army management thinking seems to fall most closely to the functional school view. In addition to the Army's reliance on the principles of management and leadership, other techniques and ideas are as follows: the idea of a type staff study, estimate of the situation, commander's estimate, the intelligence estimate taught in the Army school system, the principle of managing class I installations listed in AR 5-3 (Management Doctrine and Philosophy for Management of Class I Installations, July 1970), the twelve functions in the Army management process, the seven functions of the manager, and the five functions of management found in Chapter 2 of DA Pamphlet 5-2, and other Army publications seem to support this view.

From the conclusion that the Army holds most closely to the functional school, one may be able to visualize a framework for a philosophy of management. But, we here at the Infantry School have chosen to teach what we consider the best of all four schools of management thought. DA Pamphlet 5-2 serves as a convenient framework for us to develop management and leadership as functions of command.

WORKGROUP REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    a. Special Studies Group

    b. Officer Advanced Group

    c. Officer Basic Group

    d. Noncommissioned Officer Advanced Group

    e. Noncommissioned Officer Basic Group

REPORT OF THE STUDIES GROUP

The Studies Group had a mission to think, discuss, and draft in narrative form various problem areas confronting leaders in our today's Army. Due to limited time for workshop process, the group members outlined three objectives. These included:

    a. To determine a philosophy of leadership.

    b. To determine objectives of leadership instruction.

    c. To determine a concept of leadership.

Following two workshop sessions, the group members drafted two sufficient philosophies of leadership. The first one was as follows:

"Professional leadership is the essential ingredient for the success of the United States Army."

The second one is a refining of the former and the group settled on the acceptance of this particular revision.

"Professional leadership is, in the end, the ultimate determinant of military success."

After determining a philosophy of leadership, the Studies Group attempted to determine ways of improving leadership instruction. This problem was attacked by brainstorming ideas. Their approach included examining concepts, analyzing their rationale, and determining how to execute the material. Conclusions from this session follow the brief report.

Members of the Studies Group determined that the objective of leadership instruction as defined by the Infantry School is appropriate and should not be changed.

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HOW TO IMPROVE LEADERSHIP TRAINING

CONCEPT (WHAT)	RATIONALE (WHY)	ACTION (HOW)
1. THE USE OF CASE STUDIES	INCREASES STUDENT ACCEPTANCE REALISTIC SKILL ORIENTED	DRAWN FROM INSTRUCTORS' EXPERINCES PART OF STUDENT WRITING REQUIREMENT STUDENT CLASS REQUIREMENT RESULTS OF AR 15-6 INVESTIGA- TIONS ROLE PLAYING - GAMING
2. MUST BE PERFORMANCE ORIENTED TRAINING	SAME AS ABOVE	SAME AS ABOVE
3. STUDENT MUST DEVELOP UNDERSTANDING AND SELF-ANALYSIS	INTERPERSONAL SKILL THAT STRENGTHENS A LEADER SUN TZU	TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS (INVESTIGATE POTENTIAL)
4. ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAMS	CLOSES FEEDBACK LOOP OF ASSESS-MENT	SITE VISITS BY INSTRUCTORS STUDENT FEEDBACK CONSUMER RESEARCH TECHNIQUES PROVIDE EVALUATION OBJECTIVES TO OTHER DEPARTMENTS
5. SPECIFY THE CRITERIA OF EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION	MAKE CLEAR THE PURPOSE-- UNIT OF EFFORT YARDSTICK OF ASSESSMENT	CONSOLIDATE AND ANALYZE STU-DENT COMMENTS (LONG AND SHORT TERM USER)
6. TRANSLATION AND UNDER-STANDING OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH	PRACTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH UTILIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE RESOURCES	CONDUCT AN OBJECTIVE STUDY OF LEADERSHIP LITERATURE BY QUALIFIED MILITARY PERSONNEL
7. MAINTAIN INTERAGENCY LIAISON	PREVENTS TRIAL AND ERROR LEARN-ING FACILITATES PROGRESSIVE LEARNING PROMOTES INTERCHANGES OF IDEAS	MAINTAINED THRU FORMAL AND INFORMAL COMMUNICATIONS SUCH AS SEMINARS, VISITS, MAILING LISTS, CLEARING HOUSES AND INTEREST PROFILES

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CONCEPT (WHAT)	RATIONALE (WHY)	ACTION (WHY)
8. DEVELOP TRAINING THAT MAINTAINS MISSION/MEN PERSPECTIVES	CREATES BETTER UNDERSTANDING, BALANCE AND COORDINATION OF LEADERSHIP	USED IN CONJUNCTION W/#4 INTERVIEWS AND VISITS DIRECTED TOWARD MISSION/MEN TAILOR INSTRUCTION TO PREDICTABLE SITUATIONS
9. OFF TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR ALL LEVELS OF LEADERS	REINFORCES SCHOOL INSTRUCTION CONTINUES LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT	INCLUDE LEADERSHIP TRAINING IN UNIT TRAINING PROGRAMS, PERFORMANCE COUNSELING AND LEADERSHIP APPRAISAL POST SCHOOL TRAINING
10. DETERMINE PRIORITY OF LEADERSHIP TRAINING WITHIN CURRICULUM	FORCES A JUST ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES	COMMAND DECISION
11. FORMULATION OF CRITERIA FOR INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT TRAINING	INSURES MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF TRAINING RESOURCES	BY ACHIEVING A BALANCE BETWEEN PRACTICAL AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE
12. ORGANIZE AND CONDUCT FUTURE LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTOR SEMINARS	KEEP PACE W/TIME CONTINUE DEVELOPMENT OF INSTRUCTOR EXPERTISE (LONG/SHORT RANGE--SCHOOL AND ARMY)	ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTORS' COURSES (MILITARY AND ACADEMIC) TO A TRADOC ACTIVITY
13. INTEGRATION OF LEADERSHIP INTO ENTIRE POI	REINFORCES SCHOOL INSTRUCTION CONTINUES LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT	INTER-DEPARTMENT COMMO INTRA-DEPARTMENT COMMO
14. UTILIZATION OF OFFICERS W/DEGREES IN AREA OF LEADERSHIP/MANAGEMENT	INTENDED UTILIZATION OF ARMY	ENFORCEMENT OF EXISTING ARMY POLICY
15. DEMONSTRATION OF LEADERSHIP BY SCHOOL SYSTEM	ENHANCE CREDITABILITY OF LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION	COMMAND AWARENESS OF NEED FOR CREDITABILITY LEADERSHIP TRAINING IN ITC GEARED TO INSTRUCTIONAL SITUATION

THE APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE PROCESS OCCURING BETWEEN RECOGNITION OF THE MISSION AND ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION

LOGIC | **MODEL** | **PROCESS**

① ANALYZE TASK TO BE ACCOMPLISHED

LONG TERM
SHORT TERM
STATED
IMPLIED
UNDERSTOOD

EXPECTATIONS
EXPERIENCE
VALUES
SKILLS

MISSION

TASKS AND CRITERIA

● IN THE BEGINNING, THERE IS ALWAYS A MISSION OR PURPOSE. WITHOUT MISSION, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS LEADERSHIP... SYMBOLIC RELATIONSHIP.

● WE COMMONLY FAIL TO ESTABLISH PRECISE AND OBSERVABLE STANDARDS WHICH TELL US HOW WELL WE ARE DOING WHAT WE SET OUT TO DO

SAME AS SUPERIOR

② GATHER INFORMATION RELATING TO THE TASK

SUPERIOR   SUBORDINATE

PERCEIVED SITUATION

ENVIRONMENT   RESOURCES

MOVE
SHOOT
COMMUNICATE

SELF

MOTIVATE
COMMUNICATE

● FIVE BIG PROBLEMS IN A SITUATIONAL APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP. TRIANGLE DEFINES TRUE LOYALTY THREE HUMAN FACTORS ARE MOST IMPORTANT.

THE LEADER IS THE ACTION AGENT OF THE PROCESS.

③ FORMULATE ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

TECHNICAL SKILLS

KNOWLEDGE
+
EXPERIENCE

INTERPERSONAL SKILLS

ACTION OPTIONS

● OPTIONS ARE GENERALIZED BY THE VARIOUS UNKNOWNS AND MIXES OF THREE THINGS THAT ARE WITH ANY LEADER, GOOD OR BAD. LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PUTS THE DATA IN EACH OF THE THREE BIG AREAS. FORCING A BROAD, FIVE ELEMENT LOOK AT THE SITUATION HELPS THIS PROCESS OF DRAWDOWN AND MIXING.

④ ANALYZE, EVALUATE, AND COMPARE ALTERNATING COURSES OF ACTION.

[1] [2] [3]

TASKS AND CRITERIA

PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP

TERMS OF INFORMAL CONTRACT

ARTICULATE THE EXPECTATIONS OF BOTH PARTIES TO THE CONTACT

● WE MUST KEEP THIS IN MIND, NOTICE THAT IT APPEARS THREE TIMES IN THE MODEL. THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE IS ALWAYS IN THE FOREFRONT.

● THE VALUE OF THE PRINCIPLES IS THAT THEY SUMMARIZE.

● THE IDEA HERE IS THAT WE ACHIEVE THE BEST BALANCE OF SKILL TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASKS TO THE DESIRED LEVEL.

⑤ DECISION

ACTION CONCEPT

● THIS IS A THOUGHT... STILL IN THE LEADERS HEAD.

⑥ DIRECTION

ACTIONS AND ORDERS

● CRITICAL PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION ... VERBAL AND NON-VERBAL, FACTUAL AND EMOTIONAL, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP. DIFFICULT WITH INSERTION OF CHAIN OF COMMAND, BUT THE CHAIN IS NECESSARY FOR AUTHORITY, COORDINATION, AND CONCENTRATION OF POWER ON PROBLEM.

⑦ FEEDBACK, ADJUSTMENT, AND GUIDANCE

SUPPORT
INSTRUCTION
CONTROL

EXECUTION   **SUPERVISION**

INFORMATION

● IT IS HERE THAT WE ADJUST OR FEEL THE EFFORT FOR EFFICIENCY. FEEDBACK AND ADJUSTMENT... A CONSTANT PROCESS.

● THERE IS ALWAYS MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT, AT LEAST TO SOME DEGREE, SINCE SOME LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN EXPENDED. WITHOUT LEADERSHIP THERE CAN NEVER BE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

⑧ PROBLEM SOLUTION AT THE LEVEL OF STANDARDS ESTABLISHED

MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

● AGAIN, WE MUST BRING IN THE CRITERIA. WITHOUT EVALUATION AND FEEDBACK, ATTEMPTS TO LEARN ARE NOTHING MORE THAN RANDOM BEHAVIOR.

TASKS AND CRITERIA

REPORT OF

OFFICER ADVANCED

GROUP

1.   PURPOSE: The purpose of the Advanced Officer course instruction is to prepare officers for command and staff duties at battalion through brigade levels or comparable levels in both divisional and nondivisional units with emphasis on its exercise of command at battalion level.

Subsequent to the completion of the Leadership Conference, a review of the purpose of the Advanced Officer leader course was initiated.   The new USAIS proposed IOAC purpose statement is:

> To prepare commissioned officers for command duties at company and
> battalion level and for staff duties at battalion and brigade level in
> both divisional and nondivisional units, with emphasis on command and
> staff duties at the battalion level.

2.   SCHOOLS REPRESENTED:

United States Army Armor School

United States Army Field Artillery School

United States Army Europe, CSTC

United States Army Chaplain School

United States Army Military Academy

United States Army Quartermaster School

United States Army Infantry School

United States Army Engineer School

United States Army Aviation Command

United States Army Adjutant General School

3.   APPROACH FOR DEVELOPMENTAL POI's: The primary problem surfaced during this seminar was a lack of clearly defined philosophy and definition of management in the Army today caused by:

a. Outdated Army Regulations in the area of "general" management.

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NOTE: The term, "general" management excludes such areas as maintenance, personnel, logistics, facilities, and financial management and such technical management areas as ADP, OR/SA, and MAPTOE. It may be broadly defined as using people and other resources to accomplish results and includes such areas as organizational leadership, organizational theory, and organizational behavior.

b. No concensus or even a clear understanding was evident of what the term "general" management meant to the participants of the seminar group.

c. No proponent agency or service school for "general" management existed.

d. Lack of an updating of military management with contemporary civilian work was evident.

Another problem brought out in the seminar group was a lack of distinction between the area of general management and leadership. The discussion centered around whether or not management deals only with things, resources other than people, or, if it should include the human aspect as well. The conclusion of the seminar group was that management does include the utilization and employment of people. An interface does exist between leadership and "general" management.

Stemming from the previous problem, the question was raised as to how best to resolve the area of overlap between these two areas. The problem is compounded by the fact that a vacuum exists in the area of doctrine, guidance, or policy.

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4. <u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u>: Several recommendations were made based on a discussion of the above mentioned problems.

    a. The interface between leadership and "general" management be assigned to a proponent agency. Both leadership and "general" management be handled by a single agency. Several alternatives were discussed: Fort Benning, Command General Staff College, the Army War College, and the United States Military Academy. The final recommendation was that CONARC solicit from CONUS installations those desiring to have proponency for general management and leadership, and make a decision to assign that responsibility.

    b. It is further recommended that "general" management be defined by AR 1-24, Planning, Organizing, Directing, Coordinating, and Controlling.

    c. Leadership interpersonal skills should interface with general management.

    d. Service schools determine other management and leadership skills as appropriate to their branch.

5. <u>DISCUSSION AND RATIONALE</u>:

    a. During the morning session, the group conducted a brainstorming session to determine leadership topics which should be included in the Leadership POI. Some 29 topics were identified as being relevant to leadership at the Advanced Course level.

    b. During the afternoon session, the group first decided to accept a sequence for teaching leadership. This sequence was Introduction--Individual--Interpersonal--Group (Intra--Inter)--Organizational--and Application.

    This sequence was accepted and basically stems from merging the sequence used at USMA, USAIS, and USAQMS into a logical way for presenting leadership instruction.

    c. After accepting the above sequence the group next assigned the 29 topics identified during the morning session into the levels of leadership identified in the sequence. This breakout is identified below:

> ### Introduction
>
> Professionalism
> Principles and Traits
> Purpose of Course
> Trial Concept
> Informal Contract
> AWC Studies
> Leadership Board Results
>
> ### Individual
>
> Self Awareness
> Self Analysis
> Motivation
> Decision-Making/Problem Solving
> Human Behavior (Attitudes, Values, Perception)
> Standards
> Creativity
> Frustration/Pressure
> Goals
> Perception
> Socialization

Interpersonal

Counseling
Communication
Human Behavior
Senior-subordinate Relationships
Power Relationships
Develop-subordinates
Conflict Resolution
Perception
Socialization

Group (Intra-Inter)

Norms
Communications
Human Behavior
Command and Staff Relationships
Roles
Expectations
Goals
Standards
Power
Deviance
Ethics
Styles

Organizational

Ethics
Motivation
Communications
Senior-subordinate Relationships
Power Relationships
Develop Subordinates
Command and Staff Relationships
Goals
Standards
Creativity
Organization Theory
Planning
Socialization

Application

Contemporary Problems
Decision-making/Problem Solving
Seminars
General Officer Talks
Case Studies
PE's

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Role Playing

d. Following this exercise the sequence of topics were matched against the training objectives developed during the last workshop. It was determined that very little modification was necessary in terms of content to update the training objectives for current use. The wording of all objectives, however, had to be changed to conform to current systems engineering format. A few objectives were combined to make them more general and several objectives were eliminated completely while a few new objectives were added.

e. The West Point model was presented by LTC McFadden and discussed by the group. The QMS model was also discussed by LTC Semerjian. Both of these models were recognized as being reasonable and logical. The similarity between these models and our sequencing were recognized. These two models are outlined briefly below:

WEST POINT MODEL
TRANSACTION
INTERACTION PROCESS

INDIV	GP	LDR	ORG
Motivation	Norms	Ldr Style	Conflict & Dilemma
Needs	Roles	Life Cycle	Motivation
Incentives	Goals	Fiedler	Change
Rwd-Punish	Conformity	DHID State	Professionalism
Attitudes	Deviancy	Consider	Ethics
Values	Power	Task	
Socialization	Authority	Stress	
Resocialization	Social Exchange	Cohesion	
Attitude Change	Expectations	Linking Pin	
	Status		

f. Finally, it was agreed to recommend to CONARC that the minimum time necessary to teach leadership be raised to 80 hours. A detailed scope for these 80 hours is provided in the following material.

SCOPES FOR THE ARMY LEADERSHIP/MANAGEMENT IOAC POI

SUBJECT TITLE	RECOMMENDED HOURS	MINIMUM HOURS	SCOPE
INTRODUCTION			
Introduction to Army Leadership/ Management	2	2	Introduce the Army Leadership/ Management block of instruction; illustrate the need to study leadership/ management; explain the relationship between the different elements of command; leadership, management and decision-making; discuss the current research efforts in leadership (AWC study, CONARC Leadership Board); define and discuss the concept of leadership and the informal contract; discuss professionalism, principles and traits and the trial concept.
INDIVIDUAL LEADERSHIP			
Self Analysis/ Awareness	5	1	Introspection and analysis of one's behavior through test instruments and "Rover" TV cameras.
Human Behavior Needs Attitudes Values	4	3	Analysis of institutions that influence an individual's value and attitude formation; appraise four methods which can be used to change attitudes; discuss how physical/learned needs affect military behavior.
Socialization	2	0	Analysis of developmental process of child in order to create an awareness of the new nature of the soldier today.
Pressure, Stress, and Adjustment	2	1	Analyze the elements of stress, i.e., pressure and frustration, well enough to identify stress producing situations and behavior manifested through reactions to pressure; discuss techniques to reduce pressure among subordinates.
Transaction Analysis	3	0	Analyze the three behavior patterns-- that of parent, adult, and child--to understand and apply these patterns to improve your ability to interact with others; include role playing to teach applicable methods.
SUBTOTAL	16	5	

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INTERPERSONAL LEADERSHIP

SUBJECT TITLE	RECOMMENDED HOURS	MINIMUM HOURS	SCOPE
Interpersonal Communications	3	2	Analysis of informal systems to include transmission of ideas, work social relationships; identify barriers to and causes for breakdown in communications.
Counseling	3	2	To make the student aware that good counseling is an important part of leadership; identify the pitfalls of counseling; discuss and demonstrate the characteristics and skills of proper counseling; familiarize the student with the preparation necessary for a counseling interview; discuss the various styles of counseling; analyze the Taylor-Johnson Temperament analysis; familiarize the student with assistance agencies and follow-up actions; include role playing exercises to teach methodology.
Human Behavior	1	0	Identify biases and filters which detract from accurate perception; analysis of commonality of terms; symbols and actions which convey meanings and allow one to perceive accurately.
Senior-Subordinate	2	0	To discuss and analyze the proper types of senior-subordinate relationships found in a service organization, i.e., officer-officer, officer-NCO, officer-EM, NCO-EM; to analyze why these relationships are necessary and to discuss techniques used to form the proper relationships; to be illustrated by role playing.
Developing Subordinates	2	2	To discuss the senior's responsibility to develop his subordinates and to discuss techniques which could be used on a one to one basis to develop a subordinate; concept to be illustrated by case study.
Conflct Resolution	4	3	To appraise "personality conflicts;" to discuss the setting and adherence to standards; to discuss why people resist change and techniques to overcome resistance to change; concepts illustrated by case study.

SUBJECT TITLE	RECOMMENDED HOURS	MINIMUM HOURS	SCOPE
Power/Authority/ Responsibility/ Relationships	2	1	To differentiate between power, authority and responsibility as ways in which organizations deal with people; to discriminate between the bases of authority; and to study techniques used in controlling personnel through the assignment of responsibility; includes role-playing.
Re-socialization	3	0	To analyze the transition process which a soldier goes through when entering the service to understand methods which could be used to help the soldier make the adjustment to military life; illustrate by case study.
SUBTOTAL	20	10	

GROUP LEADERSHIP

Human Behavior and Group Dynamics
    Norms/Values
    Roles
    Power
    Goals
	6	4	Analysis of norms, roles, goals, and expectations as applicable to three basic variables of leadership: leader, led, and situation, through role-playing exercises; examine source of informal power and goal congruence.

Group Decision-Making	3	0	To examine the advantages and disadvantages of group decision-making to include the factors of time, expertise and acceptance; to analyze and apply techniques to influence the group; to include case study.
Competition vs. Cooperation	3	2	To analyze the advantages and disadvantages of using competition in fostering group morale and esprit; to study sub-optimization and techniques to improve reaching group goals; concepts illustrated by case study.
Creativity	1	0	To analyze and apply techniques which would foster the development of creative ideas; to include the techniques of deferral judgment and brainstorming
Deviance	2	1	Analyze the need for discipline in controlling deviant behavior; evaluate possible solutions to current leadership problems.

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SUBJECT TITLE	RECOMMENDED HOURS	MINIMUM HOURS	SCOPE
Informal Communications Systems	1	1	To examine informal communications systems which are used in groups; to analyze how these systems act to aid or hinder the organization; to analyze and apply techniques useful in influencing and taking advantage of the informal communications systems.
Command and Staff Relationships	2	2	To examine the role of the staff and the relationships between the commander and his staff; to analyze and discuss techniques useful in improving the effectiveness of a staff; and to study how to develop staff teamwork, to include case study.
Styles of Leadership	2	1	To analyze the three styles of leadership through self scoring tests for student benefit; discuss recommended styles for specific situations.
SUBTOTAL	20	11	

ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Organizational Theory	2	1	To analyze and discuss the basic concepts or organization theory to include the line, line and staff, staff and functional types of organizations; to analyze techniques useful in organizing for mission accomplishment.
Planning	5	5	To analyze the planning process to include the types of planning carried out in organizations; to discuss and apply methods to improve planning, illustrate by case study; to include PERT as a planning technique.
Goals and Standards	2	2	To study the need to establish goals and standards within an organization; to discuss and apply methods to set goals and standards, includes case study.
Creativity	1	2	To analyze and apply techniques which would foster an organizational climate conducive to innovation and creativity; to discuss how one could introduce and gain acceptance of innovative ideas within an organization.

SUBJECT TITLE	RECOMMENDED HOURS	MINIMUM HOURS	SCOPE
Ethics and Discipline	2	3	To explain the differences between ideal and operative codes of ethics; to assess the climate of discipline; to illustrate by case study.
Motivation	1	3	To discuss and apply motivation theory to include the necessity to satisfy needs and provide motivators within an organization; to discuss and apply techniques for obtaining motivation to include job enrichment, participative techniques, and MBO.
Formal Communications Systems	2	1	To analyze and discuss the formal communications system; to discuss types of formal communications and when to use these methods, to include discussion of the open-door policy.
Power Relationships	2	1	To discuss and analyze power relationships within the organization to include how to recognize and use sources of power; to discuss reference power, expert and legal power and how to use these within an organization.
Command Staff Relationships	2	2	To discuss the proper command and staff relationships within an organization to include how to coordinate and maintain harmony between subelements within the organization; to analyze how you can operate effectively within the organization.
Developing Subordinates	3	2	To examine the commander's role in developing subordinates and techniques which could be used to develop individual and team skills within an organization; illustrate by case study.
SUBTOTAL	22	22	

RECAPITULATION	RECOMMENDED HOURS	MINIMUM HOURS
Introduction	2	2
Individual Leadership	16	5
Interpersonal Leadership	20	10
Group Leadership	20	11
Organizational Leadership	22	22
TOTAL	80	50

REPORT OF

OFFICER BASIC

GROUP

1. **PURPOSE:** The purpose of the basic course is to prepare lieutenants for their first duty assignment. The term "first duty assignment" is used rather than infantry platoon leader because less than 50% of the new lieutenants go to TOE units as platoon leaders.

2. **REPRESENTATION IN OFFICERS BASIC COURSE COMMITTEE:** The following schools were represented in the Officers Basic Course (OBC) committee:

a. United States Military Academy

b. Infantry School

c. Transportation School

d. Womens Army Corps

e. Military Intelligence

f. Engineer School

g. Adjutant General School

h. Signal School

i. Quartermaster School

j. Artillery School

k. Armor School

3. **APPROACH FOR DEVELOPMENT OF OBC POI:**

a. General. The POI was developed with two basic considerations. First, the instruction must be based on a model such as our Concept of Leadership. The model serves as a road map to show the student where he is, where he has been, and what he can expect. The model ties the instruction together and graphically represents where each subject fits into the overall POI. Second, classes should be conducted in 12-15 man groups under the control of a facilitator. Emphasis should be placed on student presentation and participation. Heavy emphasis on role playing, games, case studies, etc., is essential to involve students in using the material presented in class. Furthermore, small groups would give the facilitator the opportunity to accurately measure the performance of each group leader.

b. Approach. The OBC POI was developed by examining, within the time limitations, the skills a lieutenant should possess, the POI from the April 1972 workshop, and the systems engineered USAIS POI.

(1) It was felt that a knowledge of the basic leadership skills was appropriate regardless of branch or assignment. Branch schools were responsible for developing and teaching those specific skills required by their branch.

(2) The April 1972 model POI was used as a basic standard and point of departure.

(3) This USAIS POI was used as a basis for the development of a model POI. The training objectives of this POI were examined in detail to insure that the lieutenant would have the basic skills required of him to perform his duties well regardless of assignment.

4. **DISCUSSION AND RATIONALE:**

a. The instruction is progressive in that it transits from subjects concerned with understanding people, to the conduct and role of the lieutenant, to applying this knowledge in resolving common problems found within any unit. Specific subjects which have been identified as problems within the Army, such as communications and counseling, are taught and then applied both in the class devoted to that subject and during later classes where unit problems are addressed.

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b. The major addition of hours to the OBC POI was in the area of management. Because the lieutenant devotes much of his time to managing, i.e., mess officer, supply officer, training officer, etc., a basic understanding of management was felt necessary so that he would not only be prepared to perform these duties but would be able to communicate with his seniors and subordinates. MAPTOE was also added for the same reasons. Specifically, the lieutenant will be required to supervise NCOs who have received formal MAPTOE instruction. To do this, he must be aware of MAPTOE.

5. MODEL OBC POI

SUBJECT	HOURS	SCOPE
Introduction to Army Leadership	2	Analyze concept of leadership. Analyze principles of leadership. Apply the problem solving process.
Counseling for Subordinates	3	Identify skills and characteristics of counseling. Analyze necessary steps in planning a counseling session. Counsel subordinates using proper techniques.
Control of Fear, Panic, & Dissent	1	*(ILC) Identify the actions necessary to control fear and panic. Identify corrective actions to minimize dissent within a unit.
Code of Conduct	1	*(ILC) Explain the implications of the Code of Conduct.
Prevention of AWOL	1	*(ILC) Analyze preventive measures leaders can take to minimize AWOL.
LRC	4	Lead a group of men. Apply problem solving process. Conduct self-evaluation of leadership ability. Apply the principles of leadership.
LRC Counseling	2	Conduct counseling session based on LRC performance.
Leadership Problems of Command	2	Identify considerations when assuming command. Determine actions to take with subordinates who display unfavorable attitudes. Reestablish a broken chain of command. Identify considerations for minimizing fatigue. Identify considerations for setting standards.
Leadership Problems Panel	1	Identify considerations of concern to Junior Officers. Determine actions current field commanders take to resolve unit problems.
The Effective Leader	3	Assess the variables in a leadership climate. Take appropriate action to maximize motivation to accomplish unit missions and goals.

*(ILC) - Individual Learning Center instructional program. This is a self-paced program using video tape with questions at the conclusion.

SUBJECT	HOURS	SCOPE
Leadership Aspects of Human Behavior	2	Analyze the elements of the personality. Determine how the elements of the personality affect individual behavior. Analyze man's needs. Determine how need satisfaction affects behavior.
Military Ethics and Discipline	2	Explain the difference between an ideal and operative code of ethics. Assess the climate of discipline. Explain how the climate of discipline relates to the informal contract.
Role of the Junior Leader	1	Evaluate the responsibilities of leadership. Analyze the styles of leadership.
Process of Management	6	Identify the functions of management. Identify the tasks of a commander. Analyze ADP as tool for decision making.
MAPTOE	4	Identify the function of MAPTOE. Apply MAPTOE to a case study.
Communications in Leadership	2	Analyze communications requirements between the leader and his subordinates. Identify communications barriers and breakdowns. Apply proper action to eliminate barriers and breakdowns.
Exam		Apply leadership and management instruction to situations of all leadership and management classes.
TOTAL HOURS	37	

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REPORT OF

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ADVANCED GROUP

GROUP

1. **PURPOSE:** The purpose of the ANCOES course is to provide selected enlisted personnel in grades E6 and E7 with a working knowledge of those duties required to perform as first sergeants and operation sergeants.

2. **SCHOOLS REPRESENTED:**

   a. Air Defense School.

   b. Adjutant General School.

   c. CDC Agency.

   d. Field Artillery School

   e. Finance School.

   f. Missile and Munitions School.

   g. Sergeant Major Academy.

   h. Signal School.

   i. Transportation School.

   j. Infantry School.

3. **APPROACH FOR DEVELOPMENTAL POI's:**

   a. The representatives of the ANCOES group approached the task of developing a model POI by listening to, making an analysis of, and evaluating each school's POI. The group also considered the courses already systems engineered.

   b. After evaluating each school's POI and training objectives already systems engineered, the group compiled a list of 35 subject areas currently being taught or that should be taught. The group revised the training objectives in the model POI accordingly.

   c. Because of a limited amount of time, the group did not consider the sequence subjects should be taught.

4. **DISCUSSION AND RATIONALE:**

   a. It was the consensus of the group that it should agree on a minimum time required for each subject area. The rationale was that each service school could add to the minimum time depending on the needs of a particular school.

   b. It was decided that not less than two hours be allocated for the Concept of Leadership, because most instructors feel that the ANCOES student cannot analyze and solve the more complex problem situations without a good knowledge of the basic concept of leadership. This is because of a long absence from a school environment in most cases.

c. In analyzing many of the training objectives it was discovered that there were many duplications and as a result many subjects were combined into one class. Prevention of AWOL, a separate class, is now recommended to be taught in leadership problem areas.

d. The rationale for recommending a block on "Equal Opportunity" was that more than ever before WAC's are in many of the military occupational specialist areas. The group decided that this instruction is important to the senior NCO in order for him to appreciate the worth of individuals not only with respect to race, but also sex.

5. COURSE RECOMMENDATIONS:

SUBJECT	HOURS	SCOPE
Concept of Army Leadership	2	Analyze the concept of leadership. Analyze the principles of leadership. Analyze the traits of a leader.
Interpersonal Communications	2	Analyze the importance of vertical and lateral communications, its impact on leadership success, the barriers, filters, distortions, perceptions, interpretations, and bias' emphasizing that "the only message that brings action is the one received, not the one sent."
Leadership Problems of Command	3	Analyze the handling of situations that may arise in a unit. Situations will range from training in garrison to control in combat.
Indicators	1	Analyze the indicators of leadership as they apply to evaluating a unit.
Decision-Making/ Problem Solving	3	Analyze the decision-making process. Analyze the principles and techniques of effective decision-making. Analyze the role and effectiveness of a unit staff. Analyze the problem solving process as
Senior-Subordinate Relations	1	Analyze the methods of seeking and utilizing advice others, how to establish and maintain proper senior-subordinate relationships.
Professional Ethics	2	Analyze the differences between an ideal and operative code of ethics.
Equal Opportunity	2	Analyze attitudes of discrimination against sex, race, and religion.
Counseling	4	Identify methods of obtaining maximum performance through motivation and proper counseling. Identify methods of planning, conducting and terminating a counseling session.
Leadership Styles	2	Analyze the leader group situation well enough to determine the leadership style to fit the situation.
Human Behavior	4	Identify methods of motivating and controlling the behavior of subordinates. Analyze the individuals needs, personality, values, and how to integrate the man into the unit. Analyze methods of motivating men to produce maximum performance.

SUBJECT	HOURS	SCOPE
Tasks of a Manager	3	Identify the seven tasks of a manager and discuss the aspects to consider when performing each task.
Functions of Management	3	Identify the five management functions and be able to discuss the aspects which must be considered in applying these five functions.
Method Improvement Techniques I	3	Analyze the objectives and goals of the MAPTOE Program. Analyze a completed work distribution chart. Prepare and analyze a flow process chart, analyze a completed procedure chart.
Method Improvement Techniques II	3	Prepare and analyze a layout study. Analyze and discuss work measurement. Analyze the elements of quality control contained in the MAPTOE Program. Analyze and discuss the supervisors handbook.
TOTAL	38	

REPORT OF

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER BASIC GROUP

GROUP

1. **PURPOSE**: The purpose of the BNCOES course is to prepare enlisted men in grades E4 and E5 to perform duties as noncommissioned officers in grades E5, E6 and E7.

2. **REPRESENTATION IN BNCOES COMMITTEE BY SCHOOL**: The following schools were represented in the BNCOES committee:

    a. U.S. Army Field Artillery School

    b. U.S. Army Intelligence School

    c. 82d Abn Div Leadership School

    d. U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance

    e. U.S. Army Southeastern Signal School

    f. U.S. Army Aviation School

    g. U.S. Army Military Police School

    h. U.S. Army Infantry School

3. **APPROACH FOR DEVELOPMENT OF BNCOES POI**:

    a. General: The POI was developed with several basic considerations. First, the BNCOES course represents the first formal instruction that the student receives after being identified as a potential leader. While the course must be progressive, built upon what the student has previously received in AIT, some subjects should be presented again because the student will look at it from a different light, the viewpoint of the leader. Ideally, the instruction should be given in small groups and should be practical and oriented to student participation. Emphasis should be on student involvement during instruction and student performance during examinations.

    b. Management as a part of leadership: Every leader in the chain of command is also a manager. In the case of NCO grades E5, E6 and E7, these leaders normally have relatively little resources to manage other than men. Therefore, the basic course instruction should be leadership oriented but a minimum amount of management instruction should be included to prepare him for the higher rank.

    c. Approach: The general approach was as follows. Initially, as a point of departure, the committee used the training objectives that were listed in the model POI developed by USAIS in 1972. The action element of each objective was scrutinized to determine validity. The conditions and standards of each objective were considered to be a matter for the systems engineering effort and was left to the option of the respective service school. After this first step was underway, the general consensus of the committee was that the 1972 model POI was lacking emphasis in the professional heritage and self-development aspects of the noncommissioned officer. The committee then further divided into four sub-groups consisting of four and five man teams. The goal of each team was to develop a model POI by modifying the 1972 model. Later, the sub-groups of the committee reconsolidated and meshed their conclusions.

4. **DISCUSSION AND RATIONALE:** As was previously indicated, the BNCOES course being the first formal course to which the newly identified leader is exposed, a firm foundation of professionalism must be instilled. Additional POI time is necessary to allow instruction in subjects such as Professionalism, American Heritage, Military Heritage, Enlisted Evaluation System, Personal Affairs and Personal Development. Instruction in management subjects should be expanded to cover the basic fundamentals of management techniques. Doctrine found in DA Pam 5-2 is considered adequate in this regard. Leadership aspects of race relations and drug abuse are problems that every leader must face, therefore, the consensus of the committee was that these subjects should be presented in a situational context and should be integrated into problems the leader will face. As a result, the committee recommended that race relations and drug abuse subjects be presented in classes discussing heritage, professionalism, and problems of leadership, rather than be presented as separate blocks of instruction. However, CONARC regulations dictate otherwise. While Automatic Data Processing was not discussed, CONARC Reg 350-3 lists ADP as a selected subject, and as a result of a recommendation previously staffed at USAIS, this subject was added to the committee recommendation.

5. **COURSE RECOMMENDATIONS:**

SUBJECT	HOURS	SCOPE
Professionalism	2	Definition of military ethics, situational ethics, standards of conduct. Identify source documents for military ethics.
American Heritage	2	Discussion of the American melting pot, role of minorities in building America, the Constitution, Bill of Rights, the three branches of Government, the flow of authority from the President and Congress to the Army NCO.
Military Heritage	2	A presentation of the history of the Army, Branch and the unit.
Fundamentals of Leadership and Management	3	Definition of the concept, elements, principles, traits of leadership. Discussion of the interface between Command, Leadership, Management and Decision-Making. Discussion of the Functions of Management and the tasks of a manager.
Responsibilities of the Leader	1	Discussion of the basic responsibilities of a leader, the informal contract, the potential conflict between the mission and the men.
Leadership Styles	1	A presentation of the various styles of leadership ranging from authoritarian to persuasive. Should be related to successful, well known leaders. Discussion of how the small unit leader must cope with each style for best impact and results within the unit.
Effective Listening	1	To introduce to the BNCOES student the 10 common faults in listening habits and how to overcome them. (Nichols Tape)
Communications in Leading	4	Vertical and lateral communications, its impact on leadership success, barriers, filters, distortion, perception, interpretation as pertains to inter-personal communications. A discussion of the roots of human needs and values.

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SUBJECT	HOURS	SCOPE
Counseling	4	Definition of counseling and coaching. Reasons for a counseling program. Proper techniques of counseling subordinates w/personal or performance problems. How to critique performance. The principles used in planning and conducting a counseling session. The military and civilian agencies that can assist in solving personal problems. Role playing exercise.
The Problem Solving Process	4	Introduction and discussion of the problem solving process. A series of practical exercises applying the problem solving process.
Senior-Subordinate Relationships	4	Discussion of factors involved in establishing an effective two-way communication between seniors and subordinates. Benefits which result from such a relationship. Individual responsibilities in forming an effective senior-subordinate relationship. A panel of officers and a panel of Sr NCOs recommended.
Problems in Small Unit Leadership (Garrison)	4	A practical exercise consisting of a series of realistic leadership problems a leader would face in garrison. This class would serve to reinforce all previous instruction in this POI.
Problems in Small Unit Leadership (Combat)	2	Same as above, with addition of stress and adjustment in combat.
Job Improvement (MAPTOE)	4	How to improve any job. Illustration and explanation of the basic tools for job improvement, i.e., work distribution chart, flow process chart, procedures chart, layout chart, work measurement and quality assurance.
Role of the Inspector General	1	Explanation of the role of the Inspector General. Discussion of the responsibility of the IG vs the responsibilities of the chain of command. (It is recommended that a representative of the installation IG office present this instruction.)
Enlisted Evaluation System		Presentation of the film "EES, the Key to your Future." A discussion of how to maintain the integrity of the EES and how it affects career development.
Personal Affairs	2	To provide the BNCOES student with basic information on wills, insurance, personal finance, etc. Such information will enable him to keep his own affairs in order and will assist him in counseling his subordinates.
Personal Development	2	Discussion of educational and development opportunities in the military community. Identification of agencies available such as: USAFI, Service Schools, Education Center, Correspondence Courses, and Learning Centers. Generally, demonstrate to the NCO how he can better himself.

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SUBJECT	HOURS	SCOPE
Automatic Data Processing	10	To teach the fundamentals of ADP, so that the student will be able to communicate with a computer through an on-line imput device, be familiar with common punched card machines, be able to use a computer output microfilm display device, prepare input and use output of TOS, be familiar with the concept and application of TOS, TACFIRE and CS_3 systems.
Leader's Reaction Course	8	Tasks designed to provide a vehicle in which the student can apply leadership principles and the problem solving process, thereby providing the instructor and the student with a basis for identifying weak areas in his leadership ability.
Evaluation and Feedback	8	At the direction of the service school.
TOTAL HOURS	71	

SEMINAR
INSTRUCTIONS

APPENDIX A

ADMINISTRATIVE

All work during the seminar/workshop was conducted in Building 4. Classrooms were designated in the schedule.

Classroom 50 was the message and control center. Autovon calls were made, messages taken, and/or other necessary requirements accomplished.

Classroom 52 was the lounge area for rest and relaxation. An officer, NCO, and secretary were on duty to assist.

APPENDIX B

LEADERSHIP SEMINAR/WORKSHOP

SOCIAL FUNCTIONS

MONDAY - 14 May

COCKTAILS - 1700-1830
Benning Room Fort Benning Officers Open Mess
(Duty Uniform)

SPECIAL PRESENTATION: INFANTRY CHORUS

FRIDAY - 18 May

LUNCHEON - 1130-1300
Supper Club - Adjacent to the
Fort Benning Officers Open Mess
(Duty Uniform)

APPENDIX C

1st Day, 14 May 1973

PURPOSE: To consider the future requirements of Army leadership.

SUBJECT	SPEAKER/LEADER	TIME	REMARKS
Welcome	MG Thomas M. Tarpley	0800	Clrm 6
Purpose of Seminar	BG William R. Richardson	0835	
Approach to Seminar/Workshop	COL J. J. Walsh/LTC N. C. Vail	0840	
ADDRESS: "The Direction of Army Leadership in the 1970's"	BG Robert B. Gard Director of Human Resources Development, DCSPER, Washington, D. C.	0900	Clrm 6
Question/Answer Session			
BREAK		1020	
ADDRESS: "Discipline, Commitment, and Leadership"	COL Robert L. Rollier Commander, 3d Brigade Fort Leonard Wood, MO	1040	Clrm 6
LUNCH BREAK		1200	
ADDRESS: "Training to Lead at Small Unit Level"	COL Earl G. Peck Air Force Representative	1330	Clrm 6
PANEL:	CMDR E. Fenn Schrader Navy Representative		(Break 1500)
	CPT Paul K. Van Riper Marine Representative		
Cocktail Party The Benning Room, FBOOM		1700	Duty Uniform

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2d Day, 15 May 1973

PURPOSE: To consider the future requirements of Army leadership.

SUBJECT	SPEAKER/LEADER	TIME	REMARKS
Report of Previous Seminar	LTC Nathan C. Vail	0800	Clrm 6
ADDRESS: "Army War College Study"	Donald Penner, Ph D, LTC Dandridge Malone Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA	0815	Clrm 6
Question/Answer Session			
BREAK		0950	
ADDRESS: "Human Dimensions of Leadership"	T. O. Jacobs, Ph D. HumRRO Fort Benning, GA	1010	Clrm 6
	MAJ Gerald Weigand Comd & Ldrshp Com USAIS		
Question/Answer Session			
LUNCH BREAK		1200	
ADDRESS: "Continuing Education for Instructors:	Arthur Sweney, Ph D. Dir, Human Appraisal and Communications Research Wichita, KS	1300	Clrm 6
Question/Answer Session			
BREAK		1510	
*ADDRESS: "Practical Educational Techniques in Teaching POI's" (Methods to Move the Message)	LTC Billy R. Rutherford Director, Department of Educational Technology USAIS	1530	Clrm 6
Question/Answer Session			

*Tour of facility.

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3d Day, 16 May 1973

PURPOSE: To exchange ideas and information relevant to Army leadership/management programs of instruction.

SUBJECT	SPEAKER/LEADER	TIME	REMARKS
ADDRESS: "The Professional Officer as Leader/Manager"	COL Guinn Unger Dir, Management Review and Analysis office, Comptroller of the Army, Washington, D.C.	0800	Clrm 6
BREAK		0910	
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: "Grass Roots Leadership"	LTG Melvin Zais Commander, Third Army Atlanta, GA	0930	Clrm 6
BREAK		1050	
ADDRESS: "Four Schools of Management"	MAJ Forrest V. Graves Comd and Ldrshp Com USAIS	1110	Clrm 6
LUNCH BREAK		1200	
PANEL: "Pulling Leadership/Management Programs of Instruction Together"	Representatives: USAAGS USAQMS USATSCH USACGSC USACGSC USAWC USAIS	1300	Clrm 6
"Management/Leadership Instruction"	Small Group Discussions	1430	Clrms 51, 53, 54, and 6
"Management/Leadership Instruction," night work sessions for preparation of small group reports (only if necessary)		TBA	NOTE: Yellow Group - Clrm 51 Blue Group - Clrm 53 Green Group - Clrm 54 Red Group - Clrm 6 Groups will remain the same throughout seminar.

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4th Day, 17 May 1973

PURPOSE: To examine current leadership doctrine and the direction of Army leadership. To revise model leadership programs of instruction accordingly.

SUBJECT	SPEAKER/LEADER	TIME	REMARKS
"Management/Leadership Instruction" (Small Group Reports)	LTC Nathan C. Vail	0800	Clrm 6
"Refining the Concept of Army Leadership"	LTC Nathan C. Vail	0910	Clrm 6
"Analysis of Programs of Instruction (Four Divisions: IOAC, IOBC, BNCOES, ANCOES)"	Small Group Discussions	0930	Clrms 51, 53, 54, 6 (Breaks as needed)
Night work sessions for preparation of small group reports, if necessary	Group Leaders	TBA	Clrm TBA

5th Day, 18 May 1973

PURPOSE: To examine current leadership doctrine and direction of Army leadership. To revise model leadership programs of instruction accordingly.

SUBJECT	SPEAKER/LEADER	TIME	REMARKS
"Small Group Reports on Programs of Instruction"	LTC Nathan C. Vail Group Leaders	0800	Clrm 6 (Break 1000)
LUNCHEON (Supper Club) (Located adjacent to FBOOM)		1130	
"Critique of Seminar and Closing Statement"	COL John J. Walsh, Jr. Dir, Ldrshp Dept, USAIS	1300	

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APPENDIX D

LEADERSHIP SEMINAR/WORKSHOP
TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

BG Gard, Robert G.

COL Peck, Earl G. (USAF)

COL Rollier, Robert L.

COL Smithers, Samuel W., Jr.

DR Penner, Donald D.

DR Sweney, Arthur B.

Capt Auel, Carl A. (USN)

LTC Barnes, Norman

Mr. West, Charles M.

LTC Bettinger, Frank E.

Cdr Shrader, E. Fenn (USN)

LTC Boone, Howard

LTC Drisko, Melville

Cdr Ewy, H. W. (USN)

LTC Hagan, Jerome D.

LTC Malone, Dandridge M.

LTC Montgomery, Ross

CH (LTC) Moss, Ira

LTC Relly, Frank A.

LTC Riley, Robert

LTC Ruppe, Jake M.

LTC Semerjian, Sarkis

LTC Simpson, John A.

LTC Stanford, Thomas L., Jr.

LTC Zabcik, Franklin

CH (MAJ) Andrews, Earl

MAJ Bair, Arthur N.

MAJ Beatty, Norman

MAJ Crawford, George S.

MAJ Forestiere, Frank

MAJ Freitag, Merle

MAJ Hartwell, Edward C.

MAJ Jones, Lavert

MAJ Lacey, William

MAJ McFadden, James M.

Maj Morey, William S. (USAF)

MAJ O'Neil, James W.

MAJ Powell, Richard W.

MAJ Regel, Thomas J.

CH (MAJ) Scott, John

CPT Bruton, Robert W.

CPT Cameron, Tom O.

CPT Corr, William S.

CPT Dennis, Ronald L.

CPT Govekar, Paul L.

CPT Hagerty, Michael T.

CPT Hall, Ronald A.

CPT Hesp, Dave

CPT Holley, Donna (WAC)

CPT Horhaly, Jan

CPT Kotz, John S.

CPT Kovacs, Stephen Z.

CPT Leonard, Will

CPT Miller, James E.

CPT Mineweaser, Lewis B.

CPT Russell, James P.

CPT Snyder, Cecil M., III

CPT Thorton, Victor A.

Capt Van Riper, Paul K. (USMC)

LT Duva, Kenneth J.

SFC Benjamin, Merle

SFC Axelson, Walter E., Jr.

SFC Evaro, Esquiel

SFC Farley, James R.

SFC Hightower, Hoarce

SFC Mossa, Antonio

Mr. DeLaune, Richard K.

Mr. Willeman, Louis P.

BIOGRAPHIES OF GUEST SPEAKER

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MELVIN ZAIS
MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS M. TARPLEY
BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM R. RICHARDSON
BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT G. GARD
COLONEL EARL G. PECK, USAF
COLONEL JOHN J. WALSH, JR.
COLONEL ROBERT F. ROLLIER
COLONEL GUINN UNGER
COLONEL BILLY E. RUTHERFORD
LIEUTENANT COLONEL NATHAN C. VAIL
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DANDRIDGE MALONE
COMMANDER E. FENN SCHRADER, USN
MAJOR FORREST V. GRAVES
MAJOR GERALD L. WEIGAND
CAPTAIN PAUL K. VAN RIPER, USMC
T. O. JACOBS, Ph. D.
A. B. SWENEY, Ph. D.
DONALD PENNER, Ph. D.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MELVIN ZAIS
UNITED STATES ARMY

Lieutenant General Melvin Zais entered the Army in 1937 upon graduation from the University of New Hampshire with a BA degree in Political Science and a commission in the United States Army Reserve as a Second Lieutenant of Infantry. His initial tour of active duty was for one year, under the provisions of the Thomason Act. He remained close to the military, however, after his return to civilian life, serving as a Professor of Military Tactics at Tennessee Military Institute, Sweetwater, Tennessee.

In 1940, he was recalled to active duty and assigned to the staff and faculty of the United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. While there, he volunteered for assignment to the 501st Parachute Infantry Battalion, the original paratroop battalion in the Army. His service with this battalion at Fort Benning, and later in Panama, began his close relationship with airborne units that has characterized his career.

In 1943, following graduation from the shortened, wartime course at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, General Zais was selected as a Major to command the 3d Battalion, 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment. He led this battalion from cadre training at Camp McKall, North Carolina to combat in Italy and France, including a night parachute assault into southern France. He then served as Regimental Executive Officer during combat in Belgium and Germany, remaining in this position after the termination of hostilities. He assumed command of the Regiment at Fort Bragg and commanded the unit until its inactivation.

His postwar service emphasized command and troop duty, high level staff, and schooling. He served as G1 and G3 of the 82d Airborne Division; attended the Regular Course at the Command and General Staff College and was selected to remain at Leavenworth for three years as an instructor; served as an advisor to a Turkish brigade and accompanied that unit to Korea; commanded the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment; and was selected as Chief of Staff, 101st Airborne Division, and subsequently, to command the 187th Airborne Infantry Battle Group at Fort Campbell, Kentucky during the initial tests of the Pentomic concept.

General Zais' staff experience ranges from combat units to the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the Pentagon. He served in the G3 section, Headquarters, Department of the Army from 1955-1956; as the deputy G1 of the U.S. Army Europe in 1958-1959; and, for the next three years, as G3 of Seventh Army in Germany. Upon his return to the United States, he served with both the J3 and J5 staff elements of the United States Strike Command until his promotion to Brigadier General on 1 June 1964.

With this promotion, General Zais was assigned as the Director of Enlisted Personnel, Office of Personnel Operations, Department of the Army. Subsequently, he served in Vietnam as the Deputy Commanding General, 1st Field Force, and as an Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Infantry Division. After returning from Vietnam in July 1966, General Zais served as the Director for Individual Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters Department of the Army. On 1 May 1967, he was promoted to Major General and in July 1968 was reassigned to Vietnam where he assumed command of the 101st Airborne Division--the famous "Screaming Eagles." In June 1969 he was promoted to Lieutenant General and assigned as the Commanding General XXIV Corps, in Military Region I. Following this two year combat tour, General Zais was assigned in August 1970 to the Joint Staff, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the Director for Operations (J3).

General Zais is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, the Armed Forces Staff College, the National War College and the Harvard Business School's Advanced Management Program. He has been awarded an honorary Doctor of Science degree from the University of New Hampshire. His military decorations include the award of the Distinguished Service Medal on four occasions; the Silver Star twice; the Legion of Merit three times; the Distinguished Flying Cross twice; the Bronze Star Medal; the Joint Service Commendation Medal; the Army Commendation Medal twice; the Purple Heart; and numerous foreign awards and honors. He has commanded a battalion, a division, and a corps in combat; as well as three regiments, and an Army in peacetime. Paratrooper, Combat Infantryman, and Army Aviator, Lieutenant General Zais' career has been centered on troop duty repetitive command assignments, and high level personnel and operations staff duty.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS McKEE TARPLEY
UNITED STATES ARMY

Thomas M. Tarpley was born in Quincy, Illinois, on 4 July 1922. After attending Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, he entered the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, in July 1941. He graduated on 6 June 1944 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Infantry.

General Tarpley deployed with the 66th Infantry Division to Europe in November 1944 and served as a platoon leader with that until until October 1945. During this period he was awarded his first Bronze Star and Combat Infantryman Badge. From October 1945 to July 1947 he served with the Field Information Agency (Technical), SHAEF, first as a planning officer and later as British Liaison Officer.

Upon his return to the United States, General Tarpley served as a company commander at Fort Riley, Kansas, from July 1947 to April 1949 and as Aide de Camp to the 5th Army Commander in Chicago until August 1950. He then attended the Infantry Officer's Advanced Course, Fort Benning, Georgia and in May 1951 deployed to Turkey as a member of the first divisional advisory team sent to that country. Later he became an advisor in tactics at the Turkish Infantry School and for the last year served as Special Assistant to the Chief of the Military Mission to Turkey.

General Tarpley returned to the U.S. in June 1953 to attend the Regular Course at the Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Following graduation in June 1954, he was assigned as an instructor at that institution for the next three years.

From September 1957 to November 1958 he served as the S3 and Executive Officer in the 2d Battle Group, 3d Infantry (Old Guard) in Korea.

The next three and a half years were spent in the Pentagon, first as a staff officer in the Infantry Branch, Office of Personnel Operations, and later as a planning officer in the Office, Chief of Legislative Liaison. General Tarpley left Washington, D.C., in August 1962 to attend the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Upon his graduation in 1963, General Tarpley was assigned to the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. From August 1963 until August 1965 he commanded the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry and then became the division G1 until March 1966.

General Tarpley next went to Vietnam and commanded the 2d Brigade 25th Infantry Division, until December 1966. He then served as G3, II Field Force, Vietnam until his return to the U.S. in May 1967. During his service in Vietnam he was awarded two Legions of Merit, his second Bronze Star, a star for the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Air Medal with Four Oak Clusters, and two Gallantry Crosses with Gold Star from the Republic of Vietnam.

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In July 1967, General Tarpley returned to the Pentagon and served a year as a divsion chief in the Directorate of Individual Training, five months as chairman of a special study group for the Chief of Staff, four months as the Executive to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and finally as Deputy Secretary of the General Staff for Coordination and Reports.

On 1 October 1969, he was promoted to Brigadier General and assigned as Deputy Commanding General, Fort Lewis, Washington on 10 November 1969.

General Tarpley finished Rotary Wing training at Fort Lewis in January 1970 and completed instrument qualification in December 1970.

On 1 February 1971, General Tarpley assumed command of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in northern MR1, Vietnam. He was promoted to temporary Major General on 1 August 1971 with a date of rank of 1 July 1967.

General Tarpley relinquished command of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) on 6 April 1972 and was assigned as Commanding General Delta Regional Assistance Command and Senior Advisor MR4 the same day.

On 13 January 1973 he relinquished command of Delta Regional Assistance Command and Senior Advisor MR4 to assume duties as Command, Fort Benning, Georgia. He assumed command of Fort Benning on 16 February 1973.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM R. RICHARDSON

UNITED STATES ARMY

William Rowland Richardson was born in Taichow, China, on March 25, 1929. He graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, in 1951, and upon completion of training at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, in December 1951, he was assigned to duty with the 24th Infantry Division in Japan.

General Richarson's combat service began in August 1952, when he joined the 32d Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, in Korea. He returned to Fort Benning, in 1953 as an instructor with the Weapons Department. He remained at that post until April 1957, attending the Infantry Officers Advanced Course his last year.

He served as mortar battery commander and battle group S3 with the 2d Battle Group, 28th Infantry, at Fort Riley, Kansas, from May 1957 through July 1958, at which time he was assigned as Assistant G3, 1st Infantry Division.

In August of 1959, General Richardson attended the Canadian Army Staff College in Kingston, Ontario, and in July 1961, he was assigned to the Department of Tactics, United States Military Academy, West Point, where for three years he served as an instructor in Physical Education, Assistant S1 and S1.

He attended the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia, from August 1964 until March 1965, at which time he joined Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea as plans officer in the Plans Division, G3 Section.

Returning to the United States in February 1966, General Richardson activated the 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry of the 9th Infantry Division, at Fort Riley, Kansas. He deployed with that unit to the Republic of Vietnam in December 1966 and retained command of the battalion until April 1967, at which time he was assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, for the 9th Infantry Division in RVN.

Upon return to the United States, he attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., from August 1967 to June 1968. He was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army from August 1968 until June 1970, where he served in the Force Planning Analysis Directorate and then as the Executive to the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. He returned to RVN in July 1970 and assumed command of the 198th Infantry Brigade, American Division. In April 1971, he was assigned as Chief of Staff, 23d Infantry Division (American), in RVN.

In December 1971, General Richardson became Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Training Center Engineer and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

He was named Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning in July 1972.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT G. GARD, JR.

UNITED STATES ARMY

Robert G. Gard, Jr., was born at West Point, New York, on 28 January 1928. He graduated from Texas Military Institute, San Antonio, Texas, in 1945, and was awarded an Honor Military School appointment to West Point in 1946. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1950, and was commissioned a second lieutenant of Field Artillery.

From 1950 until 1952, he was assigned to the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he performed battery and battalion staff duties in the 376th Airborne Field Artillery Battalion, and was promoted to First Lieutenant. He served as Aide de Camp to the Commanding General for four months prior to his assignment to Korea.

In 1953, in Korea, he commanded a firing battery of the 145th Field Artillery Battalion in combat, and received his promotion to Captain. After the truce, he served on the staff of X Corps Artillery until his return to the United States in the spring of 1954. Following a transition air defense course at Fort Bliss, Texas, he commanded a firing battery of the 734th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion near Chicago, Illinois, from 1954 to 1955.

He attended Harvard University from 1955 to 1957, when he joined the faculty of the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. N.Y. He was an Instructor in Economics and Assistant Professor of National Security Policy, an international politics course which he instituted for advanced seniors. He was promoted to Major in 1958. At the request of the Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration, he returned to Harvard University for academic year 1960-61, to participate in the Science and Public Policy Program. He completed his Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government, and his doctral dissertation was awarded the Charles Sumner Prize. He attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1961-62.

From 1962 to 1965, he served in U.S. Army Europe. For the first year he was a War Plans Staff Officer in the Operations Division of Headquarters, USAREUR. Following his promotion to Lieutenant Colonel in 1963, he commanded the 5th Battalion (Airborne) 81st Field Artillery, and then served on the staff of the 8th Infantry Division. He returned to the United States and attended the National War College in Washington, D. C., from 1965-66.

He joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense in Washington, D. C., in the summer of 1966. He served initially as a Staff Officer on the Policy Planning Staff in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, and then as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary. From December 1966 until his departure for Vietnam in August 1968, he was Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. He was promoted to Colonel in 1968.

He commanded the 9th Infantry Division Artillery in Vietnam from August 1968 until he was appointed Division Chief of Staff in May 1969. Following his return to the United States in August 1969, he served on the Department of the Army Staff as Chief of the Program Development Division, Manpower and Forces Directorate, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, until September 1969.

He was Army Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City during academic year 1970-71.

In June 1971, he was promoted to Brigaider General and assigned as Director of Discipline and Drug Policies, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army. Director of Human Resources Development as of 15 August 1972.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

COLONEL EARL G. PECK

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Colonel Earl G. Peck has a distinguished record as a professional. He is gifted in many areas. In 1950 he was a distinguished graduate in the Air Force Flying School. During the next several years, he held a variety of assignments including pilot and instructor pilot duty, Chief of the Special Operations Branch, MACV, Saigon. Additionally, he has been Base Commander of the 3902 Air Base Wing at Offett Air Force Base, Nebraska, which has been the headquarters for SAC.

Colonel Peck graduated from the University of Texas with a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science. He was a member of the Phi Beta Kappa fraternity. He received his Masters degree in Business Administration from George Washington University. He completed both the Squadron Officer School and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces as a distinguished graduate.

His awards include the Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters. He is a rated command pilot.

He is currently assigned as Commandant of the Squadron Officers School, Maxwell Air Force Base. Recently Colonel Peck was selected to the grade of Brigadier General.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

COLONEL JOHN J. WALSH, JR.

UNITED STATES ARMY

Colonel John J. Walsh, Jr., enlisted in the Army in 1947 and attended Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Georgia. His first duty assignment was Assistant Adjutant to the 188th Airborne Infantry Regiment, Japan. He has held a variety of assignments in his 26 years of service including company commander, battalion commander, and brigade commander. Additionally, he has served at senior level staff positions and Chief of Staff, Fort Stewart, Hunter AFB.

Colonel Walsh completed Command and General Staff College, Air Force Staff College, and the Naval War College. He is a graduate of the Rotary Wing Flight School. He attended Virginia Polytechnic Institute, received a Bachelor of Science degree from University of Georgia in education, a Master of Arts degree in Personnel Administration and a Master of Science degree in Industrial Affairs from George Washington University, Washington, D. C.

His awards include the Silver Star and Legion of Merit with three Oak Leaf Clusters.

Colonel Walsh is currently assigned as Director of the Leadership Department, United States Army Infantry School.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

COLONEL ROBERT L. ROLLIER

UNITED STATES ARMY

Colonel Robert L. Rollier has a total of 29 years of service--the first eight as an enlisted man. He received a direct commission as an infantry second lieutenant in 1949 and was integrated in the Regular Army in 1959.

He commanded five companies, a battalion, and brigade. He has served as the S3 or G3 at every level through Corps and as an operations officer at Field Army and Department of the Army level. He has been assigned to duty with the 1st, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 3d and 5th Mechanized Infantry Divisions, the Infantry School, XXIV Army Corps, Eighth U.S. Army, and in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and also in the Directorate of Military Support at Department of the Army. His schooling includes the University of Buffalo, University of Maryland (BS in Government), the Infantry Officer Career Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.

Colonel Rollier has seen combat in a total of 11 major campaigns that encompass World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. His decorations include the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit with OLC, Bronze Star with "V" and two OLC, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal, Army Commendation Medal with two OLC, Purple Heart with two OLC, the Good Conduct Medal, Combat Infantry Badge with star, senior parachutist badge, Gallantry Cross with silver star and palm, ARVN Distinguished Service Order Second Class, RVN Armed Forces Honor Medal First Class, RVN Staff Service Honor Medal, and numerous campaign and service medals from World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Colonel Rollier is currently assigned as Commander, Third Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

COLONEL GUINN E. UNGER

UNITED STATES ARMY

Colonel Unger first served in the Army as an airborne infantryman from 1943-1946 and participated in one combat jump. After graduating from Gettysburg College in 1949, he reentered the Army as a Regular Army Second Lieutenant. He has served in infantry assignments from platoon leader through brigade commander. He has a Masters in Business Administration from Syracuse University and has attended every service school available to an infantry officer from the Infantry Basic Course through the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Colonel Unger's awards and decorations include: Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal (2 awards), the Air Medal (10 awards), and the Army Commendation Medal (4 awards). In addition, he has been awarded the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Bronze Star and Vietnam Medal of Honor, First Class. He wears the Combat Infantry Badge with Star, the first award being as an enlisted man and the second as an officer.

Colonel Unger is currently serving as the Director of Management, Review and Analysis, Office of the Comptroller of the Army.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

COLONEL BILLY E. RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES ARMY

Colonel Billy Rutherford enlisted in the Army in August 1949 and was commissioned in 1952. His assignments have taken him throughout the world serving in various positions of leadership--platoon leader, company commander, battalion commander, staff positions, including Department of the Army level, and Director of Leadership Department, U.S. Army Infantry School.

Colonel Billy Rutherford is an OCS graduate, jumpmaster qualified, and a graduate from the Army Flight Training program. He has completed Command and General Staff College Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and attended the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He received his Bachelor of Science degree from St. Benedicts College in 1968 and his Master of Science degree from Shippensburg State College in 1971.

His many awards include the Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster and Distinguished Flying Cross.

He is currently serving in a new and creative assignment as Director of the Directorate of Educational Technology, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

LIEUTENANT COLONEL NATHAN C. VAIL

UNITED STATES ARMY

Lieutenant Colonel Nathan C. Vail enlisted in the active duty Army in 1953. He attended Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Georgia, and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in 1955. Since then he has served as platoon leader, company commander, and battalion commander. Additionally, he has served in staff assignments at battalion, regiment, division, corp, and DA. He has also served as ADC/Admin Asst at the joint staff level.

Lieutenant Colonel Vail completed the IOAC course, attended the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Air War College. He is a senior parachutist. His decorations include the Silver Star and Legion of Merit.

He has a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Omaha and a Master of Arts degree in Political Science from Auburn University.

Currently, Lieutenant Colonel Vail is Chairman of the Command and Leadership Committee, Leadership Department, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DANDRIGE M. MALONE

UNITED STATES ARMY

Lieutenant Colonel Dandrige M. Malone (known to many as "Mike") has had a unique career. He entered the Army in 1954 as a platoon leader in the 508th Airborne RCT, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He has served in positions of leadership which include company commander, battalion commander, Commandant of the NCO Academy, 6th Infantry Regiment, Berlin, Germany, and staff assignments from battalion to DA. Additionally, he has served one tour at West Point as instructor in the area of military psychology and leadership.

Related to his training and expertise, Lieutenant Colonel Malone has successfully completed ranger training and instructed in this area for several years. He has authored at least five articles for the Infantry, Army, and Parameters magazines. He is special forces qualified and a parachutist.

Lieutenant Colonel Malone is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Air Force Staff College, and the Army War College. He is a graduate of Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee (BA in Psychology) and holds a Master of Science Degree in Social Psychology from Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana.

Currently, Lieutenant Colonel Malone is assigned as Educational Research Analyst, Department of Research and Studies, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

COMMANDER E. FENN SCHRADER

UNITED STATES NAVY

Commander E. Fenn Schrader has a distinguished career in the United States Navy.

He has been the executive officer of the Fleet Ballistic Submarine Center at Charleston, South Carolina. He is a Polaris Poseidon Weapon Systems officer and has been commanding officer of a conventional attack submarine.

He is a graduate of Dartmouth College and holds two masters degrees, one in Personnel Administration and the other in Business Administration. Commander Schrader is directly responsible for the Navy's supervisory skilled training of Chief Petty Officers, as well as similar training programs for officers. These two pilot courses are seven day intensive mid-management development courses which the Navy feels has proven highly successful at the Fleet Ballistic Missile Training Center.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

MAJOR FORREST V. GRAVES

UNITED STATES ARMY

Major Forrest V. Graves was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army in 1960. His assignments have included platoon leader, company commander, aide-de-camp, Chief of Protocol Division at Fort Benning, Georgia, and other positions of responsibility.

Major Graves entered the Army through the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. He has successfully completed training in airborne, ranger, and IOAC at Fort Benning, Georgia. He is a master parachutist, special forces qualified, and holds both the Expert Infantryman and Combat Infantryman Badges.

He received his Master of Business Administration from Tulane University. His awards include the Legion of Merit, Soldier's Medal, and Bronze Star.

Currently, Major Graves is the Chief of Management Subcommittee, Command and Leadership Committee, Leadership Department, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

MAJOR GERALD L. WEIGAND

UNITED STATES ARMY

Major Gerald L. Weigand entered active duty as a rifle platoon leader assigned to the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, Augsburg, Germany. His variety of assignments have taken him around the world serving as rifle and Heavy Mortar Platoon Leader, Rifle & Mechanized company commander, various battalion staff positions, tactics instructor at the USASESS, Electronic Combat Detach Advisor and SGS in I Corps.

Major Weigand is a distinguished military graduate from ROTC Conisius College with a Bachelor of Science degree in Sociology and Philosophy. He received his Master of Arts degree in Social Psychology from the University of Missouri.

His decorations include the Silver Star, Bronze Star for Valor with four Oak Leaf Clusters and RVN Cross of Gallantry with Palm. He has completed airborne and ranger training, IOAC and holds the Air Crewman's Badge, and Combat Infantryman Badge.

Currently, Major Weigand is a senior instructor in the Command and Leadership Committee, Leadership Department, U.S. Army Infantry School.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

CAPTAIN PAUL K. VAN RIPER

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Captain Van Riper has had combat experience as a platoon leader, and unit commander.

He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger and Airborne Schools at Fort Benning, Georgia. He has completed the Marine Officers Basic Course and the Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico, Virginia. His experience in training includes assignments as an instructor in tactics at the Marine Officer Basic School. Inclusive is his past assignment as instructor and member of the faculty at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Institute for military assistants, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Captain Paul K. Van Riper is a Major selectee and presently holds a sensitive assignment as a unit level and indivudal training specialist in the training and education branch of the G3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

Captain Van Riper is currently involved in the designing of courses of instruction and preparation of programs of instruction for the training of small unit leaders.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

DOCTOR T. O. JACOBS

Dr. Jacobs, Director, HumRRO Division No. 4, Columbus, Georgia, received the Ph. D. degree in Psychology from the University of Pittsburgh. He joined HumRRO in 1957. Prior to that time, he was employed by the American Institute of Research where he specialized in systems analysis, human engineering of equipment, and critical incident studies of various subject areas.

Since joining HumRRO, he has specialized in research administration, training system analysis, performance measurement, leadership and leadership training, and training development. He is presently responsible for research and administrative direction of Division No. 4 whose present research activities include studies of training, motivation, leadership, and both group and individual effectiveness. He recently completed a volume on leadership and exchange in formal organizations which is being used as a text book by the University of Maryland, University of Arkansas, and the University of Kentucky. It has also been adopted as a text by the U.S. Naval Academy and the Royal Roads Military College in Canada. He presented a paper based on this work to the NATO sponsored conference on "Leadership and Managment Appraisal" in Brussels, Belguim in the summer of 1971.

Prior to assuming the position of Director, Dr. Jacobs was principal investigator for a project that developed a leadership course for junior officers based on research findings that identified effective and ineffective leader actions and on leadership training methods of demonstrated effectiveness.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

ARTHUR BARCLAY SWENEY, Ph. D.

Arthur Barclay Sweney, Ph. D., is the Director for the Center for Human Appraisal and Communication Research, Wichita, Kansas. He has a vast experience in many areas and his accomplishments depict him as a creative genius.

Dr. Sweney received a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Illinois, a Masters of Science degree in Social Work from the University of Illinois, and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in psychology from the University of Houston.

Prior to beginning his academic career he served in World War II with the Army Chemical Warfare Service, Signal Corps, and Engineers. He has maintained various academic positions as research assistant, lecturer, research associate, associate professor, and professor. His fields of interest include electrical engineering, welfare programs, administration, psychology, and psychological testing. He has authored numerous articles, research papers, and textbooks.

He is currently a consultant for the United States Army in the area of leadership instruction.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

DONALD D. PENNER, Ph. D.

Donald D. Penner, Ph. D., is professor of Behavioral Science, Department of Research and Studies, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In a short career, he has held several responsible positions.

Dr. Penner received his Bachelor of Science degree, Master of Arts degree, and Doctor of Philosophy degree from Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana. His doctoral work was in the area of Social Psychology.

During 1956 through 1958, he served in the U.S. Navy with the USS Toledo (CA-133) and USS O'Brien (DD-725), Long Beach, California. His professional work has centered around universities as lecturer, assistant professor, and professor, and professor in psychology and statistics. Dr. Penner has a special interest in ADP. He has authored and co-authored numerous monographs, scientific and technical articles and papers.

He is currently working on the Army War College study, "Leadership for the 1970's."